Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Arkkitehti Aarne Ervin kaupunkisuunnittelu pääkaupunkiseudulla : Suomalaisen suurkaupungin kaavoitusta toisen maailmansodan jälkeen

The Modern City Planning of Architect Aarne Ervi in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area: The Planning of the Finnish Capital after the Second World War This study focuses on the city planning of architect Aarne Ervi (1910-1977) in the Helsinki metropolitan area, which includes the cities of Helsinki, Espoo, Kauniainen and Vantaa, from the 1940s to the end of the 1960s. Ervi succeeded in several major architectural competitions in Finland, acted as the main designer of the "New Town" of Tapiola and of the suburb of Vantaanpuisto in the metropolitan area, and worked as the first director of the city planning department of Helsinki from 1965-1969. This study belongs to the field of planning history in which the art historical study of architecture blends with the history of Finnish society. I examine architect Aarne Ervi and his city planning architecture through the concept of "modern". I link the theoretical literature of modernism in architecture and the modernization of society with historical documents and empirical archival research. I examine Ervi's professional career, the teamwork characteristic of his office, and the collegial community in which Ervi serves different vocational roles as an architect. The postwar development of planning legislation and of municipal and state planning organisations provides the necessary context for urban planning. I also discuss the municipal development of Espoo and Vantaa and the regionalization process that occured in Helsinki during the decades in question. The main results of this study relate to the collective and cooperative group nature of work in architectural design, to the introduction of an alternative approach to the question of modernism in Finnish architectural discourse, and to the post-war planning history of legislative and institutional organisations in Finland. Furthermore, the study includes new historical research about the city planning department of the city of Helsinki, the planning of Tapiola and Vantaanpuisto, and the operations of the main developers of these two suburban areas: the Asuntosäästäjät Society and the Asuntosäätiö Foundation.