Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.

Specificity revisited: The role of cross-investments

Previous analysis has shown that traders may opt for specific technologies with nojoint productivity advantage as a way to commit themselves to trading jointly, butonly when long-term contracting is infeasible. This paper proves that speciÞcity canalso be optimal (by relaxing the budget-balance constraint) in settings with long-termcontracting. Traders will opt for specificity when one trader makes a cross-investmentand either (1) this cross-investment has a direct externality on the other trader, (2) bothparties invest, or (3) private information is present. The specificity (e.g. from non-salvageable investments, specific assets and technologies, narrow business strategies,and exclusivity restrictions) is equally effective regardless of which trader's alternativetrade payoff is reduced. Specificity supports long-term contracts in a broad rangeof settings - both with and without renegotiation. The theory also offers a novelperspective on franchising and vertical integration.

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.

Are these classical business cycles?

The aim of this paper is to test formally the classical business cyclehypothesis, using data from industrialized countries for the timeperiod since 1960. The hypothesis is characterized by the view that the cyclical structure in GDP is concentrated in the investment series: fixed investment has typically a long cycle, while the cycle in inventory investment is shorter. To check the robustness of our results, we subject the data for 15 OECD countries to a variety of detrending techniques. While the hypothesis is not confirmed uniformly for all countries, there is a considerably high number for which the data display the predicted pattern. None of the countries shows a pattern which can be interpreted as a clear rejection of the classical hypothesis.

Location models in the public sector

The past four decades have witnessed an explosive growth in the field of networkbased facilitylocation modeling. This is not at all surprising since location policy is one of the mostprofitable areas of applied systems analysis in regional science and ample theoretical andapplied challenges are offered. Location-allocation models seek the location of facilitiesand/or services (e.g., schools, hospitals, and warehouses) so as to optimize one or severalobjectives generally related to the efficiency of the system or to the allocation of resources.This paper concerns the location of facilities or services in discrete space or networks, thatare related to the public sector, such as emergency services (ambulances, fire stations, andpolice units), school systems and postal facilities. The paper is structured as follows: first,we will focus on public facility location models that use some type of coverage criterion,with special emphasis in emergency services. The second section will examine models based onthe P-Median problem and some of the issues faced by planners when implementing thisformulation in real world locational decisions. Finally, the last section will examine newtrends in public sector facility location modeling.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Skill-biased technological change and the business cycle

Over the past two decades, technological progress in the United States hasbeen biased towards skilled labor. What does this imply for business cycles?We construct a quarterly skill premium from the CPS and use it to identifyskill-biased technology shocks in a VAR with long-run restrictions. Hours fallin response to skill-biased technology shocks, indicating that at least part of thetechnology-induced fall in total hours is due to a compositional shift in labordemand. Skill-biased technology shocks have no effect on the relative price ofinvestment, suggesting that capital and skill are not complementary in aggregateproduction.

Are agent-based simulations robust? The wholesale electricity trading case

Agent-based computational economics is becoming widely used in practice. This paperexplores the consistency of some of its standard techniques. We focus in particular on prevailingwholesale electricity trading simulation methods. We include different supply and demandrepresentations and propose the Experience-Weighted Attractions method to include severalbehavioural algorithms. We compare the results across assumptions and to economic theorypredictions. The match is good under best-response and reinforcement learning but not underfictitious play. The simulations perform well under flat and upward-slopping supply bidding,and also for plausible demand elasticity assumptions. Learning is influenced by the number ofbids per plant and the initial conditions. The overall conclusion is that agent-based simulationassumptions are far from innocuous. We link their performance to underlying features, andidentify those that are better suited to model wholesale electricity markets.

Competition amongst contests

This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players aggregate effort will award their entire prize budget to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the winner increases in the contests randomness. We also provide empirical evidence for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of differing ability.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Long term debt with hidden borrowing

We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive baking sector,that shares information about borrowers, and an alternative hidden lender. We highlight thatthe presence of the hidden lender restricts the contracts that can be obtained from the banking sector and that in equilibrium some borrowers obtain funds from both the banking sector and the (inefficient) hidden lender simultaneously. We further show that as the inefficiency of the hidden lender increases, total welfare decreases. By extending the model to examine a partially hidden lender, we further highlight the key role of information.

Managing Social-Business Tensions: A Review and Research Agenda for Social Enterprise

In a world filled with poverty, environmental degradation, and moral injustice, social enterprises offer a ray of hope. These organizations seek to achieve social missions through business ventures. Yet social missions and business ventures are associated with divergent goals, values, norms, and identities. Attending to them simultaneously creates tensions, competing demands, and ethical dilemmas. Effectively understanding social enterprises therefore depends on insight into the nature and management of these tensions. While existing research recognizes tensions between social missions and business ventures, we lack any systematic analysis. Our paper addresses this issue. We first categorize the types of tensions that arise between social missions and business ventures, emphasizing their prevalence and variety. We then explore how four different organizational theories offer insight into these tensions, and we develop an agenda for future research. We end by arguing that a focus on social-business tensions not only expands insight into social enterprises, but also provides an opportunity for research on social enterprises to inform traditional organizational theories. Taken together, our analysis of tensions in social enterprises integrates and seeks to energize research on this expanding phenomenon.

Application of the 2008 definitions for invasive fungal diseases to the trial comparing voriconazole versus amphotericin B for therapy of invasive aspergillosis: a collaborative study of the Mycoses Study Group (MSG 05) and the European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer Infectious Diseases Group.

BACKGROUND: Strict definition of invasive aspergillosis (IA) cases is required to allow precise conclusions about the efficacy of antifungal therapy. The Global Comparative Aspergillus Study (GCAS) compared voriconazole to amphotericin B (AmB) deoxycholate for the primary therapy of IA. Because predefined definitions used for this trial were substantially different from the consensus definitions proposed by the European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer/Mycoses Study Group in 2008, we recategorized the 379 episodes of the GCAS according to the later definitions. METHODS: The objectives were to assess the impact of the current definitions on the classification of the episodes and to provide comparative efficacy for probable/proven and possible IA in patients treated with either voriconazole or AmB. In addition to original data, we integrated the results of baseline galactomannan serum levels obtained from 249 (65.7%) frozen samples. The original response assessment was accepted unchanged. RESULTS: Recategorization allowed 59 proven, 178 probable, and 106 possible IA cases to be identified. A higher favorable 12-week response rate was obtained with voriconazole (54.7%) than with AmB (29.9%) (P < .0001). Survival was higher for voriconazole for mycologically documented (probable/proven) IA (70.2%) than with AmB (54.9%) (P = .010). Higher response rates were obtained in possible IA treated with voriconazole vs AmB with the same magnitude of difference (26.2%; 95% confidence interval [CI], 7.2%-45.3%) as in mycologically documented episodes (24.3%; 95% CI, 11.9%-36.7%), suggesting that possible cases are true IA. CONCLUSIONS: Recategorization resulted in a better identification of the episodes and confirmed the higher efficacy of voriconazole over AmB deoxycholate in mycologically documented IA.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Business cycles, unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.