Income ineqaulity from 1960-2012: a brief time-series history of capital and labour

This commentary examines two principal forms of inequality and their evolution since the 1960s: the division of national income between capital and labour, and the share of total income held by the top 1 per cent of earners. Trends are linked to current discussions of inequality drivers such as financialisation, and a brief time-series analysis of the effects of trade and financial sector growth on top incomes is presented.

An anthropometric history of the World, 1810-1980: did migration and globalization influence country trends?

We find that regional height levels around the world were fairly uniform throughout most of the 19th century, with two exceptions: above-average levels in Anglo-Saxon settlement regions and below-average levels in Southeast Asia. After 1880, substantial diver- gences began to differentiate other regions -- making the world population taller, but more unequal. During the late 19th century and 20th century, heights between world regions devi- ated significantly, when incomes also became very unequal. Interestingly, during the “breaking point period” between the two regimes, heights declined significantly in the cattle-rich New World countries, whereas they started to increase in Old Europe. We discuss in this study whether immigration was a core factor to influence the height decline in the “Anthropometric Decline of the Cowboy and Gaucho Empires”.

History of several mistakes: on differences between Lev Gumilev and Eurasians

This article challenges prevalent views about Gumilev’s relation to classic Eurasianism. On the basis of previously unavailable correspondence and interviews, it is argued that Lev Gumilev had substantial degree of affinity with the original Eurasian movement understood as a scholarly tradition. This was manifested both in his personal contacts with some of its key members, and in his scholarly work on the nomad history, which remained Eurasian in its spirit. However, the most significant departure from Eurasianism, under-appreciated by most scholars, was his theory of ethnogenesis, which attempted to establish a new naturalistic paradigm for study of history.

Explaining the multiparty systems of Western Europe prior to the adoption of proportional representation

The literature has difficulty explaining why the number of parties in majoritarian electoral systems often exceeds the two-party predictions associated with Duverger’s Law. To understand why this is the case, I examine several party systems in Western Europe before the adoption of proportional representation. Drawing from the social cleavage approach, I argue that the emergence of multiparty systems was because of the development of the class cleavage, which provided a base of voters sizeable enough to support third parties. However, in countries where the class cleavage became the largest cleavage, the class divide displaced other cleavages and the number of parties began to converge on two. The results show that the effect of the class cleavage was nonlinear, producing the greatest party system fragmentation in countries where class cleavages were present – but not dominant – and smaller in countries where class cleavages were either dominant or non-existent.

Germany and the New Global History of Secularism: Questioning the Postcolonial Genealogy

Secularism has emerged as a central category of twenty-first century political thought that in many ways has replaced the theory of secularization. According to postcolonial scholars, neither the theory nor the practice of secularization was politically neutral. They define secularism as the set of discourses, policies, and constitutional arrangements whereby modern states and liberal elites have sought to unify nations and divide colonial populations. This definition is quite different from the original meaning of secularism, as an immanent scientific worldview linked to anticlericalism. Anthropologist Talal Asad has connected nineteenth-century worldview secularism to twenty-first century political secularism through a genealogical account that stresses continuities of liberal hegemony. This essay challenges this account. It argues that liberal elites did not merely subsume worldview secularism in their drive for state secularization. Using the tools of conceptual history, the essay shows that one reason that “secularization” only achieved its contemporary meaning in Germany after 1945 was that radical freethinkers and other anticlerical secularists had previously resisted liberal hegemony. The essay concludes by offering an agenda for research into the discontinuous history of these two types of secularism.