Immigration and the survival of the welfare state

This paper analyzes the political sustainability of the welfare state in a model where immigration policy is also endogenous. In the model, the skills of the native population are affected by immigration and skill accumulation. Moreover, immigrants affect future policies, once they gain the right to vote. The main finding is that the long-run survival of redistributive policies is linked to an immigration policy specifying both skill and quantity restrictions. In particular, in steady state the unskilled majority admits a limited inflow of unskilled immigrants in order to offset growth in the fraction of skilled voters and maintain a high degree of income redistribution.Interestingly, equilibrium immigration policy shifts from unrestricted skilled immigration,when the country is skill-scarce, to restricted unskilled immigration, as the fraction of native skilled workers increases. The analysis also suggests a new set of variables that may help explain international differences in immigration restrictions.

Deciding analytically or trusting your intuition? The advantadges and disadvantadges of analytic and intuitive thought

Recent research has highlighted the notion that people can make judgmentsand choices by means of two systems that are labeled here tacit(or intuitive) and deliberate (or analytic). Whereas most decisionstypically involve both systems, this chapter examines the conditions underwhich each system is liable to be more effective. This aims to illuminatethe age-old issue of whether and when people should trust intuition or analysis. To do this, a framework is presented to understand how thetacit and deliberate systems work in tandem. Distinctions are also madebetween the types of information typically used by both systems as wellas the characteristics of environments that facilitate or hinder accuratelearning by the tacit system. Next, several experiments that havecontrasted intuitive and analytic modes on the same tasks are reviewed.Together, the theoretical framework and experimental evidence leads tospecifying the trade-off that characterizes their relative effectiveness.Tacit system responses can be subject to biases. In making deliberate systemresponses, however, people might not be aware of the correct rule to dealwith the task they are facing and/or make errors in executing it. Whethertacit or deliberate responses are more valid in particular circumstancesrequires assessing this trade-off. In this, the probability of making errorsin deliberate thought is postulated to be a function of the analytical complexityof the task as perceived by the person. Thus the trade-off is one of bias (inimplicit responses) versus analytical complexity (when tasks are handled indeliberate mode). Finally, it is noted that whereas much attention has beenpaid in the past to helping people make decisions in deliberate mode, effortsshould also be directed toward improving ability to make decisions intacit mode since the effectiveness of decisions clearly depends on both. Thistherefore represents an important frontier for research.

Are tax subsidies for private medical insurance self-financing? Evidence from a microsimulation model for outpatient and inpatient episodes

This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.

Systemic crises and growth

In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have on average grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and growth we present a model where weak institutions lead to severe financial constraints and low growth. Financial liberalization policies that facilitaterisk-taking increase leverage and investment. This leads to higher growth, but also toa greater incidence of crises. Conditions are established under which the costs of crises are outweighed by the benefits of higher growth.

Trade, markup heterogeneity and misallocations

We argue that the procompetitive effect of international trade may bring about significant welfare costs that have not been recognized. We formulate a stylized general equilibrium model with a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries to show that, under plausible conditions, a trade-induced increase in competition can actually amplify monopoly distortions. This happens because trade, while lowering the average level of market power, may increase its cross-sectoral dispersion. Using data on US industries, we document a dramatic increase in the dispersion of market power overtime. We also show evidence thattrade might be responsible for it and provide some quantifications of the induced welfare cost. Our results suggest that, to avoid some unpleasant effects of globalization, trade integration should be accompanied by procompetitive reforms (i.e., deregulation) in the nontraded sectors.

The intra-generational redistributive effects of social security

This paper provides a quantitative evaluation of the intra--cohortredistributive elements of the United States social security system in thecontext of a computable general equilibrium model. I determine how thewell--being of individuals that differ across {\sl gender, race} and {\sl education}is affected by government social security policy. I find that females, whitesand non--college graduates stand less to gain (lose) from reductions(increases) in the size of social security than males, non--whites andcollege graduates, respectively. Differences in mortality risk and laborproductivity translate into differences in the magnitudes of capitalaccumulation and labor supply distortions, that are responsible for theobserved welfare difference between types. Results imply that the currentprogram is lifetime progressive across gender and education, yet lifetimeregressive across race.

Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Altruism, equity and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: An encompassing approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motivesmust be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recentmodels of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compareleading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. Wethen offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches,thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determiningthe relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition,the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we findthat intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruisticconsiderations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

Nonlinear models and small sample performance of the generalized method of moments

In this paper I explore the issue of nonlinearity (both in the datageneration process and in the functional form that establishes therelationship between the parameters and the data) regarding the poorperformance of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in small samples.To this purpose I build a sequence of models starting with a simple linearmodel and enlarging it progressively until I approximate a standard (nonlinear)neoclassical growth model. I then use simulation techniques to find the smallsample distribution of the GMM estimators in each of the models.

Openness, government size and the terms of trade

This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size of government, both theoretically and empirically. We show that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms of trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms. First, we show how their relative strength depends on a key parameter, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Second, while the terms of trade externality leads to inefficiently large governments, the increase in public spending due to the demand for insurance is optimal. We show that large volumes of trade may result in welfare losses if the terms of trade externality is strong enough while small volumes of trade are always beneficial. Third, we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and the size of government and test whether it is consistent with the terms of trade externality or the demand for insurance. Our findings suggest that the positive relationship is remarkably robust and that the terms of trade externality may be the driving force behind it, thus raising warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments.

Solving heterogeneous-agent models by projection and perturbation

The paper proposes a numerical solution method for general equilibrium models with a continuum of heterogeneous agents, which combines elements of projection and of perturbation methods. The basic idea is to solve first for the stationary solutionof the model, without aggregate shocks but with fully specified idiosyncratic shocks. Afterwards one computes a first-order perturbation of the solution in the aggregate shocks. This approach allows to include a high-dimensional representation of the cross-sectional distribution in the state vector. The method is applied to a model of household saving with uninsurable income risk and liquidity constraints. The model includes not only productivity shocks, but also shocks to redistributive taxation, which cause substantial short-run variation in the cross-sectional distribution of wealth. If those shocks are operative, it is shown that a solution method based on very few statistics of the distribution is not suitable, while the proposed method can solve the model with high accuracy, at least for the case of small aggregate shocks. Techniques are discussed to reduce the dimension of the state space such that higher order perturbations are feasible.Matlab programs to solve the model can be downloaded.

Pitfalls in the modeling of forward-looking price setting and investment decisions

The present paper makes progress in explaining the role of capital for inflation and output dynamics. We followWoodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming Calvo pricing combined with a convex capital adjustment cost at the firm level. Our main result is that capital accumulation affects inflation dynamics primarily through its impact on the marginal cost. This mechanism is much simpler than the one implied by the analysis in Woodford's text. The reason is that his analysis suffers from a conceptual mistake, as we show. The latter obscures the economic mechanism through which capital affects inflation and output dynamics in the Calvo model, as discussed in Woodford (2004).

Relative payoffs and happiness: An experimental study

Some current utility models presume that people are concerned with their relative standing in a reference group. If this is true, do certain types care more about this than others? Using simple binary decisions and self-reported happiness, we investigate both the prevalence of ``difference aversion'' and whether happiness levels influence the taste for social comparisons. Our decision tasks distinguish between a person s desire to achieving the social optimum, equality or advantageous relative standing. Most people appear to disregard relative payoffs, instead typically making choices resulting in higher social payoffs. While we do not find a strong general correlation between happiness and concern for relative payoffs, we do observe that a willingness to lower another person s payoff below one s own (competitive preferences) seems correlated with unhappiness.

The impact of gender composition on team performance and decision-making: Evidence from the field

We investigate whether the gender composition of teams affect theireconomic performance. We study a large business game, played in groups ofthree, where each group takes the role of a general manager. There are twoparallel competitions, one involving undergraduates and the other involvingMBAs. Our analysis shows that teams formed by three women aresignificantly outperformed by any other gender combination, both at theundergraduate and MBA levels. Looking across the performancedistribution, we find that for undergraduates, three women teams areoutperformed throughout, but by as much as 10pp at the bottom and by only1pp at the top. For MBAs, at the top, the best performing group is two menand one woman. The differences in performance are explained bydifferences in decision-making. We observe that three women teams are lessaggressive in their pricing strategies, invest less in R&D, and invest more insocial sustainability initiatives, than any other gender combination teams.Finally, we find support for the hypothesis that it is poor work dynamicsamong the three women teams that drives the results.

Responsibility-allevation and effort provision in a gift-exchange experiment

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-socialbehavior are diminished when an external authority is responsiblefor an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that ashift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internalimpulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchangeexperiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity(higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process thanwhen it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slightshift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can changebehavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economicenvironments featuring substantial personal interaction.