Regulation of nuclear factor kappa-light-chain-enhancer of activated B cells (NF-[kappa]B) by protein Kinase C theta (PKC-[theta]) and cylindromatosis (CYLD) in murine listeriosis and toxoplasmosis

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2013

Dominance of positivity of the Green's function associated to a perturbed polyharmonic dirichlet boundary value problem by pointwise estimates

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2015

Value creation : the recognition and use of scientific potential in entrepreneurship

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Univ., Dissertation, 2015

Vertical competition and multi-period interaction : a theoretical and behavioral analysis on the impact of strategic inventories in supply chain management

Otto-von-Guericke-Universtität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Univ., Dissertation, 2015

The dermal armor of the cyamodontoid placodonts (Reptilia, Sauropterygia) : morphology and systematic value / Olivier Rieppel --.

n.s. no.46(2002)

The Analysis of interval censoring and double censoring via Markov chain Monte Carlo methods

L'Anàlisi de la supervivència s'utilitza en diferents camps per analitzar el temps transcorregut entre dos esdeveniments. El que distingeix l'anàlisi de la supervivència d'altres àrees de l'estadística és que les dades normalment estan censurades. La censura en un interval apareix quan l'esdeveniment final d'interès no és directament observable i només se sap que el temps de fallada està en un interval concret. Un esquema de censura més complex encara apareix quan tant el temps inicial com el temps final estan censurats en un interval. Aquesta situació s'anomena doble censura. En aquest article donem una descripció formal d'un mètode bayesà paramètric per a l'anàlisi de dades censurades en un interval i dades doblement censurades així com unes indicacions clares de la seva utilització o pràctica. La metodologia proposada s'ilustra amb dades d'una cohort de pacients hemofílics que es varen infectar amb el virus VIH a principis dels anys 1980's.

A Methodology to measure shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation aimed at providing a research basis to investigate the link between both magnitudes

Does shareholder value orientation lead to shareholder value creation? This article proposes methods to quantify both, shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation. Through the application of these models it is possible to quantify both dimensions and examine statistically in how far shareholder value orientation explains shareholder value creation. The scoring model developed in this paper allows quantifying the orientation of managers towards the objective to maximize wealth of shareholders. The method evaluates information that comes from the companies and scores the value orientation in a scale from 0 to 10 points. Analytically the variable value orientation is operationalized expressing it as the general attitude of managers toward the objective of value creation, investment policy and behavior, flexibility and further eight value drivers. The value creation model works with market data such as stock prices and dividend payments. Both methods where applied to a sample of 38 blue chip companies: 32 firms belonged to the share index IBEX 35 on July 1st, 1999, one company represents the “new economy” listed in the Spanish New Market as per July 1st, 2001, and 5 European multinational groups formed part of the EuroStoxx 50 index also on July 1st, 2001. The research period comprised the financial years 1998, 1999, and 2000. A regression analysis showed that between 15.9% and 23.4% of shareholder value creation can be explained by shareholder value orientation.

Implementation of the ordinal shapley value for a three-agent economy

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Chain conditions for Leavitt path algebras

In this paper, results known about the artinian and noetherian conditions for the Leavitt path algebras of graphs with finitely many vertices are extended to all row-finite graphs. In our first main result, necessary and sufficient conditions on a row-finite graph E are given so that the corresponding (not necessarily unital) Leavitt path K-algebra L(E) is semisimple. These are precisely the algebras L(E)for which every corner is left (equivalently, right)artinian. They are also precisely the algebras L(E) for which every finitely generated left (equivalently, right) L(E)-module is artinian. In our second main result, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for every corner of L(E) to be left (equivalently, right) noetherian. They also turn out to be precisely those algebras L(E) for which every finitely generated left(equivalently, right) L(E)-module is noetherian. In both situations, isomorphisms between these algebras and appropriate direct sums of matrix rings over K or K[x, x−1] are provided. Likewise, in both situations, equivalent graph theoretic conditions on E are presented.