Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

Likelihood-based approaches to modeling demand for medical care

We review recent likelihood-based approaches to modeling demand for medical care. A semi-nonparametric model along the lines of Cameron and Johansson's Poisson polynomial model, but using a negative binomial baseline model, is introduced. We apply these models, as well a semiparametric Poisson, hurdle semiparametric Poisson, and finite mixtures of negative binomial models to six measures of health care usage taken from the Medical Expenditure Panel survey. We conclude that most of the models lead to statistically similar results, both in terms of information criteria and conditional and unconditional prediction. This suggests that applied researchers may not need to be overly concerned with the choice of which of these models they use to analyze data on health care demand.

Growth, habit formation, and catching-up\ with the Joneses

When habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation model, the consumers' objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper we provide conditions aimed at guaranteeing the existence of interior solutions to the consumers' problem. We also characterize the equilibrium path of two growth models with multiplicative habits: the internal habit formation model, where individual habits coincide with own past consumption, and the external habit formation (or catching-up with the Joneses) model, where habits arise from the average past consumption in the economy. We show that the introduction of external habits makes the equilibrium path inefficient during the transition towards the balanced growth path. We characterize in this context the optimal tax policy.

Income taxation with habit formation and consumption externalities

We analyze the dynamic behavior and the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. We discuss the effects of flat rate income taxes and characterize the optimal income taxation policy. We show that, when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes, a counter-cyclical income tax rate allows the competitive equilibrium to replicate the efficient path. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium.

Settlement in tax evasion prosecution

It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected evenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool.

A dual characterization of incentive efficiency

We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived.

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

Pressure groups and experts in environmental regulation

We study a problem of adverse selection in the context of environmental regulation, where the firm may suffer from a certain degree of ignorance about its own type. In a framework like the construction of a certain infrastructure project, the presence of ignorance about its impact on the environment, can play an important role in the determination of the regulatory policy. First, an optimal contract is constructed for any exogenous level of ignorance. Second, the presence of potentially informed third-parties is studied from the perspective of the regulator, which allows us to analyze the impact on the efficiency of the contract, of the presence of environmentalists and of experts. Then, we obtain some insights on how the problem differs when the degree of ignorance is a choice variable for the firm. We finally use our results to derive policy implications concerning the existing envoronmental regulation, and the potential role of interested parties as information providers.

A foundation model for marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism

Marx and the writers that followed him have produced a number of theories of the breakdown of capitalism. The majority of these theories were based on the historical tendencies: the rise in the composition of capital and the share of capital and the fall in the rate of profit. However these theories were never modeled with main stream rigour. This paper presents a constant wage model, with capital, labour and land as factors of production, which reproduces the historical tendencies and so can be used as a foundation for the various theories. The use of Chaplygins theorem in the proof of the main result also gives the paper a technical interest.

Gerogescu-Roegen versus Solow/Stiglitz and the convergence to the Cobb-Douglas

The value of the elasticity of substitution of capital for resources is a crucial element in the debate over whether continual growth is possible. It is generally held that the elasticity has to be at least one to permit continual growth and that there is no way of estimating this outside the range of the data. This paper presents a model in which the elasticity is determined endogenously and may converge to one. It is concluded that the general opinion is wrong: that the possibility of continual growth does not depend on the exogenously given value of the elasticity and that the value of the elasticity outside the range of the data can be studied by econometric methods.

Research policy and endogenous growth

This paper studies the effects of different types of research policy on economic growth. We find that while tax incentives to private research, public funding of private projects, and basic research performed at public institutions have unambiguously positive effects on economic growth, performing applied research at public institutions could have negative growth effects. This is due to the large crowding out of private research caused by public R\&D when it competes with private firms in the "patent race". Concerning the effects of these policies on welfare, it is found that research policy can either improve or reduce consumer welfare depending on the characteristics of the policy and that an excessively high research subsidy will reduce it.

Financial intermediation in a model of growth through creative destruction

This paper presents an endogenous growth model in which the research activity is financed by intermediaries that are able to reduce the incidence of researcher's moral hazard. It is shown that financial activity is growth promoting because it increases research productivity. It is also found that a subsidy to the financial sector may have larger growth effects than a direct subsidy to research. Moreover, due to the presence of moral hazard, increasing the subsidy rate to R\&D may reduce the growth rate. I show that there exists a negative relation between the financing of innovation and the process of capital accumulation. Concerning welfare, the presence of two externalities of opposite sign steaming from financial activity may cause that the no-tax equilibrium provides an inefficient level of financial services. Thus, policies oriented to balance the effects of the two externalities will be welfare improving.

A descriptive and analytic look at Marxs own explanations for the falling rate of profit

Marxs conclusions about the falling rate of profit have been analysed exhaustively. Usually this has been done by building models which broadly conform to Marxs views and then showing that his conclusions are either correct or, more frequently, that they can not be sustained. By contrast, this paper examines, both descriptively and analytically, Marxs arguments from the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value, the General Law section of the recently published Volume 33 of the Collected Works and Chapter 3 of Volume III of Capital. It also gives a new interpretation of Part III of this last work. The main conclusions are first, that Marx had an intrinsic explanation of the falling rate of profit but was unable to give it a satisfactory demonstration and second, that he had a number of subsidiary explanations of which the most important was resource scarcity. The paper closes with an assessment of the pedigree of various currents of Marxian thought on this issue.

A descriptive and analytic look at Marxs own explanations for the falling rate of profit (Long Version)

Marxs conclusions about the falling rate of profit have been analysed exhaustively. Usually this has been done by building models which broadly conform to Marxs views and then showing that his conclusions are either correct or, more frequently, that they can not be sustained. By contrast, this paper examines, both descriptively and analytically, Marxs arguments from the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value, the General Law section of the recently published Volume 33 of the Collected Works and Chapter 3 of Volume III of Capital. It also gives a new interpretation of Part III of this last work. The main conclusions are first, that Marx had an intrinsic explanation of the falling rate of profit but was unable to give it a satisfactory demonstration and second, that he had a number of subsidiary explanations of which the most important was resource scarcity. The paper closes with an assessment of the pedigree of various currents of Marxian thought on this issue.