The Nineteenth Century Law of the Sea and the British Abolition of the Slave Trade

This study focuses on British attempts during the nineteenth century to outlaw the Atlantic Slave Trade internationally, for which it was successful, after seventy-five years of effort. It considers the lack of willingness to allow Great Britain, at the Congress of Vienna and during the Concert of Europe, to establish a universal treaty outlawing the slave trade. As a result, this mandated a change in British tactics, which would ultimately prove to be successful – the establishment of a web of bilateral agreements which came to included all maritime powers. The study then moves on to consider the evolution of these bilateral agreements while highlighting the relationship between Great Britain and States (Brazil, France, Portugal and the United States) which were obstinate in their willingness to join this bilateral regime. Finally, consideration is given to the move towards the establishment of the 1890 General Act of Brussels; and thus the conclusion of the decades long British foreign policy objective of a universal instrument meant to suppress the Atlantic Slave Trade.

The Definition of Slavery in International Law

On the basis of archival research, this Article considers the negotiation history of both the 1926 Slavery Convention and 1956 Supplementary Convention and demonstrates that an interpretation of the provisions of the definition of slavery consonant with the travaux préparatoires reveal a definition which provides for the possibility of holding States and individuals responsible for not only slavery de jure but also de facto. That understanding is premised on a reading of the definition that speaks not of the ‘ownership’ of one person by another; but of the powers attached to the right of ownership. It is through an exploration of this phrase that a proper understanding of the definition of slavery in international law emerges.

ARTICLE: On the Curious Disappearance of Human Servitude from General International Law

The following study considers the fragmentation of law which occurred in 1956 with regard to the law on servitude. As States were unwilling to go as far as the Universal Declaration on Human in establishing that "no one shall be held in [...] servitude", the negotiators of the 1956 Supplementary Conventions moved to expunge the very term 'servitude' from the text and to replace it with the phrase 'institutions and practices similar to slavery' which could then be abolished 'progressively and as soon as possible'. The negotiation history of the 1956 Convention clear demonstrate that the Universal Declaration on Human was the elephant in the room and that it ultimately lead to a fragmentation of the law as between general international law manifest in the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the one hand and international human rights law on the other. It is for this reason that, for instance the 2001 UN and 2005 Council of Europe trafficking conventions mention both 'practices similar to slavery' and 'servitude' as types of human exploitation to be suppressed in their definition of 'trafficking in persons'.

'Leaving Nothing to Chance'?: Joint Tenancies, The 'Right' of Survivorship and Unilateral Severance

The joint tenancy with its inherent right of survivorship is the most prevalent form of co-ownership in the common law world today. Most couples will be joint tenants of a family home, while relations (such as siblings) who purchase property together may opt for this arrangement. Inter vivos acquisitions aside, the huge intergenerational transfer of wealth within families on death can result in a joint tenancy, and it may also be a convenient estate planning device. The fact that property automatically vests in the surviving joint tenants on death is the reason why many people choose this form of co-ownership. However, there is one serious disadvantage. A joint tenancy is an inflexible form of landholding where relationships sour or family circumstances change over time, and co-owners want their respective `shares' of the property to pass to someone else on death. Where consensual severance is not possible, one joint tenant can sever unilaterally. The latter mechanism is vital in terms of giving effect to the wishes of the severing joint tenant, especially in situations of discord or a breakdown in relations with their fellow co-owners. However, unilateral severance also has serious implications for the non-severing joint tenant(s) who expected to inherit property through survivorship, and can impact significantly on ownership of the home and other family property. This article looks at unilateral severance as a means of subverting the right of survivorship. The focus is on personal and inter-family relationships, and the various legal issues and policy considerations associated with unilateral severance across the common law jurisdictions of Britain, Ireland, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. It assesses the various methods of effecting unilateral severance and proposes specific measures, as well as considering novel arguments for preventing unilateral severance based on contractual agreements to the contrary and proprietary estoppel.