Implementing the Physical Literacy Component of the 2015 Ontario Health and Physical Education Curriculum: Is the Stage Set?

Introduction: Current physical activity levels among children and youth are alarmingly low; a mere 7% of children and youth are meeting the Canadian Physical Activity Guidelines (Colley et al., 2011), which means that the vast majority of this population is at risk of developing major health problems in adulthood (Janssen & Leblanc, 2010). These high inactivity rates may be related to suboptimal experiences in sport and physical activity stemming from a lack of competence and confidence (Lubans, Morgan, Cliff, Barnett, & Okely, 2010). Developing a foundation of physical literacy can encourage and maintain lifelong physical activity, yet this does not always occur naturally as a part of human growth (Hardman, 2011). An ideal setting to foster the growth and development of physical literacy is physical education class. Physical education class can offer all children and youth an equal opportunity to learn and practice the skills needed to be active for life (Hardman, 2011). Elementary school teachers are responsible for delivering the physical education curriculum, and it is important to understand their will and capacity as the implementing agents of physical literacy development curriculum (McLaughlin, 1987). Purpose: The purpose of this study was to explore the physical literacy component of the 2015 Ontario Health and Physical Education curriculum policy through the eyes of key informants, and to explore the resources available for the implementation of this new policy. Methods: Qualitative interviews were conducted with seven key informants of the curriculum policy development, including two teachers. In tandem with the interviews, a resource inventory and curriculum review were conducted to assess the content and availability of physical literacy resources. All data were analyzed through the lens of Hogwood and Gunn’s (1984) 10 preconditions for policy implementation. Results: Participants discussed how implementation is affected by: accountability, external capacity, internal capacity, awareness and understanding of physical literacy, implementation expertise, and policy climate. Discussion: Participants voiced similar opinions on most issues, and the overall lack of attention given to physical education programs in schools will continue to be a major dilemma when trying to combat such high physical inactivity levels.

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series 8.5

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.

Flashlight Europe No. 3, November 2014: European Social Policy? Prospects for the New EU Commission

Whilst the intricate set of national and genuine European competences is probably just as convoluted as it has always been, the expectations of EU citizens are nothing of the sort. This is especially true in the area of employment and social affairs. What they want from policymakers is social safety and risk protection. And whether these things are done on the European or national level is of little importance. We have studied the latest data on social justice in the EU in order to describe the most important tasks and challenges currently facing Marianne Thyssen, the new Social Affairs Commissioner.

Bundeswehr 3.0: The political, military and social dimensions of the reform of the German armed forces. OSW Point of View Number 28, May 2012

This reform of the Bundeswehr, launched in 2011, is the latest of the three decisive stages in the post-war transformation of the German armed forces. The reform aims at “constructing” the armed forces anew in the political, military and social dimensions.The present paper presents the evolution of the role of the armed forces in German foreign and security policy and the ongoing process of “constructing” a new Bundeswehr. It analyses the process of redefining the objectives and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s participation in international operations, its current military transformation, and changes in its image and social identity. It also presents the implications of this broader transformation for political and military.

Integrating Europeans: The Political Economy and Social Aspects of Europeanization. ACES Working Papers (Curriculum Development), 2012

This course, then, investigates the effects of integration on European citizens as well as the duality of the EU as a competitive and social model. It is sensitive to the involvement of social groups, protest, and domestic politics in the study of market integration. Some of the questions we explore are: What are the effects of regulatory policy-making on social actors, how do such actors’ strategies and behaviors change as a consequence, and how to they overcome their collective action problems? Why is it that the logic of integration has at times followed a logic of “permissive consensus” while at other times it has been described as a “constraining dissensus”? What is the importance of discourse in domestic politics in order to articulate and legitimate Europeanization? How do European identities change as a consequence of policymaking as well as of protest? To what extent do ordinary Europeans matter in terms of accepting and opposing the project of European integration, how do European citizens in core and peripheral EU states experience Europeanization, and how is their involvement in the integration project to be conceptualized?

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.5, 1998

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, political scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by the four major decisions toward European integration taken under de Gaulle's Presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in Luxembourg Compromise. In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence speeches, memoirs, or government documents suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interested in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations even in the least likely case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leaders geopolitical ideology even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary source research.

Eurozone Crisis and Social Models: What We Can Learn from Italy and Spain. CES Papers - Open Forum #20, 2013-2014

This paper considers the role of social model features in the economic performance of Italy and Spain during the run-up to the Eurozone crisis, as well as the consequences of that crisis, in turn, for the two countries social models. It takes issue with the prevailing view - what I refer to as the “competitiveness thesis” - which attributes the debtor status of the two countries to a lack of competitive capacity rooted in social model features. This competitiveness thesis has been key in justifying the “liberalization plus austerity” measures that European institutions have demanded in return for financial support for Italy and Spain at critical points during the crisis. The paper challenges this prevailing wisdom. First, it reviews the characteristics of the Italian and Spanish social models and their evolution in the period prior to the crisis, revealing a far more complex, dynamic and differentiated picture than is given in the political economy literature. Second, the paper considers various ways in which social model characteristics are said to have contributed to the Eurozone crisis, finding such explanations wanting. Italy and Spain ́s debtor status was primarily the result of much broader dynamics in the Euro- zone, including capital flows from richer to poorer countries that affected economic demand, with social model features playing, at most, an ancillary role. More aggressive reforms responding to EU demands in Spain may have increased the long term social and economic costs of the crisis, whereas the political stalemate that slowed such reforms in Italy may have paradoxically mitigated these costs. The comparison of the two countries thus suggests that, in the absence of broader macro-institutional reform of the Eurozone, compliance with EU dictates may have had perverse effects.

Social Policy Reforms in the EU: A Cross-national Comparison. Social Inclusion Monitor Europe (SIM) – Reform Barometer. Pilot Study

European countries are losing momentum for social policy reforms: The results of the SIM Europe Index report on social justice, published in September 2014, suggested a growing social divide among the member states. Assessing six policy areas of social inclusion, the data revealed the deteriorating social situation since 2009 across the EU. The report stressed, in particular, the difficulties southern EU member states were having in coping with the effects of the financial and economic crisis. This second report, the SIM Europe Reform Barometer, takes up these results and delivers two tasks: to impartially assess the extent of problem awareness of governments, and to ask whether they have enacted concrete social policy initiatives to tackle these challenges and to counterbalance the growing divide. Southern European member states, especially, did not or have not been able to pursue reforms to limit their withering levels of a socially inclusive society. In almost all key dimensions of social inclusion, those member states most affected by the implications of the protracted economic and fiscal crisis in the EU have been least able to confine the ongoing ‘internal devaluation’ in terms of socially balanced governmental activity. By contrast, some northern member states have legislated acts which seem well-suited to at least stabilise or even increase their level of social inclusion.

Europe cannot afford people in bad health - Economics of health and care as a guide for investments. EPC Commentary, 4 July 2016

It is widely accepted that a new way of looking at Europe’s health sector is necessary if we are to maintain universal health coverage. Financial resources are limited, and the sustainability of Europe’s health systems is under threat. Economic growth is slow, health expenditures outpace GDP growth, public budgets are under strain and demographics – with a growing aging population – are putting pressure on the younger tax-paying generations. In an effort to ensure the sustainability of Europe’s health systems, reforms, underpinned by a new understanding of the economic value of health for individuals and society is needed.

Report of the National Conference on Orphan Drugs : the path to promise : May 18-19, 1988, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. / [sponsored jointly by] the National Institutes of Health and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.

Mode of access: Internet.

Graduate medical education and public policy : a primer.

"December 2000."