Essays on banking theory and history of financial arrangements

Esta tese contém dois capítulos, cada um lidando com a teoria e a história dos bancos e arranjos financeiros. No capítulo 1, busca-se extender uma economia Diamond-Dybvig com monitoramento imperfeito dos saques antecipados e realizar uma comparação do bem estar social em cada uma das alocações possíveis, como proposto em Presscott and Weinberg(2003). Esse monitoramento imperfeito é implementado a partir da comunicação indireta ( através de um meio de pagamento) entre os agentes e a máquina de depósitos e saques que é um agregado do setor produtivo e financeiro. A extensão consiste em estudar alocações onde uma fração dos agentes pode explorar o monitoramento imperfeito e fraudar a alocação contratada ao consumirem mais cedo além do limite, usando múltiplos meios de pagamento. Com a punição limitada no período de consumo tardio, essa nova alocação pode ser chamada de uma alocação separadora em contraste com as alocações agregadoras onde o agente com habilidade de fraudar é bloqueado por um meio de pagamento imune a fraude, mas custoso, ou por receber consumo futuro suficiente para tornar a fraude desinteressante. A comparação de bem estar na gama de parâmetros escolhida mostra que as alocações separadoras são ótimas para as economias com menor dotação e as agregadoras para as de nível intermediário e as ricas. O capítulo termina com um possível contexto histórico para o modelo, o qual se conecta com a narrativa histórica encontrada no capítulo 2. No capítulo 2 são exploradas as propriedade quantitativas de um sistema de previsão antecedente para crises financeiras, com as váriaveis sendo escolhidas a partir de um arcabouço de ``boom and bust'' descrito mais detalhadamente no apêndice 1. As principais variáveis são: o crescimento real nos preços de imóveis e ações, o diferencial entre os juros dos títulos governamentais de 10 anos e a taxa de 3 meses no mercado inter-bancário e o crescimento nos ativos totais do setor bancário. Essas variáveis produzem uma taxa mais elevada de sinais corretos para as crises bancárias recentes (1984-2008) do que os sistemas de indicadores antecedentes comparáveis. Levar em conta um risco de base crescente ( devido à tendência de acumulação de distorções no sistema de preços relativos em expansões anteriores) também provê informação e eleva o número de sinais corretos em países que não passaram por uma expansão creditícia e nos preços de ativos tão vigorosa.

Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor: a panel data approach

This paper estimates the elasticity of substitution of an aggregate production function. The estimating equation is derived from the steady state of a neoclassical growth model. The data comes from the PWT in which different countries face different relative prices of the investment good and exhibit different investment-output ratios. Then, using this variation we estimate the elasticity of substitution. The novelty of our approach is that we use dynamic panel data techniques, which allow us to distinguish between the short and the long run elasticity and handle a host of econometric and substantive issues. In particular we accommodate the possibility that different countries have different total factor productivities and other country specific effects and that such effects are correlated with the regressors. We also accommodate the possibility that the regressors are correlated with the error terms and that shocks to regressors are manifested in future periods. Taking all this into account our estimation resuIts suggest that the Iong run eIasticity of substitution is 0.7, which is Iower than the eIasticity that had been used in previous macro-deveIopment exercises. We show that this lower eIasticity reinforces the power of the neoclassical mo deI to expIain income differences across countries as coming from differential distortions.

Multiple equilibria and protectionism

In a nonnative approach, I analyze trade policies when the industrial sector genentes positive extemalities in production, and there are adjustments costs to changing production from one sector to the other. Protectionist trade policy can make workers intemalize the benetits from moving into the industrial sector, but it is a second best policy as it also causes consumption distortions. I show that if the govemment is able to fully commit to its tariff schedule for the future, the welfare maximizing policy is to maintain a positive tariff forever, even after all adjustment has already taken place . However, if the govemment is not able to commit at all, the only time consistent policy is zero tariff at any point in time. The time inconsistency of the full commitment policy is derived from the fact that in the model only production needs interference, and the production distortion is lagged one period with respect to the tariff wbile the consumption distortion is simultaneous to the tariff. In the intermediary case, i.e., when the government can commit for a limited period of time, the time consistent optimal tariff will be positive but lower than the "full commitment" tariff. This result indicates that some institutions that have always been considered pure sources of inefficiency, such as protectionist lobbying, may in fact be welfare improving in some cases!

Agreements and disputes over non-tariff measures

In trade agreements, governments can design remedies to ensure compliance (property rule) or to compensate victims (liability rule). This paper describes an economic framework to explain the pattern of remedies over non-tariff restrictions—particularly domestic subsidies and nonviolation complaints subject to liability rules. The key determinants of the contract form for any individual measure are the expected joint surplus from an agreement and the expected loss to the constrained government. The loss is higher for domestic subsidies and nonviolations because these are the policies most likely to correct domestic distortions. Governments choose property rules when expected gains from compliance are sufficiently high and expected losses to the constrained country are sufficiently low. Liability rules are preferable when dispute costs are relatively high, because inefficiencies in the compensation process reduce the number of socially inefficient disputes filed.

A restatement of the welafare costs of inflation. The wast of scarce resources in the manufacturing , banking and household sectors

Lucas (2000) estimates that the US welfare costs of inflation are around 1% of GDP. This measurement is consistent with a speci…c distorting channel in terms of the Bailey triangle under the demand for monetary base schedule (outside money): the displacement of resources from the production of consumption goods to the household transaction time à la Baumol. Here, we consider also several new types of distortions in the manufacturing and banking industries. Our new evidences show that both banks and firms demand special occupational employments to avoid the inflation tax. We de…ne the concept of ”the foat labor”: The occupational employments that are aflected by the in‡ation rates. More administrative workers are hired relatively to the bluecollar workers for producing consumption goods. This new phenomenon makes the manufacturing industry more roundabout. To take into account this new stylized fact and others, we redo at same time both ”The model 5: A Banking Sector -2” formulated by Lucas (1993) and ”The Competitive Banking System” proposed by Yoshino (1993). This modelling allows us to characterize better the new types of misallocations. We …nd that the maximum value of the resources wasted by the US economy happened in the years 1980-81, after the 2nd oil shock. In these years, we estimate the excess resources that are allocated for every speci…c distorting channel: i) The US commercial banks spent additional resources of around 2% of GDP; ii) For the purpose of the firm foating time were used between 2.4% and 4.1% of GDP); and iii) For the household transaction time were allocated between 3.1% and 4.5 % of GDP. The Bailey triangle under the demand for the monetary base schedule represented around 1% of GDP, which is consistent with Lucas (2000). We estimate that the US total welfare costs of in‡ation were around 10% of GDP in terms of the consumption goods foregone. The big di¤erence between our results and Lucas (2000) are mainly due to the Harberger triangle in the market for loans (inside money) which makes part of the household transaction time, of the …rm ‡oat labor and of the distortion in the banking industry. This triangle arises due to the widening interest rates spread in the presence of a distorting inflation tax and under a fractionally reserve system. The Harberger triangle can represent 80% of the total welfare costs of inflation while the remaining percentage is split almost equally between the Bailey triangle and the resources used for the bank services. Finally, we formulate several theorems in terms of the optimal nonneutral monetary policy so as to compare with the classical monetary theory.

Essays on economic growth

A fundamental question in development economics is why some economies are rich and others poor. To illustrate the income per capita gap across economies consider that the average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the richest 10 percent of economies in the year 2010 was a factor of 40-fold that of the poorest 10 percent of economies. In other words, the average person in a rich economy produces in just over 9 days what the average person in a poor economy produces in an entire year. What are the factors that can explain this difference in standard of living across the world today? With this in view, this dissertation is a conjunction of three essays on the economic growth field which we seek a possible responses to this question. The first essay investigates the existence of resource misallocation in the Brazilian manufacturing sector and measures possible distortions in it. Using a similar method of measurement to the one developed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and firm-level data for 1996-2011 we find evidence of misallocation in the manufacturing sector during the observed period. Moreover, our results show that misallocation has been growing since 2005, and it presents a non-smooth dynamic. Significantly, we find that the Brazilian manufacturing sector operates at about 50% of its efficient product. With this, if capital and labor were optimally reallocated between firms and sectors we would obtain an aggregate output growth of approximately 110-180% depending on the mode in which the capital share is measured. We also find that the economic crisis did not have a substantial effect on the total productivity factor or on the sector's misallocation. However, small firms in particular seem to be strongly affected in a global crisis. Furthermore, the effects described would be attenuated if we consider linkages and complementarity effects among sectors. Despite Brazil's well-known high tax burden, there is not evidence that this is the main source of resource misallocation. Moreover, there is a distinct pattern of structural change between the manufacturing sectors in industrialized countries and those in developing countries. Therefore, the second essay demonstrate that this pattern differs because there are some factors that distort the relative prices and also affect the output productivity. For this, we present a multi-sector model of economic growth, where distortions affect the relative prices and the allocation of inputs. This phenomenon imply that change of the production structure or perpetuation of the harmful structures to the growth rate of aggregate output. We also demonstrate that in an environment with majority decision, this distortion can be enhanced and depends on the initial distribution of firms. Furthermore, distortions in relative prices would lead to increases in the degree of misallocation of resources, and that imply that there are distinct patterns of structural changes between economies. Finally, the calibrated results of the framework developed here converge with the structural change observed in the firm-level data of the Brazilian manufacturing sector. Thereafter, using a cross-industry cross-country approach, the third essay investigates the existence of an optimal level of competition to enhance economic growth. With that in mind, we try to show that this optimal level is different from industrialized and under development economies due to the technology frontier distance, the terms of trade, and each economy's idiosyncratic characteristics. Therefore, the difference in competition industry-country level is a channel to explain the output for worker gap between countries. The theoretical and empirical results imply the existence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and growth: starting for an initially low level of competition, higher competition stimulates innovation and output growth; starting from a high initial level of competition, higher competition has a negative effect on innovation and output growth. Given on average industries in industrialized economies present higher competition level. With that if we control for the terms of trade and the industry-country fixed effect, if the industries of the developing economy operated under the same competition levels as of the industrialized ones, there is a potential increase of output of 0.2-1.0% per year. This effect on the output growth rate depends on the competition measurement used.

Como são julgados os juízes? Uma análise do controle disciplinar do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (2005-2013)

Uma das principais modificações introduzidas pela Reforma do Judiciário (Emenda Constitucional 45/2004) foi a criação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ). Dentre suas competências constitucionais, a do controle dos deveres funcionais dos magistrados por meio dos Processos Administrativos Sancionadores foi bastante questionada, chegando a ser objeto de controle concentrado de constitucionalidade pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). A composição do Conselho foi também alvo de reiteradas críticas, pois considerável parte dos conselheiros (6 dos 15, representando 40% do total) é composta por membros não oriundos da magistratura – vindos do Ministério Público, da Advocacia, além dos Juristas indicados pelo Congresso Nacional -, os conselheiros não-juízes. O Poder Judiciário, historicamente hermético e corporativista, passava a ser controlado por um órgão novo, um Conselho de Justiça que não contava apenas com conselheiros juízes entre seus membros. O presente trabalho estudou o CNJ a partir desses dois pontos mais controversos, com enfoque no controle disciplinar exercido pelo órgão sobre a magistratura nacional. Conselhos de Justiça, em especial em sua feição disciplinar, devem lidar com e existente tensão entre controle (ou accountability) e independência judicial. Observamos a atuação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça em vista dessa constante tensão ao longo de sua historia: por meio de uma análise que percorreu um período que vai da instalação do CNJ, em 2005, até o final do ano de 2013. Identificamos, com isso, as estratégias de legitimação institucional utilizadas para o exercício da competência disciplinar, analisamos as normas jurídicas surgidas nesse período, bem como descrevemos qual o perfil dos atores que ocuparam as cadeiras do colegiado enquanto conselheiros. Como resultado dessa observação, importante destacar que o Conselho Nacional de Justiça jogou luz sobre um Poder historicamente fechado, mas que ainda apresenta problemas de transparência. A dificuldade de localizar dados sobre matérias mais sensíveis (processos administrativos sancionadores) e as ausências de envio de informações quando solicitadas foram marcantes na pesquisa. Sobre o comportamento do órgão, mobilizamos a variável do profissionalismo (com especial enfoque na origem de carreira) para interpretar esse processo. Esperávamos um Conselho com duas características: corporativista e pouco harmônico. As análises empíricas quantitativas, que compuseram um retrato de todos os Processos Administrativos Sancionadores julgados até o final de 2013 pelo CNJ, mostraram um cenário inverso: um colegiado não corporativista e coeso. Mesmo em vista dessas características globais, identificamos que existem importantes diferenças no comportamento decisório e, quando elas estão presentes, o elemento da carreira é influente.

O mercado de opções de petrobras é Ineficiente? Um estudo a partir da estratégia delta-gama-neutra

Este trabalho tem como objetivo verificar se o mercado de opções da Petrobras PN (PETR4) é ineficiente na forma fraca, ou seja, se as informações públicas estão ou não refletidas nos preços dos ativos. Para isso, tenta-se obter lucro sistemático por meio da estratégia Delta-Gama-Neutra que utiliza a ação preferencial e as opções de compra da empresa. Essa ação foi escolhida, uma vez que as suas opções tinham alto grau de liquidez durante todo o período estudado (01/10/2012 a 31/03/2013). Para a realização do estudo, foram consideradas as ordens de compra e venda enviadas tanto para o ativo-objeto quanto para as opções de forma a chegar ao livro de ofertas (book) real de todos os instrumentos a cada cinco minutos. A estratégia foi utilizada quando distorções entre a Volatilidade Implícita, calculada pelo modelo Black & Scholes, e a volatilidade calculada por alisamento exponencial (EWMA – Exponentially Weighted Moving Average) foram observadas. Os resultados obtidos mostraram que o mercado de opções de Petrobras não é eficiente em sua forma fraca, já que em 371 operações realizadas durante esse período, 85% delas foram lucrativas, com resultado médio de 0,49% e o tempo médio de duração de cada operação sendo pouco menor que uma hora e treze minutos.