Testing for granger-causality in the Finnish roundwood market

Summary

Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

Employment risk, unemployment insurance and search strategies: a disaggregated equilibrium approach with application to the Swiss labour market in the 1990-ies

The Organization of the Thesis The remainder of the thesis comprises five chapters and a conclusion. The next chapter formalizes the envisioned theory into a tractable model. Section 2.2 presents a formal description of the model economy: the individual heterogeneity, the individual objective, the UI setting, the population dynamics and the equilibrium. The welfare and efficiency criteria for qualifying various equilibrium outcomes are proposed in section 2.3. The fourth section shows how the model-generated information can be computed. Chapter 3 transposes the model from chapter 2 in conditions that enable its use in the analysis of individual labor market strategies and their implications for the labor market equilibrium. In section 3.2 the Swiss labor market data sets, stylized facts, and the UI system are presented. The third section outlines and motivates the parameterization method. In section 3.4 the model's replication ability is evaluated and some aspects of the parameter choice are discussed. Numerical solution issues can be found in the appendix. Chapter 4 examines the determinants of search-strategic behavior in the model economy and its implications for the labor market aggregates. In section 4.2, the unemployment duration distribution is examined and related to search strategies. Section 4.3 shows how the search- strategic behavior is influenced by the UI eligibility and section 4.4 how it is determined by individual heterogeneity. The composition effects generated by search strategies in labor market aggregates are examined in section 4.5. The last section evaluates the model's replication of empirical unemployment escape frequencies reported in Sheldon [67]. Chapter 5 applies the model economy to examine the effects on the labor market equilibrium of shocks to the labor market risk structure, to the deep underlying labor market structure and to the UI setting. Section 5.2 examines the effects of the labor market risk structure on the labor market equilibrium and the labor market strategic behavior. The effects of alterations in the labor market deep economic structural parameters, i.e. individual preferences and production technology, are shown in Section 5.3. Finally, the UI setting impacts on the labor market are studied in Section 5.4. This section also evaluates the role of the UI authority monitoring and the differences in the Way changes in the replacement rate and the UI benefit duration affect the labor market. In chapter 6 the model economy is applied in counterfactual experiments to assess several aspects of the Swiss labor market movements in the nineties. Section 6.2 examines the two equilibria characterizing the Swiss labor market in the nineties, the " growth" equilibrium with a "moderate" UI regime and the "recession" equilibrium with a more "generous" UI. Section 6.3 evaluates the isolated effects of the structural shocks, while the isolated effects of the UI reforms are analyzed in section 6.4. Particular dimensions of the UI reforms, the duration, replacement rate and the tax rate effects, are studied in section 6.5, while labor market equilibria without benefits are evaluated in section 6.6. In section 6.7 the structural and institutional interactions that may act as unemployment amplifiers are discussed in view of the obtained results. A welfare analysis based on individual welfare in different structural and UI settings is presented in the eighth section. Finally, the results are related to more favorable unemployment trends after 1997. The conclusion evaluates the features embodied in the model economy with respect to the resulting model dynamics to derive lessons from the model design." The thesis ends by proposing guidelines for future improvements of the model and directions for further research.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

The relationship of capitalization period length with market portfolio composition and betas

Beta coefficients are not stable if we modify the observation periods of the returns. The market portfolio composition also varies, whereas changes in the betas are the same, whether they are calculated as regression coefficients or as a ratio of the risk premiums. The instantaneous beta, obtained when the capitalization frequency approaches infinity, may be a useful tool in portfolio selection.

Deciding the sale of a life policy in the viatical market: Implications on individual welfare

[cat] En aquest article, es presenta un model econòmic que permet determinar la venda o no d'una pòlissa de vida (total o en part) per part d'un assegurat malalt terminal en el mercat dels viatical settlements. Aquest mercat va aparèixer a finals de la dècada dels 80 a conseqüència de l'epidèmia de la SIDA. Actualment, representa una part del mercat dels life settlements. Les pòlisses que es comercialitzen en el mercat dels viaticals són aquelles on l'assegurat és malalt terminal amb una esperança de vida de dos anys o menys. El model és discret i considera només dos períodes (anys), ja que aquesta és la vida residual màxima que contempla el mercat. L'agent posseix una riquesa inicial que ha de repartir entre consum i herència. S'introdueix en primer lloc la funció d'utilitat esperada del decisor i, utilitzant programació dinàmica, es dedueix l'estratègia que reporta una utilitat més gran (no vendre/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment zero/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment ú). L'òptim depèn del preu de la pòlissa venuda i de paràmetres personals de l'individu. Es troba una expressió analítica per l'estratègia òptima i es realitza un anàlisi de sensibilitat.

The Political Economy of Active Labor-Market Policy

Active labor-market policies (ALMPs) have developed significantly over the past two decades across Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, with substantial cross-national differences in terms of both extent and overall orientation. The objective of this article is to account for cross-national variation in this policy field. It starts by reviewing existing scholarship concerning political, institutional, and ideational determinants of ALMPs. It then argues that ALMP is too broad a category to be used without further specification, and it develops a typology of four different types of ALMPs: incentive reinforcement, employment assistance, occupation, and human capital investment. These are discussed and examined through ALMP expenditure profiles in selected countries. The article uses this typology to analyze ALMP trajectories in six Western European countries and shows that the role of this instrument changes dramatically over time. It concludes that there is little regularity in the political determinants of ALMPs. In contrast, it finds strong institutional and ideational effects, nested in the interaction between the changing economic context and existing labor-market policies.

Faire la ville juste : une analyse "in itinere" de la maîtrise publique d'ouvrage du projet urbain Carré de Soie (métropole lyonnaise)

Dans certaines portions des agglomérations (poches de pauvreté de centre-ville, couronnes suburbaines dégradées, espaces périurbains sans aménité), un cumul entre des inégalités sociales (pauvreté, chômage, etc.) et environnementales (exposition au bruit, aux risques industriels, etc.) peut être observé. La persistance de ces inégalités croisées dans le temps indique une tendance de fond : la capacité d'accéder à un cadre de vie de qualité n'est pas équitablement partagée parmi les individus. Ce constat interroge : comment se créent ces inégalités ? Comment infléchir cette tendance et faire la ville plus juste ?¦Apporter des réponses à cette problématique nécessite d'identifier les facteurs de causalités qui entrent en jeu dans le système de (re)production des inégalités urbaines. Le fonctionnement des marchés foncier et immobilier, la « tyrannie des petites décisions » et les politiques publiques à incidence spatiale sont principalement impliqués. Ces dernières, agissant sur tous les éléments du système, sont placées au coeur de ce travail. On va ainsi s'intéresser précisément à la manière dont les collectivités publiques pilotent la production de la ville contemporaine, en portant l'attention sur la maîtrise publique d'ouvrage (MPO) des grands projets urbains.¦Poser la question de la justice dans la fabrique de la ville implique également de questionner les référentiels normatifs de l'action publique : à quelle conception de la justice celle-ci doit- elle obéir? Quatre perspectives (radicale, substantialiste, procédurale et intégrative) sont caractérisées, chacune se traduisant par des principes d'action différenciés. Une méthodologie hybride - empruntant à la sociologie des organisations et à l'analyse des politiques publiques - vient clore le volet théorique, proposant par un détour métaphorique d'appréhender le projet urbain comme une pièce de théâtre dont le déroulement dépend du jeu d'acteurs.¦Cette méthodologie est utilisée dans le volet empirique de la recherche, qui consiste en une analyse de la MPO d'un projet urbain en cours dans la première couronne de l'agglomération lyonnaise : le Carré de Soie. Trois grands objectifs sont poursuivis : descriptif (reconstruire le scénario), analytique (évaluer la nature de la pièce : conte de fée, tragédie ou match d'improvisation ?) et prescriptif (tirer la morale de l'histoire). La description de la MPO montre le déploiement successif de quatre stratégies de pilotage, dont les implications sur les temporalités, le contenu du projet (programmes, morphologies) et les financements publics vont être déterminantes. Sur la base de l'analyse, plusieurs recommandations peuvent être formulées - importance de l'anticipation et de l'articulation entre planification et stratégie foncière notamment - pour permettre à la sphère publique de dominer le jeu et d'assurer la production de justice par le projet urbain (réalisation puis entretien des équipements et espaces publics, financement de logements de qualité à destination d'un large éventail de populations, etc.). Plus généralement, un décalage problématique peut être souligné entre les territoires stratégiques pour le développement de l'agglomération et les capacités de portage limitées des communes concernées. Ce déficit plaide pour le renforcement des capacités d'investissement de la structure intercommunale.¦La seule logique du marché (foncier, immobilier) mène à la polarisation sociale et à la production d'inégalités urbaines. Faire la ville juste nécessite une forte volonté des collectivités publiques, laquelle doit se traduire aussi bien dans l'ambition affichée - une juste hiérarchisation des priorités dans le développement urbain - que dans son opérationnalisation - une juste maîtrise publique d'ouvrage des projets urbains.¦Inner-city neighborhoods, poor outskirts, and peri-urban spaces with no amenities usually suffer from social and environmental inequalities, such as poverty, unemployment, and exposure to noise and industrial hazards. The observed persistence of these inequalities over time points to an underlying trend - namely, that access to proper living conditions is fundamentally unequal, thus eliciting the question of how such inequalities are effected and how this trend can be reversed so as to build a more equitable city.¦Providing answers to such questions requires that the causal factors at play within the system of (re)production of urban inequalities be identified. Real estate markets, "micromotives and macrobehavior", and public policies that bear on space are mostly involved. The latter are central in that they act on all the elements of the system. This thesis therefore focuses on the way public authorities shape the production of contemporary cities, by studying the public project ownership of major urban projects.¦The study of justice within the urban fabric also implies that the normative frames of reference of public action be questioned: what conception of justice should public action refer to? This thesis examines four perspectives (radical, substantialist, procedural, and integrative) each of which results in different principles of action. This theoretical part is concluded by a hybrid methodology that draws from sociology of organizations and public policy analysis and that suggests that the urban project may be understood as a play, whose outcome hinges on the actors' acting.¦This methodology is applied to the empirical analysis of the public project ownership of an ongoing urban project in the Lyon first-ring suburbs: the Carré de Soie. Three main objectives are pursued: descriptive (reconstructing the scenario), analytical (assessing the nature of the play - fairy tale, tragedy or improvisation match), and prescriptive (drawing the moral of the story). The description of the public project ownership shows the successive deployment of four control strategies, whose implications on deadlines, project content (programs, morphologies), and public funding are significant. Building on the analysis, several recommendations can be made to allow the public sphere to control the process and ensure the urban project produces equity (most notably, anticipation and articulation of planning and real- estate strategy, as well as provision and maintenance of equipment and public spaces, funding of quality housing for a wide range of populations, etc.). More generally, a gap can be highlighted between those territories that are strategic to the development of the agglomeration and the limited resources of the municipalities involved. This deficit calls for strengthening the investment abilities of the intermunicipal structure.¦By itself, the real-estate market logic brings about social polarization and urban inequalities. Building an equitable city requires a strong will on the part of public authorities, a will that must be reflected both in the stated ambition - setting priorities of urban development equitably - and in its implementation managing urban public projects fairly.