Les "grans negociacions" a la Unió Europea: la formació de preferències, les estratègies y l’èxit a les negociacions

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la School of politics and international relations, de la University College of Dublin, United Kingdom, entre 2007 i 2009. L’ objectiu del projecte present ha estat contribuir a l’estudi de les negociacions intergovernamentals a la Unió Europea (UE). En primer lloc, s’ha estudiat les estratègies de negociació del estats membres a negociacions intergovernamentals en la UE, per la qual cosa s’ha desenvolupat una tipologia d’estratègies de negociació, diferenciant entre les més agressives (conflictives) i les menys agressives (cooperatives). La conclusió principal ha estat que els actors difereixen en la elecció de les estratègies i que és precisament el poder relatiu dels actors que explica quines estratègies adopten. En segon lloc, s’analitza la ratificació dels resultats a les negociacions intergovernamentals, concentrant-me en l’us dels referèndums. La investigació mostra que els referèndums són sovint usats pels partits polítics com un instrument utilitzat durant les campanyes electorals, posant en dubte la tesis de que l’objectiu principal dels referèndums és influenciar els poder relatiu dels estats membres en negociacions intergovernamentals. Finalment, s’ha estudiat com els actors socials influeixen aquestes negociacions en la UE. La evidencia empírica clarament mostra que la pressió que exerceixen els grups de pressió es sovint subestimada.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

On [summation of 1 raised to the power 1] equivalence relations over the natural numbers

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt"

Las Imágenes del malestar. Representaciones del yo y la construcción de subjetividad en la producción audiovisual contemporánea y en los nuevos dispositivos tecnológicos

El tema de la investigación propuesto aquí, se centra en el malestar social, y la representación de éste desde un punto de vista personal y autobiográfico, algo que en estas página denomino Autorepresentación del malestar social. ¿Cómo se autorepresenta el malestar y qué prácticas artísticas se emplean para ello? ¿Cuáles son la transformaciones que provocan estas prácticas artísticas en el terreno audiovisual? En este sentido, exploraremos dos vías de análisis: por un lado nos interesa observar cuales han sido las modificaciones que el poder ha desarrollado para establecer nuevas formas de explotación, y por otro lado, veremos como estas modificaciones están generando una nueva praxis social donde las prácticas artísticas cobran un nuevo y reforzado sentido, así como una nueva capacidad política, individual y colectiva a un mismo tiempo, cargada de una fuerza transformadora capaz de componer nuevos espacios de sujeto. Analizaremos, desde la representación del yo en la vida cotidiana, el género y las relaciones interpersonales, hasta las transformaciones contemporáneas del trabajo, y los cambios en la construcción de la subjetividad. El principal elemento en el que se apoyaran nuestras investigaciones será el anàlisis de producciones audiovisuales contemporáneas y la distribución de estas en algunas de las redes de comunicación contemporáneas, intentando mostrar, de esta manera, la interacción y los efectos directos que provocan en la realidad social.

Benign pineal cysts in children with bilateral retinoblastoma: a new variant of trilateral retinoblastoma?

PURPOSE: Patients with hereditary retinoblastoma (Rb) develop in 4%-8% a malignant midline tumor called trilateral Rb (TRb). We report in this study on benign pineal cysts observed in patients investigated for TRb. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Between September 1990 and December 2001, 172 patients were screened for TRb. Ninty-five had bilateral, 77 unilateral disease. The median age at diagnosis of Rb was 7 months (range 1-26). Treatment included enucleation, local treatment with cryotherapy or photocoagulation, first-line chemotherapy (CT), thermo-chemotherapy (TCT), Ruthenium plaque, and, rarely, external beam radiation (EBR). RESULTS: TRb was found in 5/95 patients (5.3%) with bilateral disease. Interestingly, five other patients (5.3%) presented a pineal cyst on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). No cysts were recorded in the 77 patients with unilateral disease. This difference was statistically significant (P < 0.05). The median age at diagnosis of the pineal cyst was 26 months (range 16-80), much younger than reported in literature for healthy children. Four of five patients with TRb died of the disease, while all the patients with pineal cysts remained stable and asymptomatic during a median follow-up of 41 months (range 37-54). CONCLUSIONS: This report describes benign cystic lesions of the pineal gland in patients with hereditary Rb, suggesting a benign variant of TRb. Underlying possible pathogenetic mechanisms are discussed.

Satellizing Galileo? Non-state Authority and Interoperability Standards in the European Global Navigation Satellite System

This paper explores the extent and limits of non-state authority in international affairs. While a number of studies have emphasised the role of state support and the ability of strategically situated actors to capture regulatory processes, they often fail to unpack the conditions under which this takes place. In order to probe the assumption that structural market power, backed by political support, equates regulatory capture, the article examines the interplay of political and economic considerations in the negotiations to establish worldwide interoperability standards needed for the development of Galileo as a genuinely European global navigation satellite system under civil control. It argues that industries supported and identified as strategic by public actors are more likely to capture standardisation processes than those with the largest market share expected to be created by the standards. This suggests that the influence of industries in space, air and maritime traffic control closely related to the militaro-industrial complex remains disproportionate in comparison to the prospective market of location-based services expected to vastly transform business practices, labour relations and many aspects of our daily life.