The value premium and time-varying volatility

Numerous studies have documented the failure of the static and conditional capital asset pricing models to explain the difference in returns between value and growth stocks. This paper examines the post-1963 value premium by employing a model that captures the time-varying total risk of the value-minus-growth portfolios. Our results show that the time-series of value premia is strongly and positively correlated with its volatility. This conclusion is robust to the criterion used to sort stocks into value and growth portfolios and to the country under review (the US and the UK). Our paper is consistent with evidence on the possible role of idiosyncratic risk in explaining equity returns, and also with a separate strand of literature concerning the relative lack of reversibility of value firms' investment decisions.

A comparison of extreme value theory approaches for determining value at risk

This paper compares a number of different extreme value models for determining the value at risk (VaR) of three LIFFE futures contracts. A semi-nonparametric approach is also proposed, where the tail events are modeled using the generalised Pareto distribution, and normal market conditions are captured by the empirical distribution function. The value at risk estimates from this approach are compared with those of standard nonparametric extreme value tail estimation approaches, with a small sample bias-corrected extreme value approach, and with those calculated from bootstrapping the unconditional density and bootstrapping from a GARCH(1,1) model. The results indicate that, for a holdout sample, the proposed semi-nonparametric extreme value approach yields superior results to other methods, but the small sample tail index technique is also accurate.

Does active management add any value?

The question as to whether active management adds any value above that of the funds investment policy is one of continual interest to investors. In order to investigate this issue in the UK real estate market we examine a number of related questions. First, how much return variability is explained by investment policy? Second, how similar are the policies across funds? Third, how much of a fund’s return is determined by investment policy? Finally, how was this added value achieved? Using data for 19 real estate funds we find that investment policy explains less than half of the variability in returns over time, nothing of the variation across funds and that more than 100% of a level of return is attributed to investment policy. The results also show UK real estate fund focus exclusively on trying to pick winners to add value and that in pursuit of active return fund mangers incur high tracking error risk, consequently, successful active management is very difficult to achieve. In addition, the results are dependent on the benchmark used to represent the investment policy of the fund. Nonetheless, active management can indeed add value to a real estate funds performance. This is the good news. The bad news is adding value is much more difficult to achieve than is generally accepted.