942 resultados para Tariff heading
Resumo:
Nossa pesquisa pretende descrever a trajetória do Orçamento Participativo desde seu surgimento, em 1988, até 2000, através de seu processo de implantação e desenvolvimento que vem garantindo uma formação para a cidadania a partir de uma prática de participação política junto às populações integrantes do espaço social de Porto Alegre. Esse sistema estratégico de administração dos recursos públicos constituiu-se num exemplo da participação popular no espaço social. Tomou-se mesmo um instrumento símbolo da cidade, pois suas técnicas contribuem para esboçar um novo perfil da "formação para a cidadania". Nossa metodologia, partindo do objetivo de investigar a natureza da formação para a cidadania proporcionado pelo Orçamento Participativo, utilizou como técnicas de procedimento pesquisas documentais e bibliográficas, além de contatos diretos com vários agentes. Os instrumentos de pesquisa empregados nas coletas de dados, análise e interpretação, seguiram as seguintes técnicas: entrevistas junto aos conselheiros populares regionais e aos delegados das comissões temáticas.(representantes eleitos no processo do Orçamento Participativo); pesquisa documental e análise de conteúdo. As categorias de análise trabalhadas foram: o Orçamento Participativo, a formação para a cidadania e o habitus político (como um conhecimento adquirido, um haver, e/ou capital que indicam uma disposição incorporada, quase postural). Tal pesquisa é inédita devido à utilização do pressuposto teóricometodológico do sociólogo francês Pierre Bourdieu. Seus resultados têm demonstrado que garantir, em nível municipal, a transferência do poder de decisão dos investimentos públicos aos cidadãos de Porto Alegre proporciona um processo de politização cada vez mais amplo através da participação, autonomia e conseqüente formação de um novo habitus, rumo à auto gestão. Considerando que o processo de formação oportunizado pelo Orçamento Participativo garante uma valorização dos agentes sociais, este desencadeia um desabrochar do cidadão. A formação para a cidadania portanto, proporcionada por essa prática em mais de dez anos consecutivos, vem obtendo um reconhecimento internacional de destaque no cenário político do final do século xx.
Resumo:
This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.
Resumo:
Although the subject of a large number of studies, the debate on the links between trade reform and productivity growth is still unresolved and most studies at the micro level have not been able to establish a relationship between the two phenomena. Brazil provides a natural experiment to study this issue that is seldom available: it was one of the closest economies in the world until 1988, when trade reform was launched, and intra-industry data are available on an annual basis before, during and after liberalization. Using a panel of industry sectors this paper tests and measures the impact of trade reform on productivity growth. Results confirm the association between the former and the latter and show that the magnitude of the impact of tariff reduction on the growth rates of TFP and output per worker was substantial. Our data reveal large and widespread productivity improvement, so that the estimations in this paper are an indication that liberalization had an important effect on industrial performance in the country. Cross-sectional differences in protection are also investigated.
Resumo:
This paper analyses the equilibrium structure of protection in Mercosul, developing empirical analyses based on the literature ensuing from the sequence of models set forth by Grossman and Helpman since 1994. Not only Mercosul’s common external tariff (CET) may be explained under a political economy perspective, but the existence of deviations, both at the level of the external tariffs and at that of the internal ones, make it interesting to contrast several structures under this approach. Different general equilibrium frameworks, in which governments are concerned with campaign contributions and with the welfare of the average voter, while organized special-interest groups care only about the welfare of their members, are used as the theoretical basis of the empirical tests. We build a single equation for explaining the CET and two fourequations systems (one equation for each member) for explaining deviations from the CET and from the internal free trade between members. The results (at the two-digit level) shed an interesting light on the sectoral dynamics of protection in each country; notably, Brazil seems to fit in better in the model framework, followed by Uruguay. In the case of the CET, and of deviations from it, the interaction between the domestic lobbies in the four countries plays a major role. There is also suggestion that the lobby structure that bid for deviations, be they internal or external, differs from the one which bid for the CET.
Resumo:
A pesquisa procura identificar o elo existente entre a distribuição dos gastos e receitas públicas, entre as esferas de governo, e o desequilíbrio financeiro que se instalou no setor público federal. Desta forma, o estudo procura mostrar a evolução histórica da distribuição de tributos e encargos no Brasil, sempre procurando correlacioná-la ao crescimento da dívida pública. De forma embrionária o trabalho analisa o debate sobre a redefinição sobre o papel do Estado na economia e a participação dos atores envolvidos e suas propostas, para a diminuição do déficit público e, conseqüentemente, da dívida pública.
Resumo:
O propósito deste trabalho é examinar possíveis ganhos de bem-estar provenientes de arranjos comerciais entre Brasil e China sob a ótica de um modelo de equilíbrio geral computável, o chamado “modelo GTAP” (sigla para Global Trade Analysis Project). Com base em uma descrição extensiva das estruturas econômicas e comerciais dos países e das Vantagens Comparativas de cada um deles, é possível simular acordos preferenciais de comércio e analisar os resultados de bem-estar por meio da medida de Variação Equivalente. Outro aspecto referente ao comércio sino-brasileiro que pode ser avaliado pela medida de bem-estar é o desalinhamento cambial dos dois países e as consequências deste para as transações comerciais entre ambos. Utilizando o mesmo ferramental anteriormente citado, o trabalho busca avaliar o impacto de tal desalinhamento no bem-estar dos países, uma vez que o câmbio seja corrigido via ajuste tarifário.
Resumo:
Apresentação do Japão de hoje e suas relações econômicas e comerciais com o Brasil. Estudo do mercado japonês, condição de acesso, estrutura de comercialização e perspectivas futuras. Uma análise dos produtos da pauta de exportação brasileira ao Japão, que apesar da sua participação marginal no total da exportação apresentaram uma taxa de crescimento superior à média nos últimos cinco anos, possuindo um mercado não convenientemente explorado pelos empresários brasileiros.
Resumo:
A crise bancária que atingiu a Coreia do Sul em 2002 está relacionada, em grande parte, com a grande velocidade de crescimento e penetração da população no segmento de cartões de crédito, fazendo com que o país recebesse a denominação de “República dos Cartões de Plástico” pela mídia internacional. Em 2003, como resultado deste crescimento, o sistema financeiro do país precisou ser socorrido pelo governo sul coreano, pois o endividamento do consumidor havia saído do controle. Atualmente, alguns estudos indicam que o Brasil pode estar caminhando para uma situação semelhante, compensando o alto nível de endividamento da população sul-coreana, com as altas taxas de juros cobradas neste segmento pelos bancos brasileiros. Com base na experiência da Coreia do Sul, este trabalho explora as principais causas deste fenômeno, a motivação da população em buscar este tipo específico de financiamento, a dicotomia dos agentes ao tratar deste crescimento e quais medidas podem ser tomadas para evitar um possível colapso no sistema financeiro.
Resumo:
This paper examines the extent of rent-sharing in Brazil, between 1988 and 1995, combining two different data sets: annual industrial surveys (pIA) and annual household surveys (PNADs). The aim is to use the trade liberalization policies that took place in Brazil in the early 1990s as a "natural experiment" to examine the impact ofproduct market rents on wages. We first estimate inter-industry wage differentials in Brazil, using the household surveys, afier controlling for various observable workers' characteristics. In a reduced form fixed effects equation, these controlled inter-industry differentials are seen to depend on the industries' rate of effective tariff. We also find that LSDV estimates of the effect of value-added per worker (computed using the industrial surveys) on the wage differentials are positive, but somewhat small. However, we find that instrumenting the valued-added with the effective tariffs more than doubles the estimated rent-sharing coefficient. The paper concludes that rent-sharing is prevalent in the Brazilian manufacturing sector, and this mechanism transferred part of the productivity gains due to trade liberalization to manufacturing workers in the form ofhigher (controlled) wage premium.
Resumo:
From 1988 to 1995, when trade liberalization was implemented in Brazil, relative earnings of skilled workers decreased. In this paper, we investigate the role of trade liberalization in explaining these relative earnings movements, by checking all the steps predicted by the HeckscherOhlin- style trade transmission mechanism. We find that: i) employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and each Sector increased its relative share of skilled labor; ii) relative prices fell in skill intensive sectors; iii) tariff changes across sectors were not related to skill intensities, but the pass-through from tariffs to prices was stronger in skill intensive sectors; iv) the decline in skilled eamings differentials mandated by the price variation predicted by trade is very elose to the observed one. The results are compatible with trade liberalization, accounting for the observed rei ative eamings changes in Brazil.
Resumo:
In a nonnative approach, I analyze trade policies when the industrial sector genentes positive extemalities in production, and there are adjustments costs to changing production from one sector to the other. Protectionist trade policy can make workers intemalize the benetits from moving into the industrial sector, but it is a second best policy as it also causes consumption distortions. I show that if the govemment is able to fully commit to its tariff schedule for the future, the welfare maximizing policy is to maintain a positive tariff forever, even after all adjustment has already taken place . However, if the govemment is not able to commit at all, the only time consistent policy is zero tariff at any point in time. The time inconsistency of the full commitment policy is derived from the fact that in the model only production needs interference, and the production distortion is lagged one period with respect to the tariff wbile the consumption distortion is simultaneous to the tariff. In the intermediary case, i.e., when the government can commit for a limited period of time, the time consistent optimal tariff will be positive but lower than the "full commitment" tariff. This result indicates that some institutions that have always been considered pure sources of inefficiency, such as protectionist lobbying, may in fact be welfare improving in some cases!
Resumo:
Over the past few years, renewable energy subsidies have become one of the main sources of trade disputes in the WTO. A total of six cases have been initiated against renewable energy subsidy programs since the first of such disputes was brought by Japan against Canada’s Feed in Tariff (FIT) program in 2010. Yet not even a single case has so far been initiated against the much larger and environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies. The main objective of this paper is to examine what makes renewable energy subsidies vulnerable to WTO dispute, as compared fossil fuel subsidies.