A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Adopting a new religion: The case of Protestantism in 16th Century Germany

Using a rich dataset of territories and cities of the Holy Roman Empire in the16th century, this paper investigates the determinants of adoption and diffusion ofProtestantism as a state religion. A territory s distance to Wittenberg, the city whereMartin Luther taught, is a major determinant of adoption. This finding can be explainedthrough a theory of strategic neighbourhood interactions: in an uncertainlegal context, introducing the Reformation was a risky enterprise for territorial lords,and had higher prospects of success if powerful neighbouring states committed tothe new faith first. The model is tested in a panel dataset featuring the dates ofintroduction of the Reformation.

The implicit theory of historical change in the work of Alan S. Milward

Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory ofhistorical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist positedthat social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be agradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmicrevolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benignchange depended much less on natural resource endowment or technologicaldevelopments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changingpolitical demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamentalto formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meetthem. Since each society was different there was no single model of developmentto be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state onothers, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor coulddevelopment be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successfuleconomy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demandsarising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individuallybut could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasinginterdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to thesedomestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.

Risk reduction practices in men who have sex with men in Switzerland: serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation.

The aim of this study was to identify predictors of intentional use of the HIV risk reduction practices of serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation during unprotected anal intercourse (UAI) with casual partners. A cross-sectional survey pertaining to the Swiss HIV behavioral surveillance system, using an anonymous self-administered questionnaire, was conducted in 2007 in a self-selected sample of men having sex with other men (MSM). Analysis was restricted to participants with UAI with casual partner(s) (N = 410). Logistic regression was used to estimate factors associated with intentional use of serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation. In the previous 12 months, 71% of participants reported having UAI with a casual partner of different or unknown HIV-status. Of these, 47% reported practicing withdrawal, 38% serosorting, and 25% strategic positioning. In the 319 participants with known HIV-status, serosorting was associated with frequent Internet use to find partners (OR = 2.32), STI (OR = 2.07), and HIV testing in the past 12 months (OR = 1.81). Strategic positioning was associated with HIV-status (OR = 0.13) and having UAI with a partner of different or unknown HIV-status (OR = 3.57). Withdrawal was more frequently practiced by HIV-negative participants or participants reporting high numbers of sexual partners (OR = 2.48) and having UAI with a partner of unknown or different serostatus (OR = 2.08). Risk reduction practices are widely used by MSM, each practice having its own specificities. Further research is needed to determine the contextual factors surrounding harm reduction practices, particularly the strategic or opportunistic nature of their use.

A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are madecompatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is donethrough a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibilityproblems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only majorcooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of mostcooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept(like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in theNash program are adapted into the model.

Improving Transition Outcomes: State Transition Plan: Iowa's Youth Development Strategic Plan 2007-2010 developed by the Iowa Collaboration for Youth Development team

Iowa's youth development plan for fulfilling Iowa's Promise.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Scaled and adjusted restricted tests in multi-sample analysis of moment structures

We extend to score, Wald and difference test statistics the scaled and adjusted corrections to goodness-of-fit test statistics developed in Satorra and Bentler (1988a,b). The theory is framed in the general context of multisample analysis of moment structures, under general conditions on the distribution of observable variables. Computational issues, as well as the relation of the scaled and corrected statistics to the asymptotic robust ones, is discussed. A Monte Carlo study illustrates thecomparative performance in finite samples of corrected score test statistics.

Business cycle measurement with some theory

A method to evaluate cyclical models not requiring knowledge of the DGP and the exact specificationof the aggregate decision rules is proposed. We derive robust restrictions in a class of models; use someto identify structural shocks in the data and others to evaluate the class or contrast sub-models. Theapproach has good properties, even in small samples, and when the class of models is misspecified. Themethod is used to sort out the relevance of a certain friction (the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers)in a standard class of models.

Bringing game theory to hypothesis testing: Establishing finite sample bounds on inference

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.

The optimum quantity of money: Theory and evidence

In this paper we propose a simple and general model for computing the Ramsey optimal inflation tax, which includes several models from the previous literature as special cases. We show that it cannot be claimed that the Friedman rule is always optimal (or always non--optimal) on theoretical grounds. The Friedman rule is optimal or not, depending on conditions related to the shape of various relevant functions. One contribution of this paper is to relate these conditions to {\it measurable} variables such as the interest rate or the consumption elasticity of money demand. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money when there are economies of scale in the demand for money (the scale elasticity is smaller than one) and/or when money is required for the payment of consumption or wage taxes. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money more heavily when the interest elasticity of money demand is small. We present empirical evidence on the parameters that determine the optimal inflation tax. Calibrating the model to a variety of empirical studies yields a optimal nominal interest rate of less than 1\%/year, although that finding is sensitive to the calibration.

Relative price riddles in international business cycle theory: Are transport costs the explanation?

We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.