Probabilistic choice: A simple invariance.

When subjects must choose repeatedly between two or more alternatives, each of which dispenses reward on a probabilistic basis (two-armed bandit ), their behavior is guided by the two possible outcomes, reward and nonreward. The simplest stochastic choice rule is that the probability of choosing an alternative increases following a reward and decreases following a nonreward (reward following ). We show experimentally and theoretically that animal subjects behave as if the absolute magnitudes of the changes in choice probability caused by reward and nonreward do not depend on the response which produced the reward or nonreward (source independence ), and that the effects of reward and nonreward are in constant ratio under fixed conditions (effect-ratio invariance )--properties that fit the definition of satisficing . Our experimental results are either not predicted by, or are inconsistent with, other theories of free-operant choice such as Bush-Mosteller, molar maximization, momentary maximizing, and melioration (matching).

Same-sex gaze attraction influences mate-choice copying in humans.

Mate-choice copying occurs when animals rely on the mating choices of others to inform their own mating decisions. The proximate mechanisms underlying mate-choice copying remain unknown. To address this question, we tracked the gaze of men and women as they viewed a series of photographs in which a potential mate was pictured beside an opposite-sex partner; the participants then indicated their willingness to engage in a long-term relationship with each potential mate. We found that both men and women expressed more interest in engaging in a relationship with a potential mate if that mate was paired with an attractive partner. Men and women's attention to partners varied with partner attractiveness and this gaze attraction influenced their subsequent mate choices. These results highlight the prevalence of non-independent mate choice in humans and implicate social attention and reward circuitry in these decisions.

Enhanced rewarding properties of morphine, but not cocaine, in beta(arrestin)-2 knock-out mice.

The reinforcing and psychomotor effects of morphine involve opiate stimulation of the dopaminergic system via activation of mu-opioid receptors (muOR). Both mu-opioid and dopamine receptors are members of the G-protein-coupled receptor (GPCR) family of proteins. GPCRs are known to undergo desensitization involving phosphorylation of the receptor and the subsequent binding of beta(arrestins), which prevents further receptor-G-protein coupling. Mice lacking beta(arrestin)-2 (beta(arr2)) display enhanced sensitivity to morphine in tests of pain perception attributable to impaired desensitization of muOR. However, whether abrogating muOR desensitization affects the reinforcing and psychomotor properties of morphine has remained unexplored. In the present study, we examined this question by assessing the effects of morphine and cocaine on locomotor activity, behavioral sensitization, conditioned place preference, and striatal dopamine release in beta(arr2) knock-out (beta(arr2)-KO) mice and their wild-type (WT) controls. Cocaine treatment resulted in very similar neurochemical and behavioral responses between the genotypes. However, in the beta(arr2)-KO mice, morphine induced more pronounced increases in striatal extracellular dopamine than in WT mice. Moreover, the rewarding properties of morphine in the conditioned place preference test were greater in the beta(arr2)-KO mice when compared with the WT mice. Thus, beta(arr2) appears to play a more important role in the dopaminergic effects mediated by morphine than those induced by cocaine.

The evolutionary origins of human patience: temporal preferences in chimpanzees, bonobos, and human adults.

To make adaptive choices, individuals must sometimes exhibit patience, forgoing immediate benefits to acquire more valuable future rewards [1-3]. Although humans account for future consequences when making temporal decisions [4], many animal species wait only a few seconds for delayed benefits [5-10]. Current research thus suggests a phylogenetic gap between patient humans and impulsive, present-oriented animals [9, 11], a distinction with implications for our understanding of economic decision making [12] and the origins of human cooperation [13]. On the basis of a series of experimental results, we reject this conclusion. First, bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) exhibit a degree of patience not seen in other animals tested thus far. Second, humans are less willing to wait for food rewards than are chimpanzees. Third, humans are more willing to wait for monetary rewards than for food, and show the highest degree of patience only in response to decisions about money involving low opportunity costs. These findings suggest that core components of the capacity for future-oriented decisions evolved before the human lineage diverged from apes. Moreover, the different levels of patience that humans exhibit might be driven by fundamental differences in the mechanisms representing biological versus abstract rewards.

Attentional Biases in Value-Based Decision-Making

Humans make decisions in highly complex physical, economic and social environments. In order to adaptively choose, the human brain has to learn about- and attend to- sensory cues that provide information about the potential outcome of different courses of action. Here I present three event-related potential (ERP) studies, in which I evaluated the role of the interactions between attention and reward learning in economic decision-making. I focused my analyses on three ERP components (Chap. 1): (1) the N2pc, an early lateralized ERP response reflecting the lateralized focus of visual; (2) the feedback-related negativity (FRN), which reflects the process by which the brain extracts utility from feedback; and (3) the P300 (P3), which reflects the amount of attention devoted to feedback-processing. I found that learned stimulus-reward associations can influence the rapid allocation of attention (N2pc) towards outcome-predicting cues, and that differences in this attention allocation process are associated with individual differences in economic decision performance (Chap. 2). Such individual differences were also linked to differences in neural responses reflecting the amount of attention devoted to processing monetary outcomes (P3) (Chap. 3). Finally, the relative amount of attention devoted to processing rewards for oneself versus others (as reflected by the P3) predicted both charitable giving and self-reported engagement in real-life altruistic behaviors across individuals (Chap. 4). Overall, these findings indicate that attention and reward processing interact and can influence each other in the brain. Moreover, they indicate that individual differences in economic choice behavior are associated both with biases in the manner in which attention is drawn towards sensory cues that inform subsequent choices, and with biases in the way that attention is allocated to learn from the outcomes of recent choices.

The `Ulama' and the State: Negotiating Tradition, Authority and Sovereignty in Contemporary Pakistan

This dissertation is an account of how contemporary Pakistani ulama grapple with their political realities and the Islamic state of Pakistan. The central conceptual question that scaffolds my dissertation is: How do Pakistani ulama negotiate tradition, authority and sovereignty with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan? In engaging with this issue, this dissertation employs a methodology that weds ethnography with rigorous textual analysis. The ulama that feature in this study belong to a variety of sectarian persuasions. The Sunni ulama are Deobandi and Barelvi; the Shia ulama in this study are Ithna Ashari.

In assessing the relationship between Pakistani ulama and their nation-state, I assert that the ulama's dialectical engagements with the state are best understood as a dexterous navigation between affirmation, critique, contestation and cultivation. In proposing this manner of thinking about Pakistani ulama's engagements with their state, I provide a more detailed and nuanced view of the ulama-state relationship compared to earlier works. While emphasizing Pakistani ulama's vitality and their impact on their state, this dissertation also draws attention to the manners in which the state impacts the ulama. It theorizes the subject formation of the ulama and asserts the importance of understanding the ulama as formed not just by the ethico-legal tradition in which they are trained but also by the state apparatus.

Activation in mesolimbic and visuospatial neural circuits elicited by smoking cues: evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging.

OBJECTIVE: The authors sought to increase understanding of the brain mechanisms involved in cigarette addiction by identifying neural substrates modulated by visual smoking cues in nicotine-deprived smokers. METHOD: Event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to detect brain activation after exposure to smoking-related images in a group of nicotine-deprived smokers and a nonsmoking comparison group. Subjects viewed a pseudo-random sequence of smoking images, neutral nonsmoking images, and rare targets (photographs of animals). Subjects pressed a button whenever a rare target appeared. RESULTS: In smokers, the fMRI signal was greater after exposure to smoking-related images than after exposure to neutral images in mesolimbic dopamine reward circuits known to be activated by addictive drugs (right posterior amygdala, posterior hippocampus, ventral tegmental area, and medial thalamus) as well as in areas related to visuospatial attention (bilateral prefrontal and parietal cortex and right fusiform gyrus). In nonsmokers, no significant differences in fMRI signal following exposure to smoking-related and neutral images were detected. In most regions studied, both subject groups showed greater activation following presentation of rare target images than after exposure to neutral images. CONCLUSIONS: In nicotine-deprived smokers, both reward and attention circuits were activated by exposure to smoking-related images. Smoking cues are processed like rare targets in that they activate attentional regions. These cues are also processed like addictive drugs in that they activate mesolimbic reward regions.

Science incubators: synthesis centers and their role in the research ecosystem.

How should funding agencies enable researchers to explore high-risk but potentially high-reward science? One model that appears to work is the NSF-funded synthesis center, an incubator for community-led, innovative science.

Neuronal correlates of metacognition in primate frontal cortex.

Humans are metacognitive: they monitor and control their cognition. Our hypothesis was that neuronal correlates of metacognition reside in the same brain areas responsible for cognition, including frontal cortex. Recent work demonstrated that nonhuman primates are capable of metacognition, so we recorded from single neurons in the frontal eye field, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and supplementary eye field of monkeys (Macaca mulatta) that performed a metacognitive visual-oculomotor task. The animals made a decision and reported it with a saccade, but received no immediate reward or feedback. Instead, they had to monitor their decision and bet whether it was correct. Activity was correlated with decisions and bets in all three brain areas, but putative metacognitive activity that linked decisions to appropriate bets occurred exclusively in the SEF. Our results offer a survey of neuronal correlates of metacognition and implicate the SEF in linking cognitive functions over short periods of time.

Metacognition in monkeys during an oculomotor task.

This study investigated whether rhesus monkeys show evidence of metacognition in a reduced, visual oculomotor task that is particularly suitable for use in fMRI and electrophysiology. The 2-stage task involved punctate visual stimulation and saccadic eye movement responses. In each trial, monkeys made a decision and then made a bet. To earn maximum reward, they had to monitor their decision and use that information to bet advantageously. Two monkeys learned to base their bets on their decisions within a few weeks. We implemented an operational definition of metacognitive behavior that relied on trial-by-trial analyses and signal detection theory. Both monkeys exhibited metacognition according to these quantitative criteria. Neither external visual cues nor potential reaction time cues explained the betting behavior; the animals seemed to rely exclusively on internal traces of their decisions. We documented the learning process of one monkey. During a 10-session transition phase, betting switched from random to a decision-based strategy. The results reinforce previous findings of metacognitive ability in monkeys and may facilitate the neurophysiological investigation of metacognitive functions.