Does political capital create value in the IPO market? Evidence from China

This study examines the value of political capital in the Chinese IPO market. We find a positive relationship between a politically connected executive and the probability of IPO approval of entrepreneurial firms. We further identify that shareholders value those connections and give a market premium to connected firms after the firms go public. We provide evidence that other types of political capital gained through external sources, such as politically connected sponsors and PE investors, also bring benefits to the firms in their IPO approval, and these connections substitute for the effect of the executive's political connections on IPO approval. We argue that in emerging markets where government intervention is still prevalent, political capital does create value and entrepreneurial firms usually build political capital to facilitate their access to the IPO market, although other types of political capital do not bring further benefits into the post-IPO market.

Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on tunneling in China’s listed firms

We investigate the impact of manager political connection and founder status on tunneling in China's listed firms from 2004 to 2010. By classifying the political connections into three dimensions with two categories of controlling ownerships, we find that overall manager political connection is negatively related to tunneling in private firms but positively related to tunneling in SOEs. The CPC/CPPCC-type connection is likely to protect firms from tunneling, while the official-type connection facilitates tunneling from firms. The impact of these two types of political connection on tunneling is stronger at the central level than the local level. A chairman's political connection has significantly greater influence on tunneling than a CEO's connection. We also find that firms with founder-managers have a stronger resistance to tunneling than those with non-founder-managers, which is still observed in firms with politically connected founder-managers. Our results show that the incentives of various managers towards tunneling depend on their motivation for establishing relevant political connections.

Postmodern psychologies, societal practice, and political life

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Educating for futures in marginalized regions: a sociological framework for rethinking and researching aspirations

'Raising aspirations' for education among young people in low socioeconomic regions has become a widespread policy prescription for increasing human capital investment and economic competitiveness in so-called 'knowledge economies'. However, policy tends not to address difficult social, cultural, economic and political conditions for aspiring, based in structural changes associated with globalization. Drawing conceptually on the works of Pierre Bourdieu, Raymond Williams, Arjun Appadurai and authors in the Funds of Knowledge tradition, this article theorizes two logics for aspiring that are recognizable in research with young people and families: a doxic logic, grounded in populist-ideological mediations; and a habituated logic, grounded in biographic-historical legacies and embodied as habitus. A less tangible third 'logic' is also theorized: emergent senses of future potential, grounded in lived cultures, which hold possibility for imagining and pursuing alternative futures. The article offers a sociological framework for understanding aspirations as complex social-cultural phenomena, and for capacitating emergent and hopeful aspirations through school- and community-based research and dialogue. © 2013 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia.

A critique of the political theology of Slavoj Zizek

This chapter critiques the political theology of Slavoj Zizek as beset by social theoretical and strategic political problems. Political theology here is a privileged intellectual terrain on which to simultaneously resolve questions about liberating forms of social cohesion in a post-revolutionary political community and about cultural strategy in the radical program. In connection with the Marxist critique of religious ideology, Zizek’s work represents an important contribution to the research program that emerged from the Althusserian approaches to social theory. But although Zizek has the conceptual resources to generate a dialectical theory of the connection between religious ideology and political strategy, he instead opts for a theory of radical rupture with existing forms of life. Detoured through the encounter with Carl Schmitt, Zizek’s doctrine of radical rupture quickly becomes an inverted Schmittianism, freighted with the problems of the militarisation of politics and the arbitrary designation of enemies that he diagnoses in Schmitt, but does not transcend in his own response. Zizek’s figure of the “religious suspension of the ethical” brings the politics of rupture to its most problematic (and baroque) formulations, revealing the fundamental problem of the ideological representation of political structures.

Corporate political connections and the 2008 Malaysian election

We examine whether the relationship between political connections and firm value is moderated by the length of time firms have been politically connected. We find that compared to firms with political connections for a short period, firms with political connections for a long period have a smaller magnitude of negative stock price reaction to the 2008 General Election loss of the supermajority by the ruling party in Malaysia. We also find that the smaller magnitude of negative stock price reaction is, in part, attributable to improvements in board of director characteristics. Furthermore, we find that while the performance subsequent to the General Election of politically connected firms is worse than that of non-politically connected firms, firms with political connections for a long period exhibit better performance than those connected for short periods. Collectively, the evidence shows that the length of political connections is an important factor that moderates economic value.

The political economy of markets and development: a case study of health care consumption in the State of Kerala, India

Marketing theory has largely ignored the issue of power in influencing exchanges. Most of the studies either disregard the role of power, or resource power is the only dimension taken into account. In this study, we expand the existing understanding by centrally situating the role of socio-political power in the consumption process. We examine the health care system in the Indian state of Kerala and highlight that socio-political power is a crucial determinant of consumption levels. In the process, we argue that in a resource—constrained Third World society socio-political empowerment is critical to the development process.

Political connection and leverage: Some Malaysian evidence

This paper extends prior work on the linkage between politically connected (PCON) firms and capital structure in developing countries. Specifically, this paper focuses on the association between Malaysian PCON firms and leverage, and is motivated by the results of Fraser et al. (2006) who report a positive association between leverage and political patronage. Controlling for a potential misspecification in that paper, this study documents that a significant proportion (almost 12%) of the Malaysian PCON firms have negative equity, and builds on the previous paper by providing fresh evidence that market to book ratio is positively associated with leverage, and that borrowing PCON firms have significantly lower ROA compared to non-PCON firms. © 2012.

Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian evidence

This paper investigates the association between Malaysian politically connected (PCON) firms and the cost of debt. We extend previous research that finds Malaysian PCON firms are perceived as being of higher risk by the market, and by audit firms, by providing evidence that lenders also perceive these firms as being of higher risk. We also find that PCON firms have a significantly (1) higher extent of leverage, (2) higher likelihood of reporting a loss, (3) higher likelihood of having negative equity, and (4) higher likelihood of being audited by a big audit firm. We suggest that PCON firms are charged higher interest rates by lenders as a result of efficient contracting given their higher inherent risks. Additionally, we find that CEO duality present in PCON firms is perceived by lenders as being more risky, and that a higher proportion of independent directors on the audit committee mitigate this perceived risk. © 2012.

Auditor industry specialization, political economy and earnings quality: some cross-country evidence

Using cross-country data, we evaluate the impact of investor protection on the association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists. Our findings show that the positive association between industry specialist auditors and earnings quality as documented in the literature is affected by the political electoral system, which reflects investor protection rights in a country. We document that audits by industry specialists are associated with higher earnings quality in countries with the proportional electoral system, reflecting weak investor protection. Our results also confirm Kwon et al.'s findings that overall there is a positive association between earnings quality and audits by industry specialists in countries with weak legal enforcement. Our findings, however, indicate that Kwon et al.'s results are valid only for countries with weak investor protection reflected by the proportional electoral system and not for countries with strong investor protection reflected by the majoritarian electoral system. These findings thus suggest that higher earnings quality of firms audited by industry specialists across countries can especially be expected when investor protection is low and legal enforcement is also weak. In addition, our research suggests that future cross-country studies could explicitly consider the role of the political electoral system of a country in evaluating corporate governance, management and accounting issues.

Do political connections affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO Duality? Some evidence from Malaysian audit pricing

This study examines whether political connection to firms affects the association between audit committee independence and demand for higher quality audits. In line with Carcello et al. (2002), our findings show that there is a positive association between audit committee independence and audit fees thus supporting the hypothesis that more independent audit committees demand higher audit quality. However, we find that this relationship is weaker for politically connected (PCON) firms suggesting that the independence of audit committees in Malaysian PCON firms may be compromised. Additionally, we provide evidence that PCON firms that have CEO duality are perceived by audit firms as being of higher risk than CEO duality firms without political connection.

Does political economy reduce agency costs? Some evidence from dividend policies around the world

This study shows that firms in proportional-electoral countries pay out lower dividends and that the correlation between a firm's growth potential and dividend payout ratio is weaker in proportional-electoral countries. However, firms in proportional-electoral countries that cross-list in majoritarian system countries, tend to pay out higher dividends and the negative relation between growth potential and dividend payout tend to be stronger than their peers that do not cross-list. For a few countries that changed their electoral system towards a more proportional system, we observe a decrease in dividend payout ratio and a weaker relation between growth and dividends after the change. Overall these results indicate that a country's political system affects the severity of agency problems. Further, the effect of legal origin on dividend policy reverses once we include the political economy variables in the regressions. We also document that the electoral system not only affects the amount of dividends paid by a firm but also the form of payment.