955 resultados para Panama (Panama) American Congress, 1826.
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Item 1017-A, 1017-B (microfiche)
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"San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 16, 17, and 19, 1989"--Pt. 2.
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Includes index.
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Examines health and medical facilities in Africa south of Sahara and considers needs and opportunities for U.S. private investment in Africa.
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Vol.32-40 also called n.s., v.1-9
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Mode of access: Internet.
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No more published.
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"Letter from Wendell Phillips, Esq.": pages [xiii]-xvi.
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Variability in the test of Globorotalia menardii during the past 8 million years has been investigated at DSDP Site 502A (Caribbean Sea) and DSDP Site 503A (Eastern Equatorial Pacific). Measurements were made of spire height (delta x), maximum diameter (delta y), the tangent angles of the upper and lower peripheral keels (phi 1, phi 2, respectively), the number of chambers in the final whorl, and the area of the silhouette in keel view. Four morphotypes alpha, beta, gamma, and delta were distinguished. Morphotype alpha was found in strata ranging in age from the Late Miocene through the Holocene. It shows a continuous increase in delta x and delta y until the Late Pleistocene. During and after the final closure of the ancient Central American Seaway (between 2.4 Ma and 1.8 Ma) there was a rapid increase in the area of the test in keel view. At the Caribbean Sea site, morphotype beta evolved during the past 0.22 Ma. It is less inflated than alpha and has a more delicate test. In the morphospace of delta x vs. delta y, morphotypes alpha and beta can be distinguished by a separation line delta y = 3.2 * delta x - 160 (delta x and delta y in µm). Plots of morphotype alpha are below that line, those of beta are above it. Morphotype alpha is taken to be Globorotalia menardii menardii Parker, Jones & Brady (1865) and includes G. menardii 'A' Bolli (1970). Morphotype beta is identified as G. menardii cultrata (d'Orbigny). Morphotypes gamma and delta are extinct Upper Miocene to Pliocene forms which evolved from morphotype alpha. They have a narrower phi 1 angle and more chambers (>=7) than morphotype alpha commonly with 5 to 6 chambers (7 in transitional forms). In contemporaneous samples morphotype delta can be distinguished from gamma by a smaller value of phi 1 and 8 or more chambers in the final whorl. Morphotype gamma is taken to be G. limbata (Fornasini, 1902) and includes the junior synonym G. menardii 'B' Bolli (1970). Morphotype delta is G. multicamerata Cushman & Jarvis (1930). With the exception of the Late Pleistocene development of G. menardii cultrataonly in the Caribbean the morphological changes of G. menardii at DSDP Sites 502A and 503A are similar. The development from the ancestral G. menardii menardii of the G. limbata - G. multicamerata lineage during the Pliocene and of G. menardii cultrata during the Late Pleistocene suggests responses at the two sites to a changing palaeoceanography during and after the formation of the Isthmus of Panama.
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En este trabajo me propongo analizar la influencia de la revolución de Haití en las independencias de Venezuela y Colombia durante los años 1804-1825. Miintención es demostrar que las repercusiones del proceso haitiano fueron vastas, complejas y sufrieron importantes cambios durante el transcurso de los años. En líneas generales, la revolución generó pánico entre las elites criollas y peninsulares y esperanzas entre grupos de esclavos y pardos. Inicialmente los sectores criollos revolucionarios buscaron evitar todo contacto con la isla y eludir el modelo insurgente haitiano por considerar que produciría en la Tierra Firme una "guerra de razas" y una hecatombe similar a la que, en su opinión, allí había acontecido. Sin embargo, a partir de 1812-1813 debido a las dificultades de la guerra de independencia una fracción de la elite criolla comenzó a estrechar vínculos con la República del Sur de Haití a través de contactos diplomáticos y corsarios. Estas primeras relaciones, más bien tímidas, fueron la condición de posibilidad de un cambio importante que sobrevino en 1816. En dicho año, debido a la reconquista de la expedición realista, la mayoría de los líderes independentistas huyeron de Tierra Firme y tuvieron que exiliarse en Haití, uno de los pocos lugares donde encontraron refugio y apoyo. En aquel contexto, se dio el pacto entre Alexandre Petión y Simón Bolívar, por el cual el primero se comprometió a aportar armas, barcos y hombres a la causa patriota a cambio de la emancipación de los esclavos hispanoamericanos. Este acuerdo fue fundamental ya que no sólo posibilitó la exitosa contraofensiva independentista, sino que además le dio un cariz social al proceso revolucionario de Venezuela y Colombia. Así, a partir de 1816 y hasta 1821, se dieron numerosos contactos e incluso el gobierno de Jean Pierre Boyer (sucesor de Alexandre Petión) colaboró con otras dos expediciones a cargo de Gregor Mac Gregor para liberar Panamá y Río Hacha. Sin embargo, el cambio no fue total y aún durante estos años, los líderes criollos continuaron teniendo reparos frente al peligro de la explosión de un nuevo Haití en la Tierra Firme hispana. Por último, el fin de la guerra de independencia abrió un nuevo contexto en el cual aquellos miedos se intensificaron debido a la movilización social interna. Esto derivó en nuevo alejamiento y el gobierno de Colombia no sólo se negó a mantener relaciones con Haití, sino que incluso lo excluyó del Congreso de Panamá.
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The Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991 marks the end of the Cold War and the elimination of the United States' main rival for global political-economic leadership. For decades U.S. foreign policymakers had formulated policies aimed at containing the spread of Soviet communism and Moscow's interventionist policies in the Americas. They now assumed that Latin American leftist revolutionary upheavals could also be committed to history. This study explores how Congress takes an active role in U.S. foreign policymaking when dealing with revolutionary changes in Latin America. This study finds that despite Chávez's vitriolic statements and U.S. economic vulnerability due to its dependence on foreign oil sources, Congress today sees Chávez as a nuisance and not a threat to U.S. vital interests. Devoid of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American patron intent on challenging the United States for regional leadership, Chávez is seen by Congress largely as a threat to the stability of Venezuela's institutions and political-economic stability. Today both the U.S. executive and the legislative branches largely see Bolivarianism a distraction and not an existential threat. The research is based on an examination of Bolivarian Venezuela compared to revolutionary upheaval and governance in Nicaragua over the course of the twentieth century. This project is largely descriptive, qualitative in approach, but quantitative data are used when appropriate. To analyze both the U.S. executive and legislative branches' reaction to revolutionary change, Cole Blasier's theoretical propositions as developed in the Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910-1985 are utilized. The present study highlights the fact that Blasier's propositions remain a relevant means for analyzing U.S. foreign policymaking.
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Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.
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This dissertation poses a set of six questions about one of the Israel Lobby's particular components, a Potential Christian Jewish coalition (PCJc) within American politics that advocates for Israeli sovereignty over "Judea and Samaria" ("the West Bank"). The study addresses: the profiles of the individuals of the PCJc; its policy positions, the issues that have divided it, and what has prevented, and continues to prevent, the coalition from being absorbed into one or more of the more formally organized components of the Israel Lobby; the resources and methods this coalition has used to attempt to influence U.S. policy on (a) the Middle East, and (b) the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular; the successes or failures of this coalition's advocacy and why it has not organized; and what this case reveals about interest group politics and social movements in the United States. This dissertation follows the descriptive-analytic case-study tradition that comprises a detailed analysis of a specific interest group and one policy issue, which conforms to my interest in the potential Christian Jewish coalition that supports a Jewish Judea and Samaria. I have employed participant observation, interviewing, content analysis and documentary research. The findings suggest: The PCJc consists of Christian Zionists and mostly Jews of the center religious denominations. Orthodox Jewish traditions of separation from Christians inhibit like-minded Christians and Jews from organizing. The PCJc opposes an Arab state in Judea and Samaria, and is not absorbed into more formally organized interest groups that support that policy. The PCJc's resources consist of support and funding from conservatives. Methods include use of education, debates and media. Members of the PCJc are successful because they persist in their support for a Jewish Judea and Samaria and meet through other organizations around Judeo-Christian values. The PCJc is deterred from advocacy and organization by a mobilization of bias from a subgovernment in Washington, D.C. comprising Congress, the Executive branch and lobby organizations. The study's results raise questions about interest group politics in America and the degree to which the U.S. political system is pluralistic, suggesting that executive power constrains the agenda to "safe" positions it favors.
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The Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991 marks the end of the Cold War and the elimination of the United States' main rival for global political-economic leadership. For decades U.S. foreign policymakers had formulated policies aimed at containing the spread of Soviet communism and Moscow's interventionist policies in the Americas. They now assumed that Latin American leftist revolutionary upheavals could also be committed to history. This study explores how Congress takes an active role in U.S. foreign policymaking when dealing with revolutionary changes in Latin America. This study finds that despite Chavez's vitriolic statements and U.S. economic vulnerability due to its dependence on foreign oil sources, Congress today sees Chavez as a nuisance and not a threat to U.S. vital interests. Devoid of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American patron intent on challenging the United States for regional leadership, Chavez is seen by Congress largely as a threat to the stability of Venezuela's institutions and political-economic stability. Today both the U.S. executive and the legislative branches largely see Bolivarianism a distraction and not an existential threat. The research is based on an examination of Bolivarian Venezuela compared to revolutionary upheaval and governance in Nicaragua over the course of the twentieth century. This project is largely descriptive, qualitative in approach, but quantitative data are used when appropriate. To analyze both the U.S. executive and legislative branches' reaction to revolutionary change, Cole Blasier's theoretical propositions as developed in the Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910- 1985 are utilized. The present study highlights the fact that Blasier's propositions remain a relevant means for analyzing U.S. foreign policymaking.
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The delta18O values of planktonic foraminifera increased in the Caribbean by about 0.5? relative to the equatorial East Pacific values between 4.6 and 4.2 Ma as a consequence of the closure of the Central American Gateway (CAG). This increase in delta18O can be interpreted either as an increase in Caribbean sea surface (mixed layer) salinity (SSS) or as a decrease in sea surface temperatures (SST). This problem represents an ideal situation to apply the recently developed paleotemperature proxy delta44/40Ca together with Mg/Ca and d18O on the planktic foraminifer Globigerinoides sacculifer from ODP Site 999. Although differences in absolute temperature calibration of delta44/40Ca and Mg/Ca exist, the general pattern is similar indicating a SST decrease of about 2-3 8C between 4.4 and 4.3 Ma followed by an increase in the same order of magnitude between 4.3 and 4.0 Ma. Correcting the delta18O record for this temperature change and assuming that changes in global ice volume are negligible, the salinity-induced planktonic delta18O signal decreased by about 0.4? between 4.4 and 4.3 Ma and increased by about 0.9? between 4.3 and 4.0 Ma in the Caribbean. The observed temperature and salinity trends are interpreted to reflect the restricted exchange of surface water between the Caribbean and the Pacific in response to the shoaling of the Panamanian Seaway, possibly accompanied by a southward shift of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) between 4.4 and 4.3 Ma. Differences in Mg/Ca- and delta44/40Ca-derived temperatures can be reconciled by corrections for secular variations of the marine Mg/Ca[sw] and delta44/40Ca, a salinity effect on the Mg/Ca ratio and a constant temperature offset of ~2.5 °C between both SST proxy calibrations.