Report of Savings by Using Video Conferencing Through Iowa Communications Network

Iowa Department of Transportation Fiscal Year 2007 Report of Savings by Using Video Conferencing Through Iowa Communications Network to the Iowa General Assembly Pursuant to Chapter II 84 Acts and Joint Resolutions Enacted at the 1994 Regular Session of the 75th General Assembly of the State of Iowa Code section 8D.10 Report of Savings by State Agencies Iowa Code section 8D.10 requires certain state agencies prepare an annual report to the General Assembly certifying the identified savings associated with that state agency’s use of the Iowa Communications Network (ICN). This report covers estimated cost savings related to video conferencing via ICN for the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT). In FY 2007, the DOT conducted two sessions utilizing ICN’s video conferencing system. These two sessions included DOT employees in Ames with non-DOT participants at remote ICN sites. Since the cost savings is calculated based on DOT staff savings, no cost savings from these conferences were gained because the public participants were attending from the ICN sites.

Robust response transformations based on optimal prediction

Nonlinear regression problems can often be reduced to linearity by transforming the response variable (e.g., using the Box-Cox family of transformations). The classic estimates of the parameter defining the transformation as well as of the regression coefficients are based on the maximum likelihood criterion, assuming homoscedastic normal errors for the transformed response. These estimates are nonrobust in the presence of outliers and can be inconsistent when the errors are nonnormal or heteroscedastic. This article proposes new robust estimates that are consistent and asymptotically normal for any unimodal and homoscedastic error distribution. For this purpose, a robust version of conditional expectation is introduced for which the prediction mean squared error is replaced with an M scale. This concept is then used to develop a nonparametric criterion to estimate the transformation parameter as well as the regression coefficients. A finite sample estimate of this criterion based on a robust version of smearing is also proposed. Monte Carlo experiments show that the new estimates compare favorably with respect to the available competitors.

Fracture network characterization using hydrological and geophysical data

Les décisions de gestion des eaux souterraines doivent souvent être justiffées par des modèles quantitatifs d'aquifères qui tiennent compte de l'hétérogénéité des propriétés hydrauliques. Les aquifères fracturés sont parmi les plus hétérogènes et très difficiles à étudier. Dans ceux-ci, les fractures connectées, d'ouverture millimètrique, peuvent agir comme conducteurs hydrauliques et donc créer des écoulements très localisés. Le manque général d'informations sur la distribution spatiale des fractures limite la possibilité de construire des modèles quantitatifs de flux et de transport. Les données qui conditionnent les modèles sont généralement spatialement limitées, bruitées et elles ne représentent que des mesures indirectes de propriétés physiques. Ces limitations aux données peuvent être en partie surmontées en combinant différents types de données, telles que les données hydrologiques et de radar à pénétration de sol plus commun ément appelé géoradar. L'utilisation du géoradar en forage est un outil prometteur pour identiffer les fractures individuelles jusqu'à quelques dizaines de mètres dans la formation. Dans cette thèse, je développe des approches pour combiner le géoradar avec les données hydrologiques affn d'améliorer la caractérisation des aquifères fracturés. Des investigations hydrologiques intensives ont déjà été réalisées à partir de trois forage adjacents dans un aquifère cristallin en Bretagne (France). Néanmoins, la dimension des fractures et la géométrie 3-D des fractures conductives restaient mal connue. Affn d'améliorer la caractérisation du réseau de fractures je propose dans un premier temps un traitement géoradar avancé qui permet l'imagerie des fractures individuellement. Les résultats montrent que les fractures perméables précédemment identiffées dans les forages peuvent être caractérisées géométriquement loin du forage et que les fractures qui ne croisent pas les forages peuvent aussi être identiffées. Les résultats d'une deuxième étude montrent que les données géoradar peuvent suivre le transport d'un traceur salin. Ainsi, les fractures qui font partie du réseau conductif et connecté qui dominent l'écoulement et le transport local sont identiffées. C'est la première fois que le transport d'un traceur salin a pu être imagé sur une dizaines de mètres dans des fractures individuelles. Une troisième étude conffrme ces résultats par des expériences répétées et des essais de traçage supplémentaires dans différentes parties du réseau local. En outre, la combinaison des données de surveillance hydrologique et géoradar fournit la preuve que les variations temporelles d'amplitude des signaux géoradar peuvent nous informer sur les changements relatifs de concentrations de traceurs dans la formation. Par conséquent, les données géoradar et hydrologiques sont complémentaires. Je propose ensuite une approche d'inversion stochastique pour générer des modèles 3-D de fractures discrètes qui sont conditionnés à toutes les données disponibles en respectant leurs incertitudes. La génération stochastique des modèles conditionnés par géoradar est capable de reproduire les connexions hydrauliques observées et leur contribution aux écoulements. L'ensemble des modèles conditionnés fournit des estimations quantitatives des dimensions et de l'organisation spatiale des fractures hydrauliquement importantes. Cette thèse montre clairement que l'imagerie géoradar est un outil utile pour caractériser les fractures. La combinaison de mesures géoradar avec des données hydrologiques permet de conditionner avec succès le réseau de fractures et de fournir des modèles quantitatifs. Les approches présentées peuvent être appliquées dans d'autres types de formations rocheuses fracturées où la roche est électriquement résistive.

Aspects thérapeutiques de la vitamine D: quels taux cibler avec quels traitements [Therapeutic goal of vitamin D: optimal serum level and dose requirements].

Therapeutic goal of vitamin D: optimal serum level and dose requirements Results of randomized controlled trials and meta-analyses investigating the effect of vitamin D supplementation on falls and fractures are inconsistent. The optimal serum level 25(OH) vitamin D for musculoskeletal and global health is > or = 30 ng/ml (75 nmol/l) for some experts and 20 ng/ml (50 nmol/l) for some others. A daily dose of vitamin D is better than high intermittent doses to reach this goal. High dose once-yearly vitamin D therapy may increase the incidence of fractures and falls. High serum level of vitamin D is probably harmful for the musculoskeletal system and health at large. The optimal benefits for musculoskeletal health are obtained with an 800 UI daily dose and a serum level of near 30 ng/ml (75 nmol/l).

The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing

This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptationcost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long-term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of specific investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades of specific and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and specificity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.

The P-median problem in a changing network: The case of Barcelona

In this paper a p--median--like model is formulated to address theissue of locating new facilities when there is uncertainty. Severalpossible future scenarios with respect to demand and/or the travel times/distanceparameters are presented. The planner will want a strategy of positioning thatwill do as ``well as possible'' over the future scenarios. This paper presents a discrete location model formulation to address this P--Medianproblem under uncertainty. The model is applied to the location of firestations in Barcelona.

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the countrylevel, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.

Optimal negligence rule under limited liability

We study the standard economic model of unilateral accidents, in its simplest form, assumingthat the injurers have limited assets.We identify a second-best optimal rule that selects as duecare the minimum of first-best care, and a level of care that takes into account the wealth ofthe injurer. We show that such a rule in fact maximizes the precautionary effort by a potentialinjurer. The idea is counterintuitive: Being softer on an injurer, in terms of the required level ofcare, actually improves the incentives to take care when he is potentially insolvent. We extendthe basic result to an entire population of potentially insolvent injurers, and find that the optimalgeneral standards of care do depend on wealth, and distribution of income. We also show theconditions for the result that higher income levels in a given society call for higher levels of carefor accidents.

Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

Optimal magnitude and probability of fines

The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Assessing an intuitive condition for stability under a range of traffic conditions via a generalised Lu-Kumar network

We argue the importance both of developing simple sufficientconditions for the stability of general multiclass queueing networks and also of assessing such conditions under a range of assumptions on the weight of the traffic flowing between service stations. To achieve the former, we review a peak-rate stability condition and extend its range of application and for the latter, we introduce a generalisation of the Lu-Kumar network on which the stability condition may be tested for a range of traffic configurations. The peak-rate condition is close to exact when the between-station traffic is light, but degrades as this traffic increases.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.