On the fate of sexual traits under asexuality.

Environmental shifts and life-history changes may result in formerly adaptive traits becoming non-functional or maladaptive. In the absence of pleiotropy and other constraints, such traits may decay as a consequence of neutral mutation accumulation or selective processes, highlighting the importance of natural selection for adaptations. A suite of traits are expected to lose their adaptive function in asexual organisms derived from sexual ancestors, and the many independent transitions to asexuality allow for comparative studies of parallel trait maintenance versus decay. In addition, because certain traits, notably male-specific traits, are usually not exposed to selection under asexuality, their decay would have to occur as a consequence of drift. Selective processes could drive the decay of traits associated with costs, which may be the case for the majority of sexual traits expressed in females. We review the fate of male and female sexual traits in 93 animal lineages characterized by asexual reproduction, covering a broad taxon range including molluscs, arachnids, diplopods, crustaceans and eleven different hexapod orders. Many asexual lineages are still able occasionally to produce males. These asexually produced males are often largely or even fully functional, revealing that major developmental pathways can remain quiescent and functional over extended time periods. By contrast, for asexual females, there is a parallel and rapid decay of sexual traits, especially of traits related to mate attraction and location, as expected given the considerable costs often associated with the expression of these traits. The level of decay of female sexual traits, in addition to asexual females being unable to fertilize their eggs, would severely impede reversals to sexual reproduction, even in recently derived asexual lineages. More generally, the parallel maintenance versus decay of different trait types across diverse asexual lineages suggests that neutral traits display little or no decay even after extended periods under relaxed selection, while extensive decay for selected traits occurs extremely quickly. These patterns also highlight that adaptations can fix rapidly in natural populations of asexual organisms, in spite of their mode of reproduction.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.

Transaction Costs and Institutions

This paper proposes a simple framework for understanding endogenous transaction costs - their composition, size and implications. In a model of diversification against risk, we distinguish between investments in institutions that facilitate exchange and the costs of conducting exchange itself. Institutional quality and market size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents and conditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be decentralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxation and measurement issues.

Niche conservatism in non-native birds in Europe: niche unfilling rather than niche expansion

Aim Niche conservatism, or the extent to which niches are conserved across space and time, is of special concern for the study of non-native species as it underlies predictions of invasion risk. Based on the occurrence of 28 non-native birds in Europe, we assess to what extent Grinnellian realized niches are conserved during invasion, formulate hypotheses to explain the variation in observed niche changes and test how well species distribution models can predict non-native bird occurrence in Europe. Location Europe. Methods To quantify niche changes, a recent method that applies kernel smoothers to densities of species occurrence in a gridded environmental space was used. This corrects for differences in the availability of environments between study areas and allows discrimination between 'niche expansion' into environments new to the species and 'niche unfilling', whereby the species only partially fills its niche in the invaded range. Predictions of non-native bird distribution in Europe were generated using several distribution modelling techniques. Results Niche overlap between native and non-native bird populations is low, but niche changes are smaller for species having a higher propagule pressure and that were introduced longer ago. Non-native birds in Europe occupy a subset of the environments they inhabit in their native ranges. Niche expansion into novel environments is rare for most species, allowing species distribution models to accurately predict invasion risk. Main conclusions Because of the recent nature of most bird introductions, species occupy only part of the suitable environments available in the invaded range. This signals that apart from purely ecological factors, patterns of niche conservatism may also be contingent on population-specific historical factors. These results also suggest that many claims of niche differences may be due to a partial filling of the native niche in the invaded range and thus do not represent true niche changes.

Evaluation et interprétation de la douleur chez les patients non-communicants

Colloque de Formation de Centre d'Antalgie du CHUV Lausanne, Suisse, septembre, 2011

Distinct neurophysiological mechanisms mediate mixing costs and switch costs.

Using event-related potentials (ERPs), we investigated the neural response associated with preparing to switch from one task to another. We used a cued task-switching paradigm in which the interval between the cue and the imperative stimulus was varied. The difference between response time (RT) to trials on which the task switched and trials on which the task repeated (switch cost) decreased as the interval between cue and target (CTI) was increased, demonstrating that subjects used the CTI to prepare for the forthcoming task. However, the RT on repeated-task trials in blocks during which the task could switch (mixed-task blocks) were never as short as RTs during single-task blocks (mixing cost). This replicates previous research. The ERPs in response to the cue were compared across three conditions: single-task trials, switch trials, and repeat trials. ERP topographic differences were found between single-task trials and mixed-task (switch and repeat) trials at approximately 160 and approximately 310 msec after the cue, indicative of changes in the underlying neural generator configuration as a basis for the mixing cost. In contrast, there were no topographic differences evident between switch and repeat trials during the CTI. Rather, the response of statistically indistinguishable generator configurations was stronger at approximately 310 msec on switch than on repeat trials. By separating differences in ERP topography from differences in response strength, these results suggest that a reappraisal of previous research is appropriate.

Trade Costs, International Competition and Selection: The Effects of Unionisation on Market Size

Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.

Metabolic origin of insulin resistance in obesity with and without type 2 (non-insulin-dependent) diabetes mellitus.

A metabolic hypothesis is presented for insulin resistance in obesity, in the presence or absence of Type 2 (non-insulin-dependent) diabetes mellitus. It is based on physiological mechanisms including a series of negative feed-back mechanisms, with the inhibition of the function of the glycogen cycle in skeletal muscle as a consequence of decreased glucose utilization resulting from increased lipid oxidation in the obese. It considers the inhibition of glycogen synthase activity together with inhibition of glucose storage and impaired glucose tolerance. The prolonged duration of increased lipid oxidation, considered as the initial cause, may lead to Type 2 diabetes. This hypothesis is compatible with others based on the inhibition of insulin receptor kinase and of glucose transporter activities.

Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures

We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. This creates an incentive to form large entities. Individuals also incur a transportation cost depending on their location and that of the facility which makes small jurisdictions advantageous. We consider a fairly general class of distributions of agents and generalize previous versions of this model by allowing for non-linear transportation costs. We show that, in general, jurisdictions are not necessarily homogeneous. However, they are if facilities are always intraterritory and transportation costs are superadditive. Superadditivity can be weakened to strictly increasing and strictly concave when agents are uniformly distributed. Keywords: Consecutiveness, stratification, local public goods, coalition formation, country formation. JEL Classification: C71 (Cooperative Games), D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations), H73 (Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects).

My Group Beats Your Group: Evaluating Non-Income Inequalities

This paper proposes a new methodology, the Domination Index, to evaluate non-income inequalities between social groups such as inequalities of educational attainment, occupational status, health or subjective well-being. The Domination Index does not require specific cardinalisation assumptions, but only uses the ordinal structure of these non-income variables. We approach from an axiomatic perspective and show that a set of desirable properties for a group inequality measure when the variable of interest is ordinal, characterizes the Domination Index up to a positive scalar transformation. Moreover we make use of the Domination Index to explore the relation between inequality and segregation and show how these two concepts are related theoretically.

FDI, Trade Costs and Regional Asymmetries

We set up a trade model where three countries compete for an exogenous number of firms. Our innovation lies in the geography of the model. Of the three countries, one is the hub through which all trade takes place. First, we establish the natural geography of the region, which is given by the equilibrium distribution of industrial activity in the absence of taxes or subsidies. We then examine the implications for corporate taxes when the countries compete with each other to attract firms. We find that, even when all countries are the same size, the centrality of the hub gives it an advantage in tax setting, such that its equilibrium tax can be larger than that of the spokes and yet it still attracts a disproportionate share of industry. Thus geographic advantage in tax competition has a second dimension, centrality in addition to size.

The Liberal Ethics of Non-Interference and the Pareto Principle

We analyse the liberal ethics of non-interference applied to social choice. A liberal principle capturing noninterfering views of society and inspired by John Stuart Mill s conception of liberty, is examined. The principle captures the idea that society should not penalise agents after changes in their situation that do not a¤ect others. An impossibility for liberal approaches is highlighted: every social decision rule that satis es unanimity and a general principle of noninterference must be dictatorial. This raises some important issues for liberal approaches in social choice and political philosophy.