973 resultados para Liability for hazardous substances pollution damages
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Brand harm crisis often result in negative consumer responses. This thesis addresses the buffering and amplifying theoretical perspectives of brand equity effects. We theorize that brand equity may interplay with the nature of brand-harm crisis in shaping consumer reactions. Results from focus group studies provide interesting insights into the amplifying and buffering effects. Moreover, research findings from two experiment studies show that brand equity amplifies consumer negative responses in a performance-related crisis but only when the crisis is extremely severe. When the crisis becomes less severe, the amplifying effect diminishes from outset. However, in a value-related crisis, the amplifying effect of brand equity is pervasive regardless of the level of crisis severity. The current thesis adds to the extant literature by demonstrating that brand equity can have very complex effects on consumer responses, which are contingent on the severity and domain of a crisis. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.
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This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.
Resumo:
This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.
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