Close-in planets around giant stars: lack of hot-Jupiters and prevalence of multiplanetary systems

Extrasolar planets abound in almost any possible configuration. However, until five years ago, there was a lack of planets orbiting closer than 0.5 au to giant or subgiant stars. Since then, recent detections have started to populated this regime by confirming 13 planetary systems. We discuss the properties of these systems in terms of their formation and evolution off the main sequence. Interestingly, we find that 70.0 ± 6.6% of the planets in this regime are inner components of multiplanetary systems. This value is 4.2σ higher than for main-sequence hosts, which we find to be 42.4 ± 0.1%. The properties of the known planets seem to indicate that the closest-in planets (a< 0.06 au) to main-sequence stars are massive (i.e., hot Jupiters) and isolated and that they are subsequently engulfed by their host as it evolves to the red giant branch, leaving only the predominant population of multiplanetary systems in orbits 0.06 of this emerging observational trend in the context of formation and evolution of hot Jupiters.

Who Governs Educational Change? The Paradoxes of State Power and the Pursuit of Educational Reform in Post-Neoliberal Ecuador (2007-2015)

This study identifies and compares competing policy stories of key actors involved in the Ecuadorian education reform under President Rafael Correa from 2007-2015. By revealing these competing policy stories the study generates insights into the political and technical aspects of education reform in a context where state capacity has been eroded by decades of neoliberal policies. Since the elections in 2007, President Correa has focused much of his political effort and capital on reconstituting the state’s authority and capacity to not only formulate but also implement public policies. The concentration of power combined with a capacity building agenda allowed the Correa government to advance an ambitious comprehensive education reform with substantive results in equity and quality. At the same time the concentration of power has undermined a more inclusive and participatory approach which are essential for deepening and sustaining the reform. This study underscores both the limits and importance of state control over education; the inevitable conflicts and complexities associated with education reforms that focus on quality; and the limits and importance of participation in reform. Finally, it examines the analytical benefits of understanding governance, participation and quality as socially constructed concepts that are tied to normative and ideological interests.

Partial Privatization of State Holding Corporations

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Influence of delayed cholecystectomy after acute gallstone pancreatitis on recurrence: consequences of lack of resources

Introduction: Acute pancreatitis is often a relapsing condition, particularly when its triggering factor persists. Our goal is to determine the recurrence rate of acute biliary pancreatitis after an initial episode, and the time to relapse, as well as to identify the risk factors for recurrence. Material and method: We included all patients admitted for a first acute gallstone pancreatitis event during four years. Primary endpoints included readmission for recurrence and time to relapse. Results: We included 296 patients admitted on a total of 386 occasions. The incidence of acute biliary pancreatitis in our setting is 17.5/100,000 population/year. In all, 19.6% of pancreatitis were severe (22.6% of severe acute pancreatitis for first episodes versus 3.6% for recurring pancreatitis), with an overall mortality of 4.4%. Overall recurrence rate was 15.5%, with a median time to relapse of 82 days. In total, 14.2% of patients relapsed after an acute pancreatitis event without cholecystectomy or endoscopic retrograde cholangio-pancreatography. Severe acute pancreatitis recur in 7.2% of patients, whereas mild cases do so in 16.3%, this being the only risk factor for recurrence thus far identified. Conclusions: Patients admitted for pancreatitis should undergo cholecystectomy as soon as possible or be guaranteed priority on the waiting list. Otherwise, endoscopic retrograde cholangio-pancreatography with sphincterotomy may be an alternative to surgery for selected patients.

Corporate social responsibility reporting in the mining sector of Tanzania:(Lack of) government regulatory controls and NGO activism

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate on governance, accountability, transparency and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the mining sector of a developing country context. It examines the reporting practices of the two largest transnational gold-mining companies in Tanzania in order to draw attention to the role played by local government regulations and advocacy and campaigning by nationally organised non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with respect to promoting corporate social reporting practices. Design/methodology/approach – The paper takes a political economy perspective to consider the serious implications of the neo-liberal ideologies of the global capitalist economy, as manifested in Tanzania’s regulatory framework and in NGO activism, for the corporate disclosure, accountability and responsibility of transnational companies (TNCs). A qualitative field case study methodology is adopted to locate the largely unfamiliar issues of CSR in the Tanzanian mining sector within a more familiar literature on social accounting. Data for the case study were obtained from interviews and from analysis of documents such as annual reports, social responsibility reports, newspapers, NGO reports and other publicly available documents. Findings – Analysis of interviews, press clips and NGO reports draws attention to social and environmental problems in the Tanzanian mining sector, which are arguably linked to the manifestation of the broader crisis of neo-liberal agendas. While these issues have serious impacts on local populations in the mining areas, they often remain invisible in mining companies’ social disclosures. Increasing evidence of social and environmental ills raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the regulatory frameworks, as well as the roles played by NGOs and other pressure groups in Tanzania. Practical implications – By empowering local NGOs through educational, capacity building, technological and other support, NGOs’ advocacy, campaigning and networking with other civil society groups can play a pivotal role in encouraging corporations, especially TNCs, to adopt more socially and environmentally responsible business practices and to adhere to international and local standards, which in turn may help to improve the lives of many poor people living in developing countries in general, and Tanzania in particular. Originality/value – This paper contributes insights from gold-mining activities in Tanzania to the existing literature on CSR in the mining sector. It also contributes to political economy theory by locating CSR reporting within the socio-political and regulatory context in which mining operations take place in Tanzania. It is argued that, for CSR reporting to be effective, robust regulations and enforcement and stronger political pressure must be put in place.

Roster of State Officials, 2007

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 2001

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 2000

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 1999

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 1998

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 1996

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 1995

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 1994

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 1993

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.