Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Clarke Community School District, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2006

Community School District Audit Report

City of Knoxville, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report

Sheldon Community School District, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

Community School District Audit Report

Peace Officer's Retirement, Accident and Disability System, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements and Required Supplementary Information, June 30, 2006

State Audit Reports

Does Health Information Matter for Modifying Consumption?, October 2006

A field experiment was conducted in France to evaluate the impact of health information on fish consumption. A warning given to the treatment group revealed the risks of methylmercury contamination in fish and also gave consumption recommendations. Using difference-indifferences estimation, we show that this warning led to a significant but relatively weak decrease in fish consumption. However, consumption of the most contaminated fish did not decrease despite advice to avoid consumption of these types of fish. Accompanying questionnaires show that consumers imperfectly memorize the fish species quoted in the warning. The results point to the relatively poor efficacy of a complex health message, despite its use by health agencies around the world.

City of Hiawatha, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report

Iowa Corn Promotion Board, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements, Supplementary Information and Schedule of Findings, August 31, 2005 & 2006

State Audit Reports

City of Jesup, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report

Butler County, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

County Audit Report

City of Wapello, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report

City of Hartford, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2005

City Audit Report

Iowa Public Television, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, June 30, 2006

State Audit Reports

Iowa Lottery Authority, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

State Audit Reports

City of Bedford, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report