985 resultados para Income group
Resumo:
A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program
Resumo:
A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program
Resumo:
A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, October 2007
Resumo:
Revision of the Leucosphyrus Group of Anopheles (Cellia) (Diptera, Culicidae). This is a comprehensive revision of 20 species of the Leucosphyrus Group of the Neomyzomyia Series of Anopheles (Cellia). Morphological description of the adults, male and female, male genitalia, pupa and fourth-instar larva are provided for each taxon in addition to bionomics, distribution data and systematic discussion for each species, including diagnostic characters. Identification keys for females and fourth-instar larvae are provided. When possible medical importance of each species is included. Illustrations of of the adults, fourth-instar larvae and pupae are provided. Distribution maps for each species are mainly based on the material examined; however, when possible published data were also used. Tables on adult character variations, fourth-instar larval and pupal setal branching are included as appendices. A neotype for An. takasagoensis Morishita and An. sulawesi Koesoemawinangoen, and a lectotype for An. balabacensis Baisas, are designated. The authorship of An. sulawesi previously cited as Waktoedi is corrected to Koesoemawinangoen.
Resumo:
If you have limited income and resources, the State of Iowa may pay some of your Medicare expenses. Programs paying these expenses are shown in the chart on page 2. To see if you might be eligible, answer the questions below.
Resumo:
COBRA stands for Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act *COBRA is not insurance; it is the law, since 1985. COBRA allows employees and their dependents to continue employer group health insurance for several months when that insurance would usually end. *Insurance plans under COBRA are private health plans, not plans sold by the government. *The U.S. Departments of Labor and Treasury enforce COBRA.
Resumo:
We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.
Resumo:
We evaluate the effect of a 2003 reform in the Spanish income tax on fertility and the employment of mothers with small children. The reform introduced a tax credit for working mothers with children under the age of three, while also increasing child deductions for all households with children. Theoretically, given the interplay of these two components, the expected effect of the reform is ambiguous on both outcomes. We find that the combined reforms significantly increased both fertility (by almost five percent) and the employment rate of mothers with children under three (by two percent). These effects were more pronounced among less-educated women. In addition, to disentangle the impact of the two reform components, we use an earlier reform that increased child deductions in 1999. We find that the child deductions affect mothers employment negatively, which implies that the 2003 tax credit would have increased employment even more (up to five percent) in the absence of the change in child deductions.
Resumo:
PURPOSE: O6-methylguanine-methyltransferase (MGMT) promoter methylation has been shown to predict survival of patients with glioblastomas if temozolomide is added to radiotherapy (RT). It is unknown if MGMT promoter methylation is also predictive to outcome to RT followed by adjuvant procarbazine, lomustine, and vincristine (PCV) chemotherapy in patients with anaplastic oligodendroglial tumors (AOT). PATIENTS AND METHODS: In the European Organisation for the Research and Treatment of Cancer study 26951, 368 patients with AOT were randomly assigned to either RT alone or to RT followed by adjuvant PCV. From 165 patients of this study, formalin-fixed, paraffin-embedded tumor tissue was available for MGMT promoter methylation analysis. This was investigated with methylation specific multiplex ligation-dependent probe amplification. RESULTS: In 152 cases, an MGMT result was obtained, in 121 (80%) cases MGMT promoter methylation was observed. Methylation strongly correlated with combined loss of chromosome 1p and 19q loss (P = .00043). In multivariate analysis, MGMT promoter methylation, 1p/19q codeletion, tumor necrosis, and extent of resection were independent prognostic factors. The prognostic significance of MGMT promoter methylation was equally strong in the RT arm and the RT/PCV arm for both progression-free survival and overall survival. In tumors diagnosed at central pathology review as glioblastoma, no prognostic effect of MGMT promoter methylation was observed. CONCLUSION: In this study, on patients with AOT MGMT promoter methylation was of prognostic significance and did not have predictive significance for outcome to adjuvant PCV chemotherapy. The biologic effect of MGMT promoter methylation or pathogenetic features associated with MGMT promoter methylation may be different for AOT compared with glioblastoma.
Resumo:
A-1a - SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM - December 2007
Resumo:
A-1a - SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM - November 2007
Resumo:
Medicare Deductible, co-insurance and premiuns form, and rescription drugs plans.
Resumo:
We use aggregate GDP data and within-country income shares for theperiod 1970-1998 to assign a level of income to each person in theworld. We then estimate the gaussian kernel density function for theworldwide distribution of income. We compute world poverty rates byintegrating the density function below the poverty lines. The $1/daypoverty rate has fallen from 20% to 5% over the last twenty five years.The $2/day rate has fallen from 44% to 18%. There are between 300 and500 million less poor people in 1998 than there were in the 70s.We estimate global income inequality using seven different popularindexes: the Gini coefficient, the variance of log-income, two ofAtkinson s indexes, the Mean Logarithmic Deviation, the Theil indexand the coefficient of variation. All indexes show a reduction in globalincome inequality between 1980 and 1998. We also find that most globaldisparities can be accounted for by across-country, not within-country,inequalities. Within-country disparities have increased slightly duringthe sample period, but not nearly enough to offset the substantialreduction in across-country disparities. The across-country reductionsin inequality are driven mainly, but not fully, by the large growth rateof the incomes of the 1.2 billion Chinese citizens. Unless Africa startsgrowing in the near future, we project that income inequalities willstart rising again. If Africa does not start growing, then China, India,the OECD and the rest of middle-income and rich countries diverge awayfrom it, and global inequality will rise. Thus, the aggregate GDP growthof the African continent should be the priority of anyone concerned withincreasing global income inequality.
Resumo:
We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.