To the Justices of the Police Court of Boston, 1828 April

Draft of a complaint against the boys in Croswell's neighborhood.

Complaint to the Police Court of Boston, 1831 November 18

One draft of a complaint regarding noisy neighbors.

Handbook of British fungi, with full descriptions of all the species, and illustrations of the genera. By M. C. Cooke, M.A.

1

Handbook of British fungi, with full descriptions of all the species, and illustrations of the genera. By M. C. Cooke, M.A.

2

Records of cases before the Mayor's Court of Albany, 1786-1796

Contains a summary of cases before the court beginning with the litigants and the damages sought, the legal action, names of counsel, actions taken, and the final disposition of the case. Most actions taken relate to debt, assault and battery, and slander and libel. At the back of the manuscript are "an account of law books by me purchased in the year 1784 & 1785" [p. 120], and"a list miscellanious books bought in the year 1784 & 1785" [p. 132].

Cases adjudged in the General Court of Virginia, 1733-1741

A copy of the reports by Edward Barradall of decisions of the general court of Virginia made by Gustavus A. Myers for William Green from a copy lent him by Conway Robinson.

At a court of admiralty held at Boston ... the 22d day of 1704 was condemned the briggantine Charles whereof John Quelch was late commander ... , 1704

Attestation regarding the trial of Quelch and other defendants, who were convicted of piracy. Signed: John Valentine, registrar.

Chancery decree, June 1786

Portion of decree in the case of George John Fardo v. Commissioners of Confiscation. Signed by Richard Hutson, John Mathews and John Rutledge. Filed 20 June 1786. The text of the decree itself, evidently once enclosed in this sheet, is missing.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the Union? Research Paper in Law 8/2003

[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.