Towards ‘EuroNest 2.0’: What should the next European Parliament learn from its predecessor? CEPS Policy Brief No. 300, 1 October 2013

The development and functioning of the EU-Eastern Partnership Parliamentary Assembly (EuroNest PA) is the focus of this Policy Brief, in which the authors argue that despite organising a number of meetings and adopting several resolutions in the past two years, the Assembly is failing to reach its objectives of promoting economic and political integration between the EU and the Eastern Partners. Three main problems are considered in this paper: i) the criticism of the European Parliament for being inconsistent about the conditions under which countries can send delegates ii) the fact that the parliamentary meetings are too short and infrequent, and iii) the observation that the Eastern Partners focus too much on national and bilateral issues, thus failing to engage in multilateral dialogue. A number of recommendations are put forward to enhance the effectiveness of the Assembly.

The European Central Bank in the age of banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/13, 1 October 2013

During the crisis the European Central Bank’s roles have been greatly extended beyond its price stability mandate. In addition to the primary objective of price stability and the secondary objective of supporting EU economic policies, we identify ten new tasks related to monetary policy and financial stability. We argue that there are three main constraints on monetary policy: fiscal dominance, financial repercussions and regional divergences. By assessing the ECB’s tasks in light of these constraints, we highlight a number of synergies between these tasks and the ECB’s primary mandate of price stability. But we highlight major conflicts of interest related to the ECB’s participation in financial assistance programmes. We also underline that the ECB’s government bond purchasing programmes have introduced the concept of ‘monetary policy under conditionality’, which involves major dilemmas. A solution would be a major change towards a US-style system, in which state public debts are small, there are no federal bail-outs for states, the central bank does not purchase state debt and banks do not hold state debt. Such a change is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.