Magnetic microstructures from magnetic force microscopy and Monte Carlo simulation in CoFe-Ag-Cu granular films

CoFe-Ag-Cu granular films, prepared by rf sputtering, displayed magnetic domain microstructures for ferromagnetic concentrations above about 32% at, and below the percolation threshold. All samples have a fcc structure with an (111) texture perpendicular to the film plane. Magnetic force microscopy (MFM) showed a variety of magnetic domain microstructures, extremely sensitive to the magnetic history of the sample, which arise from the balance of the ferromagnetic exchange, the dipolar interactions and perpendicular magnetocrystalline anisotropy, MFM images indicate that in virgin samples, magnetic bubble domains with an out-of-plane component of the magnetization are surrounded by a quasicontinuous background of opposite magnetization domains. The application of a magnetic field in different geometries drastically modifies the microstructure of the system in the remanent state: i) for an in-plane field, the MFM images show that most of the magnetic moments are aligned along the film plane, ii) for an out-of-plane field, the MFM signal increases about one order of magnitude, and out-of-plane striped domains with alternating up and down magnetization are stabilized. Numerical simulations show that a variety of metastable domain structures (similar to those observed experimentally) can be reached, depending on magnetic history, in systems with competing perpendicular anisotropy, exchange and dipolar interactions.

Computer simulation study of liquid lithium at 470 and 843 K

Both structural and dynamical properties of 7Li at 470 and 843 K are studied by molecular dynamics simulation and the results are comapred with the available experimental data. Two effective interatomic potentials are used, i.e., a potential derived from the Ashcroft pseudopotential [Phys. Lett. 23, 48 (1966)] and a recently proposed potential deduced from the neutral pseudoatom method [J. Phys.: Condens. Matter 5, 4283 (1993)]. Although the shape of the two potential functions is very different, the majority of the properties calculated from them are very similar. The differences among the results using the two interaction models are carefully discussed.

Extreme times in financial markets.

We apply the theory of continuous time random walks (CTRWs) to study some aspects involving extreme events in financial time series. We focus our attention on the mean exit time (MET). We derive a general equation for this average and compare it with empirical results coming from high-frequency data of the U.S. dollar and Deutsche mark futures market. The empirical MET follows a quadratic law in the return length interval which is consistent with the CTRW formalism.

Self-dynamic structure factor of dense liquids: Theory and simulation

The self-intermediate dynamic structure factor Fs(k,t) of liquid lithium near the melting temperature is calculated by molecular dynamics. The results are compared with the predictions of several theoretical approaches, paying special attention to the Lovesey model and the Wahnstrm and Sjgren mode-coupling theory. To this end the results for the Fs(k,t) second memory function predicted by both models are compared with the ones calculated from the simulations.

Random diffusion and leverage effect in financial markets

We prove that Brownian market models with random diffusion coefficients provide an exact measure of the leverage effect [J-P. Bouchaud et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 228701 (2001)]. This empirical fact asserts that past returns are anticorrelated with future diffusion coefficient. Several models with random diffusion have been suggested but without a quantitative study of the leverage effect. Our analysis lets us to fully estimate all parameters involved and allows a deeper study of correlated random diffusion models that may have practical implications for many aspects of financial markets.

Magnetic relaxation of a one-dimensional model for small particle systems with dipolar interactions: Monte Carlo simulation

Atribution as a function of the time are analyzed and this study leads to a deeper knowledge of the microscopic processes involved in the magnetic relaxation

Diffusive transport properties in monovalent and divalent metal-ion halide melts: A computer simulation study

Self- and cross-velocity correlation functions and related transport coefficients of molten salts are studied by molecular-dynamics simulation. Six representative systems are considered, i.e., NaCl and KCl alkali halides, CuCl and CuBr noble-metal halides, and SrCl2 and ZnCl2 divalent metal-ion halides. Computer simulation results are compared with experimental self-diffusion coefficients and electrical conductivities. Special attention is paid to dynamic cross correlations and their dependence on the Coulomb interactions as well as on the size and mass differences between anions and cations.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.