Brno: Transport to Terezin (Theresienstadt)

People in winter clothing, in a barren room lit by a bare bulb. Inscription in Czech: transport to the primary school.

Eva Stroh Family Collection 1860-2005 Bulk: 1912-1950

The Eva Stroh Family Collection provides material on the lives and family history of members of the Sondheimer and Stroh families. The collection consists of numerous photos and several photo albums, family trees, official documents, correspondence, published articles and clippings and some notes, a notebook documenting cultural activities and some daily calendars.

Sankarihautaus vapaussodassa : valkoisten kaatuneiden hautaaminen Suomessa vuonna 1918

Civil War Hero Burials the funerals of the fallen White in Finland in 1918 This study focuses on the burial with honours of fallen White combatants during the Finnish Civil War of 1918, as well as on the reasons underpinning the practice. The main sources of the study included the archives of the White army, the Civil Guard organisation and the Church, as well as the newspapers. The genetic method of history research was used. Both the existing tradition of military burials and the ecclesiastical burial culture influenced the burials of those who fell during the Civil War. The first war hero funerals took place as early as the beginning of February 1918, and the first larger-scale collective funerals were organised in Laihia and Vaasa in the Ostrobothnia province, with the latter attended by the supreme civil and military leaders of White Finland. From early on, these funerals assumed their characteristic features, such as the lion flag a design for the Finnish national flag proposed immediately upon the declaration of the country s independence military parades, lines of honour guards, eulogies, salutes and common war hero graves. As a result of the general offensive begun in mid-March 1918, the numbers of the fallen multiplied, so special organisations were established to handle the burials of the fallen. At the same time, the war hero funerals became more frequent and diffused, and the numbers of the buried grew throughout the country. In early March, the advocates of the republican system of government published their appeal in the newspapers, requesting that collective graves for those who fell in the war prepared in every locality. They motivated their request by stating that it was the funerals in particular that had inspired many men to join the ranks voluntarily in the first place, and that the large collective soldiers graves increased the numbers of those who answered the call and left for the front. The Civil Guard organisation arranged the burials of war heroes. The clergy contributed by officiating the religious service and by clearly aligning themselves with the Whites in their eulogies. The teachings of the Lutheran Church suggest that they found the Whites to be the temporal authority instituted by God, and therefore authorised raising the sword against the Reds. Speaking at the funerals with great pomp and sentimental power, the leaders of the Civil Guard and the exponents of the learned classes instigated their audiences against the Reds. The funeral speeches idealised the war hero s death by recalling military history since the times of ancient Greece. Being of the emblematic colour of the Whites, the white coffin assumed a particular importance connected to ideas of biblical purity and innocence. By the end of May 1918, almost 3,300 Whites were buried in the soldiers graves prepared by the burial organisation in some 400 localities. Only about 200 men remained missing in action or unidentified. The largest common graves accommodated over 60 fallen combatants. Thus, the traditions of the 1918 Civil War directly influenced war hero burial practices, which continued into the Finnish Winter War of 1939.

Der Weg in den Holocaust : Mit Bildern aus dem Leben der juedischen Gemeinde in Schmallenberg.

Photocopies of a catalogue for an exhibition in Schmallenberg on occasion of the town’s 750th anniversary in November 1994.

Light and heat induced interdiffusion in Sb/As2S3 nano-multilayered film

The light and heat induced changes in the optical band gap of Sb/As2S3 nanomultilayered chalcogenide film has been studied. Even though the changes in optical bandgap are attributed to the light and heat induced interdiffusion, the diffusional intermixing between the layers is rather different with light and heat. The observed difference in the light and heat induced interdiffusion is due to unequal diffusion coefficients of light and heat predicted by thermal spike model.

Humanitaarisuuden varjossa : Poliittiset tekijät lastensiirroissa Ruotsiin sotiemme aikana ja niiden jälkeen

The evacuation of Finnish children to Sweden during WW II has often been called a small migration . Historical research on this subject is scarce, considering the great number of children involved. The present research has applied, apart from the traditional archive research, the framework of history-culture developed by Rüsen in order to have an all-inclusive approach to the impact of this historical event. The framework has three dimensions: political, aesthetic and cognitive. The collective memory of war children has also been discussed. The research looks for political factors involved in the evacuations during the Winter War and the Continuation War and the post-war period. The approach is wider than a purely humanitarian one. Political factors have had an impact in both Finland and Sweden, beginning from the decision-making process and ending with the discussion of the unexpected consequences of the evacuations in the Finnish Parliament in 1950. The Winter War (30.11.1939 13.3.1940) witnessed the first child transports. These were also the model for future decision making. The transports were begun on the initiative of Swedes Maja Sandler, the wife of the resigned minister of foreign affairs Rickard Sandler, and Hanna Rydh-Munck af Rosenschöld , but this activity was soon accepted by the Swedish government because the humanitarian help in the form of child transports lightened the political burden of Prime Minister Hansson, who was not willing to help Finland militarily. It was help that Finland never asked for and it was rejected at the beginning. The negative response of Minister Juho Koivisto was not taken very seriously. The political forces in Finland supporting child transports were stronger than those rejecting them. The major politicians in support belonged to Finland´s Swedish minority. In addition, close to 1 000 Finnish children remained in Sweden after the Winter War. No analysis was made of the reasons why these children did not return home. A committee set up to help Finland and Norway was established in Sweden in 1941. Its chairman was Torsten Nothin, an influential Swedish politician. In December 1941 he appealed to the Swedish government to provide help to Finnish children under the authority of The International Red Cross. This plea had no results. The delivery of great amounts of food to Finland, which was now at war with Great Britain, had automatically caused reactions among the allies against the Swedish imports through Gothenburg. This included the import of oil, which was essential for the Swedish navy and air force. Oil was later used successfully to force a reduction in commerce between Sweden and Finland. The contradiction between Sweden´s essential political interests and humanitarian help was solved in a way that did not harm the country´s vital political interests. Instead of delivering help to Finland, Finnish children were transported to Sweden through the organisations that had already been created. At the beginning of the Continuation War (25.6.1941 27.4.1945) negative opinion regarding child transports re-emerged in Finland. Karl-August Fagerholm implemented the transports in September 1941. In 1942, members of the conservative parties in the Finnish Parliament expressed their fear of losing the children to the Swedes. They suggested that Finland should withdraw from the inter-Nordic agreement, according to which the adoptions were approved by the court of the country where the child resided. This initiative failed. Paavo Virkkunen, an influential member of the conservative party Kokoomus in Finland, favoured the so-called good-father system, where help was delivered to Finland in the form of money and goods. Virkkunen was concerned about the consequences of a long stay in a Swedish family. The risk of losing the children was clear. The extreme conservative party (IKL, the Patriotic Movement of the Finnish People) wanted to alienate Finland from Sweden and bring Finland closer to Germany. Von Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, had in his report to Berlin, mentioned the political consequences of the child transports. Among other things, they would bring Finland and Sweden closer to each other. He had also paid attention to the Nordic political orientation in Finland. He did not question or criticize the child transports. His main interest was to increase German political influence in Finland, and the Nordic political orientation was an obstacle. Fagerholm was politically ill-favoured by the Germans, because he had a strong Nordic political disposition and had criticised Germany´s activities in Norway. The criticism of child transports was at the same time criticism of Fagerholm. The official censorship organ of the Finnish government (VTL) denied the criticism of child transports in January 1942. The reasons were political. Statements made by members of the Finnish Parliament were also censored, because it was thought that they would offend the Swedes. In addition, the censorship organ used child transports as a means of active propaganda aimed at improving the relations between the two countries. The Finnish Parliament was informed in 1948 that about 15 000 Finnish children still remained in Sweden. These children would stay there permanently. In 1950 the members of the Agrarian Party in Finland stated that Finland should actively strive to get the children back. The party on the left (SKDL, the Democratic Movement of Finnish People) also focused on the unexpected consequences of the child transports. The Social Democrats, and largely Fagerholm, had been the main force in Finland behind the child transports. Members of the SKDL, controlled by Finland´s Communist Party, stated that the war time authorities were responsible for this war loss. Many of the Finnish parents could not get their children back despite repeated requests. The discussion of the problem became political, for example von Born, a member of the Swedish minority party RKP, related this problem to foreign policy by stating that the request to repatriate the Finnish children would have negative political consequences for the relations between Finland and Sweden. He emphasized expressing feelings of gratitude to the Swedes. After the war a new foreign policy was established by Prime Minister (1944 1946) and later President (1946 1956) Juho Kusti Paasikivi. The main cornerstone of this policy was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. The other, often forgotten, cornerstone was to simultaneously establish good relations with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, as a counterbalance. The unexpected results of the child evacuation, a Swedish initiative, had violated the good relations with Sweden. The motives of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People were much the same as those of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People. Only the ideology was different. The Nordic political orientation was an obstacle to both parties. The position of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People was much better than that of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People, because now one could clearly see the unexpected results, which included human tragedy for the many families who could not be re-united with their children despite their repeated requests. The Swedes questioned the figure given to the Finnish Parliament regarding the number of children permanently remaining in Sweden. This research agrees with the Swedes. In a calculation based on Swedish population registers, the number of these children is about 7 100. The reliability of this figure is increased by the fact that the child allowance programme began in Sweden in 1948. The prerequisite to have this allowance was that the child be in the Swedish population register. It was not necessary for the child to have Swedish nationality. The Finnish Parliament had false information about the number of Finnish children who remained in Sweden in 1942 and in 1950. There was no parliamentary control in Finland regarding child transports, because the decision was made by one cabinet member and speeches by MPs in the Finnish Parliament were censored, like all criticism regarding child transports to Sweden. In Great Britain parliamentary control worked better throughout the whole war, because the speeches regarding evacuation were not censored. At the beginning of the war certain members of the British Labour Party and the Welsh Nationalists were particularly outspoken about the scheme. Fagerholm does not discuss to any great extent the child transports in his memoirs. He does not evaluate the process and results as a whole. This research provides some possibilities for an evaluation of this sort. The Swedish medical reports give a clear picture of the physical condition of the Finnish children when arriving in Sweden. The transports actually revealed how bad the situation of the poorest children was. According to Titmuss, similar observations were made in Great Britain during the British evacuations. The child transports saved the lives of approximately 2 900 children. Most of these children were removed to Sweden to receive treatment for illnesses, but many among the healthy children were undernourished and some suffered from the effects of tuberculosis. The medical inspection in Finland was not thorough. If you compare the figure of 2 900 children saved and returned with the figure of about 7 100 children who remained permanently in Sweden, you may draw the conclusion that Finland as a country failed to benefit from the child transports, and that the whole operation was a political mistake with far-reaching consequenses. The basic goal of the operation was to save lives and have all the children return to Finland after the war. The difficulties with the repatriation of the children were mainly psychological. The level of child psychology in Finland at that time was low. One may question the report by Professor Martti Kaila regarding the adaptation of children to their families back in Finland. Anna Freud´s warnings concerning the difficulties that arise when child evacuees return are also valid in Finland. Freud viewed the emotional life of children in a way different from Kaila: the physical survival of a small child forces her to create strong emotional ties to the person who is looking after her. This, a characteristic of all small children, occurred with the Finnish children too, and it was something the political decision makers in Finland could not see during and after the war. It is a characteristic of all little children. Yet, such experiences were already evident during the Winter War. The best possible solution had been to limit the child transports only to children in need of medical treatment. Children from large and poor families had been helped by organising meals and by buying food from Denmark with Swedish money. Assisting Finland by all possible means should have been the basic goal of Fagerholm in September 1941, when the offer of child transports came from Sweden. Fagerholm felt gratitude towards the Swedes. The risks became clear to him only in 1943. The war children are today a rather scattered and diffuse group of people. Emotionally, part of these children remained in Sweden after the war. There is no clear collective memory, only individual memories; the collective memory of the war children has partly been shaped later through the activities of the war child associations. The main difference between the children evacuated in Finland (for example from Karelia to safer areas with their families) and the war children, who were sent abroad, is that the war children lack a shared story and experience with their families. They were outsiders . The whole matter is sensitive to many of such mothers and discussing the subject has often been avoided in families. The war-time censorship has continued in families through silence and avoidance and Finnish politicians and Finnish families had to face each other on this issue after the war. The lack of all-inclusive historical research has also prevented the formation of a collective awareness among war children returned to Finland or those remaining permanently abroad.. Knowledge of historical facts will help war-children by providing an opportunity to create an all-inclusive approach to the past. Personal experiences should be regarded as part of a large historical entity shadowed by war and where many political factors were at work in both Finland and Sweden. This means strengthening of the cognitive dimension discussed in Rüsen´s all-inclusive historical approach.

Kiista, eheys, unohdus : Vapaussodan muistaminen suojeluskunnan ja veteraaniliikkeen toiminnassa 1918-1944

Conflict, Unity, Oblivion: Commemoration of the Liberation War by the Civic Guard and the Veterans´ Union in 1918-1944 The Finnish Civil War ended in May 1918 as a victory for the white side. The war was named by the winners as the Liberation War and its legacy became a central theme for public commemorations during the interwar period. At the same time the experiences of the defeated were hindered from becoming a part of the official history of Finland. The commemoration of the war was related not only to the war experience but also to a national mission, which was seen fulfilled with the independence of Finland. Although the idea of the commemoration was to form a unifying non-political scene for the nation, the remembrance of the Liberation War rather continued than sought to reconcile to the conflict of 1918. The outbreak of the war between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939 immediately affected the memory culture. The new myth of the Miracle of the Winter War, which referred to the unity shown by the people, required a marginalization of controversial memory of the Liberation War. This study examines from the concepts of public memory and narrative templates how the problematic experience of a civil war developed to a popular public commemoration. Instead of dealing with the manipulative and elite-centered grandiose commemoration projects, the study focuses on the more modest local level and emphasizes the significance of local memory agents and narrative templates of collective memory. The main subjects in the study are the Civil Guard and the Veterans´ Union. Essential for the widespread movement was the development of the Civic Guard from a wartime organization to a peacetime popular movement. The guards, who identified themselves trough the memories and the threats of civil war, formed a huge network of memory agents in every corner of the country. They effectively linked both local memory with official memory and the civic society with the state level. Only with the emergence of the right wing veteran movement in the 30ies did the tensions grow between the two levels of public memory. The study shows the diversity of the commemoration movement of the Liberation War. It was not only a result of a nation-state project and political propaganda, but also a way for local communities to identify and strengthen themselves in a time of political upheaval and uncertainty.

Lippu, uhri, kansakunta : Ryhmäkokemukset ja -rajat Suomessa 1917 1945

This dissertation deals with the notions of sacrifice and violence in connection with the Fin¬nish flag struggles between 1917 and 1945. The study begins with the basic idea that sacrificial thinking is a key element in nationalism and the social cohesion of large groups. The method used in the study combines anthropological notions of totemism with psychoanalytical object relation theory. The aim is to explore the social and psychological elements of the Finnish national flag and the workers flags during the times of crisis and nation building. The phenomena and concepts addressed include self-sacrifice, scapegoating, remembrance of war, inclusion, and exclusion. The research is located at the intersection of nationalism studies and the cultural history of war. The analysis is based primarily on the press debates, public speeches and archival sources of the civic organizations that promoted the Finnish flag. The study is empirically divided into three sections: 1) the years of the Revolution and the Civil War (1917 1918), 2) the interwar period (1919 1938), and 3) the Second World War (1939 1945). The research demonstrates that the modern national flags and workers flags in Finland maintain certain characteristics of primitive totems. When referred to as a totem the flag means an emotionally charged symbol, a reservoir of the collective ideals of a large group. Thus the flag issue offers a path to explore the perceptions and memory of sacrifice and violence in the making of the First Republic . Any given large group, for example a nation, must conceptually pursue a consensus on its past sacrifices. Without productive interpretation sacrifice represents only meaningless violence. By looking at the passions associated with the flag the study also illuminates various group identities, boundaries and crossings of borders within the Finnish society at the same time. The study shows further that the divisive violence of the Civil War was first overcome in the late 1930s when the social democrats adopted a new perception of the Red victims of 1918 they were seen as part of the birth pains of the nation, and not only the martyrs of class struggle. At the same time the radical Right became marginalized. The study also illuminates how this development made the Spirit of the Winter War possible, a genuine albeit brief experience of horizontal brother and sisterhood, and how this spirit was reflected in the popular adoption of the Finnish flag. The experience was not based only on the external and unifying threat posed by the Soviet Union: it was grounded in a sense of unifying sacrifice which reflected a novel way of understanding the nation and its past sacrifices. Paradoxically, the newly forged consensus over the necessity and the rewards of the common sacrifices of the Winter War (1939 1940) made new sacrifices possible during the Continuation War (1941 1944). In spite of political discord and war weariness, the concept of a unified nation under the national flag survived even the absurdity of the stationary war phase. It can be said that the conflict between the idea of a national community and parliamentary party politics dissolved as a result of the collective experience of the Second World War.

A Possible and Necessary Consistency Proof

After Gödel's incompleteness theorems and the collapse of Hilbert's programme Gerhard Gentzen continued the quest for consistency proofs of Peano arithmetic. He considered a finitistic or constructive proof still possible and necessary for the foundations of mathematics. For a proof to be meaningful, the principles relied on should be considered more reliable than the doubtful elements of the theory concerned. He worked out a total of four proofs between 1934 and 1939. This thesis examines the consistency proofs for arithmetic by Gentzen from different angles. The consistency of Heyting arithmetic is shown both in a sequent calculus notation and in natural deduction. The former proof includes a cut elimination theorem for the calculus and a syntactical study of the purely arithmetical part of the system. The latter consistency proof in standard natural deduction has been an open problem since the publication of Gentzen's proofs. The solution to this problem for an intuitionistic calculus is based on a normalization proof by Howard. The proof is performed in the manner of Gentzen, by giving a reduction procedure for derivations of falsity. In contrast to Gentzen's proof, the procedure contains a vector assignment. The reduction reduces the first component of the vector and this component can be interpreted as an ordinal less than epsilon_0, thus ordering the derivations by complexity and proving termination of the process.

Oikeusvaltion paradoksin äärellä. Tasavallan suojelulakiesityksistä käyty eduskuntakeskustelu vuosina 1930 ja 1936

Tutkimuksessa lähestytään oikeusvaltion paradoksia tarkastelemalla sen ilmenemistä valtiopäiväkeskusteluissa, joita käytiin hallituksen esityksistä tasavallan suojelulaiksi vuosina 1930 ja 1936. Oikeusvaltion paradoksin ytimessä on kysymys siitä, miten yksityisen oikeussubjektin myös valtion harjoittamalta mielivallalta nauttima suoja voidaan taata, kun eduskunta on ylin lainsäätäjä ja voi muuttaa myös perustuslakia, jossa tuo suoja taataan. Tämä kysymys korostuu etenkin poikkeusoloissa, jolloin toimeenpanovallalla tulisi olla riittävät valtuudet vaikean tilanteen ratkaisemiseksi. Oikeusvaltion paradoksin kannalta keskeisiä ovat muodollinen, laillisuutta ja muotoja painottava sekä materiaalinen, oikeusjärjestyksen sisällöllisiä periaatteita, kuten perusoikeuksia painottava oikeusvaltiotulkinta. Nämä kaksi tulkintaa ovat vaikeissa tilanteissa toistensa kanssa ristiriidassa ja päättäjät joutuvat tasapainoilemaan niiden välillä: toimiako tehokkaasti yhteiskuntajärjestyksen turvaamiseksi, jolloin on riski valtion sisältä käsin tapahtuvasta oikeusvaltion murenemisesta, vai kunnioittaako perusoikeuksia ja altistaa valtakunta ulkoiselle vallankaappaukselle tai muille järjestyshäiriöille. Tutkimuskysymystä tarkastellaan vuosina 1930 ja 1936 eduskunnalle annettujen hallituksen tasavallan suojelulakiesitysten myötä. Esitykset tasavallan suojelulaiksi antoivat presidentille oikeuden, mikäli valtakuntaa uhkasi vaara tai yleinen järjestys ja turvallisuus olivat uhattuina, rajoittaa tiettyjä hallitusmuodon toisessa luvussa taattuja perusoikeuksia. Vuonna 1930 lapuanliikkeen aiheuttama vallankaappauksen uhka oli todellinen ja hallituksen oli pakko antaa sen vaatimia säädöksiä kommunistisen toiminnan tukahduttamiseksi. Paradoksaalisesti laki oli samanaikaisesti lapuanliikkeen painostuksen tulos että yritys ottaa tilanne haltuun poikkeuslailla. Vuonna 1936 tilanne oli huomattavasti rauhallisempi. Lakia perusteltiin sekä maailmanpoliittisen tilanteen epävakaudella että tarpeella säätää poikkeustilanteista etukäteen osana pysyvää lainsäädäntöä. Valtuuksia ei kuitenkaan haluttu säätää osaksi valtiosääntöä, vaan säädös annettiin erillisenä poikkeuslakina. Eduskuntakeskustelussa kannat jakautuivat yleisesti ottaen siten, että lakien vastustajat esittivät materiaaliseen oikeusvaltiotulkintaan ja kannattajat muodolliseen oikeusvaltiotulkintaan lukeutuvia argumentteja. Vastustajien mielestä oli tärkeää kunnioittaa kansalaisten perusoikeuksia ja perustuslakien pysyvyyttä. He myös pelkäsivät lakien mahdollistamaa hallinnollista mielivaltaa. Lakien kannattajat puolestaan korostivat demokratian itsepuolustuksen tärkeyttä: oli yksilön kannalta parasta oikeusturvaa, että kumoukselliset voimat voitiin pitää kurissa. Vuoden 1930 laki jätettiin lepäämään yli vaalien ja hyväksyttiin lopullisesti syksyllä 1930. Se oli osa kommunistilakipakettia, mutta sitä käytettiin lapuanliikkeen hillitsemiseksi ja Mäntsälän kapinan kukistamiseksi vuonna 1932. Vuoden 1936 laki hylättiin eduskunnassa. Vuonna 1939 annettiin vielä kolmas hallituksen esitys tasavallan suojelulaiksi. Se jätettiin lepäämään yli vaalien ja hyväksyttiin syksyllä 1939. Hallituksen laajennettuja valtuuksia tarvittiin tällä kertaa sellaisia henkilöitä vastaan, joista voisi olla uhkaa Suomen ulkoiselle turvallisuudelle. Lain nojalla tehtiin satoja poliittiseen vasemmistoon kohdistuneita turvasäilöpidätyksiä sodan aikana. Tämä laki on kuitenkin rajattu tutkimuksen ulkopuolelle.

”Totuuden ja oikeuden asia” : Eesti Muinsuskaitse Selts ja Viron historian uudelleensynnyttäminen vuosina 1987–1991

Neuvosto-Viron yhteiskunnassa tapahtui 1980-luvun loppupuoliskolla muutoksia, jotka johtivat virolaisten suurempaan toimintavapauteen. Osana uuden kansalaisyhteiskunnan muotoutumista Viroon syntyi historialle omistautunut joukkoliike, joka järjestäytyi loppuvuodesta 1987 historiaseuraksi nimeltään Eesti Muinsuskaitse Selts. Huomattava osa myöhemmän itsenäisen Viron poliittisesta eliitistä osallistui järjestön toimintaan. Seura oli luonteeltaan sekä poliittinen toimija että Viron historiaa tutkiva kansalaisjärjestö. Tutkielmani tarkastelee kumpaakin mainittua osa-aluetta historiaseuran toiminnassa. Tutkielmani tärkein alkuperäislähde on historiaseuran vuosina 1988 1991 julkaisema kerran kuukaudessa ilmestynyt aikakausilehti Muinsuskaitse Seltsi Sõnumid, jonka sivuilla käytyä keskustelua Viron historiasta, politiikasta ja Eesti Muinsuskaitse Seltsin toiminnasta tutkielmani pääosa tarkastelee. Aiempi historiantutkimus on ainoastaan sivunnut historiaseuran roolia Viron itsenäisyyden palauttamisessa. Eesti Muinsuskaitse Selts oli kansallismielinen järjestö, jonka poliittiset vaatimukset perustuivat voimakkaasti Viron kansallisesta historiasta muodostettuihin tulkintoihin. Kansallismielisten tavoitteena oli alkuvuodesta 1989 lähtien organisoida vuosien 1918 1940 tasavallan kansalaisiin tukeutunut liikehdintä, jonka oli puolestaan tarkoitus palauttaa sotienvälisen tasavallan itsenäisyys. Kansalaisliikehdintä muodosti vuoden 1990 alussa Viron kongressin, jonka syntyyn historiaseura vaikutti keskeisellä tavalla. Tutkielmani päätavoite on tarkastella historiaseuran ja sen ympärillä toimineen historialiikehdinnän tekemiä tulkintoja Viron historiasta. Vuosien 1987 1991 aikana historiaseura käynnisti Virossa ilmiön, jota kutsun historian uudelleensynnyttämiseksi. Neuvostohistorian käsitykset korvattiin kansallisromanttisella tavalla tulkita maan historiaa, joka tuki kansallismielisten poliittisia tavoitteita. Historiaseura toteutti osin tietoista historiapolitiikkaa. Ilmiötä on perusteltua kutsua uudelleensynnyttämiseksi, koska mahdollisimman laajasti noudatettiin vuosien 1918 1940 tasavallan perinteitä. Keskeisimmän osan neuvostoaikana kiellettyjen tulkintojen tuomisessa takaisin julkiseen käyttöön muodosti Viron vapaussodan (1918 1920) muiston elvyttäminen. Tärkein historiakulttuuriin liittynyt toimintamuoto oli tuhottujen muistomerkkien uudelleenrakentaminen. Historiaseuran huomio kohdistui myös presidentti Konstantin Pätsin (1874 1956) kunnianpalautukseen. Päts nostettiin kansallissankarin asemaan, vaikka hänen muistoaan varjosti vuosien 1939 1940 itsenäisyyden menetyksen aiheuttama kansallinen trauma. Viron kansallinen historia esitettiin tavalla, joka legitimoi itsenäisyyden palauttamista sekä korosti jatkuvuutta, vapaustaistelua ja itsenäisyyden välttämättömyyttä osana Viron historian kehitystä. Neuvosto-Viron ja Neuvostoliiton historian tarkastelussa korostettiin tapahtumia, joiden julkinen käsittely ei ollut aikaisempina vuosikymmeninä ollut mahdollista. Keskeiselle sijalle nostettiin monimuotoiseksi koettu punainen terrori sekä Molotovin Ribbentropin sopimus. Vuosina 1988 1991 käsitys Viron miehityksestä vahvistui. Kansallismieliset vähensivät rikolliseksi ja laittomaksi kokemansa neuvostovallan legitimiteettiä korostamalla neuvostojärjestelmän vihamieliseksi kuvattua luonnetta virolaisia kohtaan. Keskeisin päätelmäni on, että Eesti Muinsuskaitse Seltsin ja historialiikehdinnän suorittama historian uudelleensynnyttäminen mahdollisti Viron tasavallan itsenäisyyden palauttamisen vuonna 1991 siinä muodossa kuin se toteutettiin.

Juutalaisista ja heidän valheistaan

Aineisto on Keskustakampuksen kirjaston digitoimaa ja kirjasto vastaa aineiston käyttöluvista.