Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program (Clean Water Program) and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program (Drinking Water Program), joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program (Clean Water Program) and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program (Drinking Water Program), joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, for the year ended June 30, 2006

State of Iowa Public Drinking Water Program 2005 Annual Compliance Report, Department of Natural Resources, June 2006

This report contains information about Iowa's public drinking water program for the calendar year 2005. Included in the report are descriptions of Iowa's systems, monitoring and reporting requirements of the systems, and violations incurred during the year. This report meets the federal Safe Drinking Water Act's requirement of an annual report on violations of national primary drinking water regulations by public water supply systems in Iowa.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Iowa's Hidden Water Resources, 2001

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Globalization and risk sharing

We study the effects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare. Like previous literature, weassume that countries cannot commit to repay their debts. Unlike previous literature, we assumethat countries cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors when repaying theirdebts. This creates novel interactions between domestic and international trade in assets. (i)Increases in domestic trade raise the bene.ts of enforcement and facilitate international trade.In fact, in our setup countries can obtain international risk sharing even in the absence of defaultpenalties. (ii) Increases in foreign trade .i.e. globalization.raise the costs of enforcement andhamper domestic trade. As a result, globalization may worsen domestic risk sharing and lowerwelfare. We show how these e¤ects depend on various characteristics of tradable goods andexplore the roles of borrowing limits, debt renegotiations, and trade policy.

Water Quality Summary, 2002

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Water Quality Summary 2000-2002

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Accessing Iowa's Water Quality Information, 2003

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Social dynamics of Water Quality, 2004

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Water Quality Summary, 2003

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Water Quality Summary, 2000

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Risk sharing with the monarch: Excusable defaults and contingent debt in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

Contingent sovereign debt can create important welfare gains. Nonetheless,there is almost no issuance today. Using hand-collected archival data, we examine thefirst known case of large-scale use of state-contingent sovereign debt in history. Philip IIof Spain entered into hundreds of contracts whose value and due date depended onverifiable, exogenous events such as the arrival of silver fleets. We show that this allowedfor effective risk-sharing between the king and his bankers. The data also stronglysuggest that the defaults that occurred were excusable they were simply contingenciesover which Crown and bankers had not contracted previously.

Water Quality Summary, 2004

This monthly report from the Iowa Department of Transportation is about the water quality management of Iowa's rivers, streams and lakes.

Water Quality Summary, 2005

This monthly report from the Iowa Department of Transportation is about the water quality management of Iowa's rivers, streams and lakes.

Water Quality Summary, 2000-2003

This monthly report from the Iowa Department of Transportation is about the water quality management of Iowa's rivers, streams and lakes.