Utilização do permeado de leite como adjunto na produção de cerveja de alta fermentação (ALE)

O Brasil ocupa o 3º lugar entre os maiores produtores mundiais de cerveja e o mercado consumidor vem aumentando progressivamente. Tendo em vista que o consumidor brasileiro está em busca de novos sabores e aromas para a cerveja, uma alternativa para a redução de custos explorando tais características reside no uso de adjuntos não convencionais que possam agregar valor à bebida, principalmente na obtenção de boas características sensoriais. Ainda, visando à sustentabilidade, estes adjuntos podem ser coprodutos do processamento de alimentos. O permeado concentrado de leite, um coproduto dos laticínios, é obtido através da ultrafiltração do leite, sendo composto por água, lactose e sais. Neste trabalho foi desenvolvido um processo para a produção de uma cerveja de alta fermentação (ale), utilizando o permeado concentrado de leite como adjunto de fabricação. Foram obtidas cervejas ale com a proporção malte/permeado de 55/45 e 90/10, utilizando para isso, permeado hidrolisado pela enzima ?-galactosidase e permeado não hidrolisado. A caracterização do permeado revelou que este possui três vezes mais lactose que o soro de queijo. A melhor condição de hidrólise enzimática da lactose presente no permeado foi obtida empregando-se 2,0 mL/L de ?-galactosidase em 90 minutos, alcançando 92,5% de hidrólise. Nas cervejas com permeado hidrolisado observou-se que a presença de galactose aumentou o tempo de fermentação para 168h e a atenuação real de fermentação dos mostos também foi maior em comparação as cervejas com permeado não hidrolisado, nos quais a lactose não foi fermentada. As cervejas 90/10 com permeado hidrolisado e não hidrolisado receberam as maiores notas na análise sensorial, tendo boa aceitação entre os provadores. Como não houve diferença estatística entre as duas, foi possível reduzir custo e tempo na produção da cerveja 90/10 em escala piloto (120L) por não ser necessário o processo de hidrólise enzimática. O permeado concentrado de leite mostrou-se um excelente adjunto na produção de cervejas ale e quando empregado em baixa concentração, produziu cervejas com boa aceitação sensorial.

Social License to Operate: Hydraulic Fracturing-Related Challenges Facing the Oil & Gas Industry

The crossroads of urban development and improved technology allowing oil and gas development in new areas can result in contentious community issues. The debate over one of the improved technologies – i.e., hydraulic fracturing – can be highly emotional. Consequently, industry must address community issues, earning trust and therefore a “social license to operate.” This paper provides fundamental knowledge of the social license to operate concept, validates its application to the oil and gas industry, particularly with respect to shale gas development, discusses the current status of social license in the unconventional development sphere, analyzes current ongoing efforts for shale gas developers to monitor and establish a social license, and identifies potential new methods of encouraging, establishing, and monitoring a social license to operate. The paper also proposes a new institutional framework in which to promote the social license to operate, “The Center for Social License to Operate in the Oil & Gas Industry.”

Creating Beautiful Art: Challenging Comfort

Creating Beautiful Art: Challenging Comfort investigates the notion of beauty and its relationship to art while asking what is and can be art. Throughout the work, research supports the concept of beauty elevating art even with the use of atypical, unconventional, or mundane materials. Direct attention is given to this idea by completion of a Creative Capstone Project. I incorporated aesthetics with unconventional materials in order to challenge viewing comfort, as well as added value to the existing body of knowledge concerning beauty in contemporary art. The reflective section summarizes the importance of unconventional materials creating beauty in art in order to progress itself linearly by creating and reinventing the new.

Refinery Nonconventional Feedstocks: Influence of the Coprocessing of Vacuum Gas Oil and Low Density Polyethylene in Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit on Full Range Gasoline Composition

Gasoline coming from refinery fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) unit is a major contributor to the total commercial grade gasoline pool. The contents of the FCC gasoline are primarily paraffins, naphthenes, olefins, aromatics, and undesirables such as sulfur and sulfur containing compounds in low quantities. The proportions of these components in the FCC gasoline invariable determine its quality as well as the performance of the associated downstream units. The increasing demand for cleaner and lighter fuels significantly influences the need not only for novel processing technologies but also for alternative refinery and petrochemical feedstocks. Current and future clean gasoline requirements include increased isoparaffins contents, reduced olefin contents, reduced aromatics, reduced benzene, and reduced sulfur contents. The present study is aimed at investigating the effect of processing an unconventional refinery feedstock, composed of blend of vacuum gas oil (VGO) and low density polyethylene (LDPE) on FCC full range gasoline yields and compositional spectrum including its paraffins, isoparaffins, olefins, napthenes, and aromatics contents distribution within a range of operating variables of temperature (500–700 °C) and catalyst-feed oil ratio (CFR 5–10) using spent equilibrium FCC Y-zeolite based catalyst in a FCC pilot plant operated at the University of Alicante’s Research Institute of Chemical Process Engineering (RICPE). The coprocessing of the oil-polymer blend led to the production of gasoline with very similar yields and compositions as those obtained from the base oil, albeit, in some cases, the contribution of the feed polymer content as well as the processing variables on the gasoline compositional spectrum were appreciated. Carbon content analysis showed a higher fraction of the C9–C12 compounds at all catalyst rates employed and for both feedstocks. The gasoline’s paraffinicity, olefinicity, and degrees of branching of the paraffins and olefins were also affected in various degrees by the scale of operating severity. In the majority of the cases, the gasoline aromatics tended toward the decrease as the reactor temperature was increased. While the paraffins and iso-paraffins gasoline contents were relatively stable at around 5 % wt, the olefin contents on the other hand generally increased with increase in the FCC reactor temperature.

Majorana Zero Modes in Graphene

A clear demonstration of topological superconductivity (TS) and Majorana zero modes remains one of the major pending goals in the field of topological materials. One common strategy to generate TS is through the coupling of an s-wave superconductor to a helical half-metallic system. Numerous proposals for the latter have been put forward in the literature, most of them based on semiconductors or topological insulators with strong spin-orbit coupling. Here, we demonstrate an alternative approach for the creation of TS in graphene-superconductor junctions without the need for spin-orbit coupling. Our prediction stems from the helicity of graphene’s zero-Landau-level edge states in the presence of interactions and from the possibility, experimentally demonstrated, of tuning their magnetic properties with in-plane magnetic fields. We show how canted antiferromagnetic ordering in the graphene bulk close to neutrality induces TS along the junction and gives rise to isolated, topologically protected Majorana bound states at either end. We also discuss possible strategies to detect their presence in graphene Josephson junctions through Fraunhofer pattern anomalies and Andreev spectroscopy. The latter, in particular, exhibits strong unambiguous signatures of the presence of the Majorana states in the form of universal zero-bias anomalies. Remarkable progress has recently been reported in the fabrication of the proposed type of junctions, which offers a promising outlook for Majorana physics in graphene systems.

International Capital Flows and Monetary Policy Spillovers

This dissertation examines the drivers and implications of international capital flows. The overarching motivation is the observation that countries not at the centre of global financial markets are subject to considerable spillovers from centre countries, notably from their monetary policy. I present new empirical evidence on the determinants of the observed patterns of international capital flows and monetary policy spillovers, and study their effect on both financial markets and the real economy. In Chapter 2 I provide evidence on the determinants of a puzzling negative correlation observed between productivity growth and net capital inflows to developing and emerging market economies (EMEs) since 1980. By disaggregating net capital inflows into their gross components, I show that this negative correlation is explained by capital outflows related to purchases of very liquid assets from the fastest growing countries. My results suggest a desire for international portfolio diversification in liquid assets by fast growing countries is driving much of the original puzzle. In the reminder of my dissertation I pivot to study the foreign characteristics that drive international capital flows and monetary policy spillovers, with a particular focus on the role of unconventional monetary policy in the United States (U.S.). In Chapter 3 I show that a significant portion of the heterogeneity in EMEs' asset price adjustment following the quantitative easing operations by the Federal Reserve (the Fed) during 2008-2014 can be explained by the degree of bilateral capital market frictions between these countries and the U.S. This is true even after accounting for capital controls, exchange rate regimes, and domestic monetary policies. Chapter 4, co-authored with Michal Ksawery Popiel, studies unconventional monetary policy in a small open economy, looking specifically at the case of Canada since the global financial crisis. We quantify the effect Canadian unconventional monetary policy shocks had on the real economy, while carefully controlling for and quantifying spillovers from U.S. unconventional monetary policy. Our results indicate that the Bank of Canada's unconventional monetary policy increased Canadian output significantly from 2009-2010, but that spillovers from the Fed's policy were even more important for increasing Canadian output after 2008.

So far apart and yet so close: Should the ECB care about inflation differentials? Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2014/10 September 2014

Inflation rates can differ across regions of monetary unions. We show that in the euro area, the US, Canada, Japan and Australia, inflation rates have been substantially and persistently different in different regions. Differences were particularly substantial in the euro area. Inflation differences can reflect normal adjustment processes such as price convergence or the Balassa-Samuelson effect, or can reflect the different cyclical position of regions. But they can also be the result of economic distortions resulting from segmented markets or unsustainable demand and credit developments fueled by low real interest rates. In normal times, the European Central Bank cannot influence such developments with its single interest rate instrument. However, unconventional policy measures can have different effects on different countries depending on the chosen instrument, and should be used to reduce fragmentation and ensure the proper transmission of monetary policy. The new macro prudential policy tools are unlikely to be practical in addressing inflation divergences. It is crucial to keep the average inflation rate close to two percent so that inflation differentials are possible without deflation in some parts of the euro area, which in turn might endanger area-wide financial stability and price stability.

Shale gas in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania. Political context - legal status - outlook. OSW Report, September 2012

Despite their initial interest in shale gas exploration, over the past year Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania have become increasingly sceptical about the development of unconventional gas resources. In January of this year Bulgaria introduced an indefinite ban on the exploration and production of shale gas and Romania followed suit in May by introducing a six-month moratorium on exploration work, which it plans to extend by another two years following the country’s parliamentary elections scheduled for December. Similar measures are being planned by the government in Prague. The aim of this report is to explore the reasons why countries which claim to want to improve their energy security have been showing increasing scepticism towards shale gas.

Germany's stance on the TTIP. Background, interests and concerns. OSW Studies 52, March 2015

Co-operation between the United States and Germany has for many years been a subject of disputes. In addition to the differences over the US engagement in the resolution of international conflicts, bilateral relations have been strained as a consequence of the so-called Snowden scandal and the unproved allegations that Chancellor Angela Merkel’s telephone was wiretapped. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership offers a chance for improving relations between Germany and the USA for the first time in many years. Companies from the two countries may benefit from the lifting of some barriers to transatlantic economic co-operation. Furthermore, the emergence of in fact an internal EU and US market, with reduced customs tariffs and harmonised legal and economic rules, will pressure the emerging economies to make their markets more open. The TTIP may create conditions for exporting US raw materials from unconventional sources to the European Union; and this will be a benefit of geopolitical significance for Germany. The German government is aware of the fact that diversification of supplies of fossil fuels will make Europe less dependent on pressure from Moscow.

Shale gas in Europe: much ado about little? Egmont Paper No. 64, March 2014

Introduction. Shale gas is an unconventional form of gas1 because its extraction is more difficult or less economical than that of conventional natural gas. It has become an important item of energy policy during the last years since new processes have allowed its extraction. In the medium term, shale gas should foster a reinforcement of the gas part in the world’s energy mix. In 2011, the IEA released an influential report entitled “Are we entering a golden age of gas?” This report suggests that shale gas could help substantially boost global gas use.2 It also warns at the same time that this success could bring into question the international goal of limiting the long-term increase in the global temperature to 2° C above pre-industrial levels. In the world economy, the impact of shale gas is increasing rapidly (especially in the USA, albeit apparently not as significantly as expected3). In the EU, its perspectives remain uncertain, for many reasons. Estimates are not reliable. Shale gas exploitation remains a controversial issue due to geology, lack of infrastructure and also fears for the environment and public health. The EU institutions seem to have a favorable attitude towards shale gas development while the Member States’ attitude seems to vary from enthusiasm to hesitation or opposition. Public opinion on the issue appears quite divided everywhere. This brief paper will examine various estimations of potential resources in the EU (§ 1), the potential costs and benefits (§ 2), the initiatives taken by the EU institutions (§ 3) and the national authorities (§ 4), and finally the emerging EU framework (§ 5). The conclusion is, rather surprisingly, that whatever happens on this front, this will not modify the present structural challenges of the EU in the domains of climate and energy.4

Renewables: The great uncertainty of the EU energy strategy. Egmont Paper No. 71, November 2014

Summary. For more than two decades, the development of renewable energy sources (RES) has been an important aim of EU energy policy. It accelerated with the adoption of a 1997 White Paper and the setting a decade later of a 20% renewable energy target, to be reached by 2020. The EU counts on renewable energy for multiple purposes: to diversify its energy supply; to increase its security of supply; and to create new industries, jobs, economic growth and export opportunities, while at the same time reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many expectations rest on its development. Fossil fuels have been critical to the development of industrial nations, including EU Member States, which are now deeply reliant upon coal, oil and gas for nearly every aspect of their existence. Faced with some hard truths, however, the Member States have begun to shelve fossil fuel. These hard truths are as follows: firstly, fossil fuels are a finite resource, sometimes difficult to extract. This means that, at some point, fossil fuels are going to be more difficult to access in Europe or too expensive to use.1 The problem is that you cannot just stop using fossil fuels when they become too expensive; the existing infrastructure is profoundly reliant on fossil fuels. It is thus almost normal that a fierce resistance to change exists. Secondly, fossil fuels contribute to climate change. They emit GHG, which contribute greatly to climate change. As a consequence, their use needs to be drastically reduced. Thirdly, Member States are currently suffering a decline in their own fossil fuel production. This increases their dependence on increasingly costly fossil fuel imports from increasingly unstable countries. This problem is compounded by global developments: the growing share of emerging economies in global energy demand (in particular China and India but also the Middle East) and the development of unconventional oil and gas production in the United States. All these elements endanger the competitiveness of Member States’ economies and their security of supply. Therefore, new indigenous sources of energy and a diversification of energy suppliers and routes to convey energy need to be found. To solve all these challenges, in 2008 the EU put in place a strategy based on three objectives: sustainability (reduction of GHG), competitiveness and security of supply. The adoption of a renewable energy policy was considered essential for reaching these three strategic objectives. The adoption of the 20% renewable energy target has undeniably had a positive effect in the EU on the growth in renewables, with the result that renewable energy sources are steadily increasing their presence in the EU energy mix. They are now, it can be said, an integral part of the EU energy system. However, the necessity of reaching this 20% renewable energy target in 2020, combined with other circumstances, has also engendered in many Member States a certain number of difficulties, creating uncertainties for investors and postponing benefits for consumers. The electricity sector is the clearest example of this downside. Subsidies have become extremely abundant and vary from one Member State to another, compromising both fair competition and single market. Networks encountered many difficulties to develop and adapt. With technological progress these subsidies have also become quite excessive. The growing impact of renewable electricity fluctuations has made some traditional power plants unprofitable and created disincentives for new investments. The EU does clearly need to reassess its strategy. If it repeats the 2008 measures it will risk to provoke increased instability and costs.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). CEPS Special Report No. 109/May 2015

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings (BEEP) 35/2015.

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

Why Belgium Needs a Special Operations Command. Security Policy Brief No. 70, April 2016

The setting up of a Special Operations Command (SOCOM) constitutes a key element of the ongoing Belgian defence reforms. This Policy Brief aims to put the present demand for special operations forces in its historical context and engage in the discussion on how to structure and employ this special instrument of policy. Building on the legacy of the paracommando regiment, the future Belgian SOCOM constitutes a critical capability within an adaptive force structure. This new entity must be able to deliver results in a variety of unconventional missions that require high readiness, intellectual flexibility and maximum discretion or surprise. At the same time, special operations forces do not constitute a substitute for having a comprehensive security policy. They function best when used as force multipliers alongside other instruments of power towards joint effect. As the proverbial tip of the spear, they must lead the way for Belgian defence regeneration in general.

The effectiveness of the European Central Bank’s Asset Purchase Programme. Bruegel Policy Contribution issue 2016 10 June 2016

Since the end of 2014, inflation has been at or very close to zero. With very little ability to move the actual interest rate further into negative territory, the ECB has resorted to unconventional measures. The latest of these includes a programme to purchase corporate bonds, which started on 8 June 2016.