‘Supra-stewardship’: A Tool for Citizen Participation in European Union Pandemic Preparedness Planning

This article proposes developing the public bioethics aspect of stewardship and applying it to the EU as ‘supra-stewardship’, a tool for opening a discursive space for citizen participation in EU preparedness planning. With this in mind the article highlights some of the contours for engagement on the boundaries of responsibility and the production of governance distortions and failures brought out by attention to framing, distribution, vulnerability and learning. This should help citizens to tackle the complementary expert and public rationalities that undermine their involvement, contribute supplementary knowledge towards governance, and help promote institutional learning by the EU and resilience.

Utility in Willingness to Pay Space: A Tool to Address Confounding Random Scale Effects in Destination Choice to the Alps

We compare two approaches for estimating the distribution of consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) in discrete choice models. The usual procedure is to estimate the distribution of the utility coefficients and then derive the distribution of WTP, which is the ratio of coefficients. The alternative is to estimate the distribution of WTP directly. We apply both approaches to data on site choice in the Alps. We find that the alternative approach fits the data better, reduces the incidence of exceedingly large estimated WTP values, and provides the analyst with greater control in specifying and testing the distribution of WTP. © 2008 Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

Moral Compromise

A moral compromise is a compromise on moral matters; it is agreement in the face of moral disagreement but where there is agreement on the importance of consensus – namely that it secures a morally desirable outcome. It is distinguishable from other forms of agreement, and an important distinction between moral compromise with public agreement and moral compromise with public disagreement is also made. Circumstances in which the former might be permissible are outlined, and the sense in which it is allowed all things considered to agree is made clear. The relevant discussions of Dan Brock and Mary Warnock on the role of the philosopher to public policy are critically reviewed. Finally, a brief list is offered of the considerations relevant to an estimation of whether and, if so, when such compromise is allowed.