The Greek Austerity Myth. CEPS Commentary, 10 February 2015

Since Syriza’s victory in Greece’s recent general election, some fear a return to the uncertainty of 2012, when many thought that a Greek default and exit from the eurozone were imminent and that a Greek debt crisis could destabilise – and perhaps even bring down – Europe’s monetary union. CEPS Director Daniel Gros explains in this CEPS Commentary how this time really is different.

The Relevance of International Spillovers and Asymmetric Effects in the Taylor Rule. CEPS Working Document No. 403, February 2015

Deviations of policy interest rates from the levels implied by the Taylor rule have been persistent before the financial crisis and increased especially after the turn of the century. Compared to the Taylor benchmark, policy rates were often too low. This paper provides evidence that both international spillovers, for instance international dependencies in the interest rate-setting of central banks, and nonlinear reaction patterns can offer a more realistic specification of the Taylor rule in the main industrial countries. The inclusion of international spillovers and, even more, nonlinear dynamics improves the explanatory power of standard Taylor reaction functions. Deviations from Taylor rates tend to be smaller and their negative trend can be eliminated.

The end of fiscal waterboarding? CEPS Commentary, 23 February 2015

In this Commentary, Daniel Gros argues that linking the primary surplus demanded of the new Greek government to the state of the economy is a sound approach. Some flexibility is warranted on this account, but the concept should be used to distribute the effort better over time, not to wriggle out of it.

Labour Mobility in Europe: An untapped resource? CEPS Policy Brief No. 327, March 2015

Despite public perceptions, labour mobility is low in the EU, particularly within the euro area. The authors of this Policy Brief make four main points: first, that the economic and financial crisis has affected mobility patterns by redirecting flows away from the periphery, thus showing the limits of labour mobility potential within the current eurozone - largely due to the negligible mobility of nationals from large countries hit by the crisis. Second, east-west mobility has not been fundamentally affected by the crisis, and ten years after the eastern enlargement the number of East Europeans living in EU15 should be of no overall concern. Third, the long-term economic effects of mobility are uncertain, but potential negative effects are more likely to show up in sending countries than in receiving ones. Finally, in view of the lessons learned from the economic crisis, the Commission and member states should adopt a longer-term view on labour mobility. The authors recommend a further upgrade of job-matching tools, namely the EURES system, and should foster better recognition of qualifications and the exchange of best practices among mobility networks. In order to improve mobility in the longer term, the Commission and member states should improve the mobility of third-country nationals – starting with those completing tertiary education at an EU institution and able to find employment. The aim of improving mobility gives new impetus to the ‘mother tongue + two foreign languages’ objective and the European Benchmark of Language Competences Initiative, in particular competence in the first foreign language taught at school.

Will this time be different for Greece? How to assess its ability to deliver on the reform agenda. CEPS Commentary, 13 March 2015

Taking its inspiration from the ongoing debate on whether this time will be different for Greece and whether Syriza will deliver on its reform promises to the European partners, this Commentary expresses bemusement that the public debate on such an important issue as well as internal discussions among senior policy-makers frequently resort to ‘gut feelings’ or simple stereotypes. To counteract this tendency, the author presents a simple analytical framework that can be used to assess the likelihood that a government will deliver on its reform agenda. Its purpose is not to allow for a precise probabilistic calculation, but to enable better structuring of the knowledge we have. It emphasises that the change depends NOT only on the capacity of the state to design and deliver policies, but even more crucially on state autonomy from both illegitimate and legitimate interests and cognitive models used by policy-makers to make sense of the world.

Money, Finance and the Real Economy: What went wrong? CEPS Paperback, 17 March 2015

The functions of the financial system of a developed economy are often badly understood. This can largely be attributed to free-market ideology, which has spread the belief that leaving finance to its own devices would provide the best possible mechanism for allocating savings. The latest financial crisis has sparked the beginnings of a new awareness on this point, but it is far from having led to an improved understanding of the role of the financial institutions. For many people, finance remains more an enemy to be resisted than an instrument to be intelligently exploited. Its institutions, which issue and circulate money, play an important role in the working of the real economy that it would be imprudent to neglect. The allocation of savings, but also the level of activity and the growth rate depend on it. In this book, the authors carefully analyse the close links between money, finance and the real economy. In the process, they show why today the existence of a substantial potential of saving, instead of being an opportunity for the world economy, could threaten it with ‘secular stagnation’.

Living (dangerously) without a fiscal union. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/03

The euro area’s political contract requires member nations to rely principally on their own resources when confronted with severe economic distress. Since monetary policy is the same for all, national fiscal austerity is the default response to counter national fiscal stress. Moreover, the monetary policy was itself stodgy in countering the crisis, and banking-sector problems were allowed to fester. And it was considered inappropriate to impose losses on private sector creditors. Thus, the nature of the incomplete monetary union and the self-imposed taboos led deep and persistent fiscal austerity to become the norm. As a consequence, growth was hurt, which undermined the primary objective of lowering the debt burden. To prevent a meltdown, distressed nations were given official loans to repay private creditors. But the stress and instability continued and soon it became necessary to ease the repayment terms on official loans. When even that proved insufficient, the German-inspired fiscal austerity was combined with the deep pockets of the European Central Bank. The ECB’s safety net for insolvent or near-insolvent banks and sovereigns, in effect, substituted for the absent fiscal union and drew the central bank into the political process.

Greece back on centre stage: the results of a déjà vu summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 23 March 2015

The March 2015 European Council might not enter history books, but the outcome of an informal ‘mini summit’ between seven EU leaders has the potential to prepare the grounds for a breakthrough in the negotiations between Athens and its lenders. In this post-summit analysis, Janis A. Emmanouilidis argues that the search for a compromise promises to be a cumbersome, time-consuming and nerveracking exercise. But a solution now seems possible, proving all those doomsayers who have been predicting a ‘Grexit’ or ‘Graccident’ wrong. On other topics, EU leaders committed their countries to build an Energy Union, although questions remain about whether member states will agree to cede sovereignty on a number of significant points. This analysis looks also at the economic issues dealt with at the Spring Summit, with a focus on the perspectives for the European Semester and the Juncker Investment Plan. It ends with a summary of decisions taken on a number of other topics, including relations with Russia and Ukraine, the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, developments in Libya and in Tunisia, and the endorsement of the Council’s new Secretary General.

Growth for Europe – Is the Juncker Plan the answer? EPC Discussion Paper, 20 March 2015

Executive Summary. The euro area is still suffering from low growth and high unemployment. For the recovery to become a reality, there needs to be a balance between fiscal discipline, supply side improvements and actions aimed at stimulating demand and growth. Increasing investment, both private and public, are important components in overcoming the recession. This becomes especially clear when comparing investment dynamics during the crisis with pre-crisis levels. Total investment is still much lower than before the crisis and public investment is well below its pre-crisis peak as well. In late November 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker submitted a long-awaited proposal for a European Investment Plan that aims to stimulate private investment. Apart from the creation of the new European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), through which private investors will receive public guarantees, the investment plan also aims to provide project assistance and improve the Single Market by removing sector-specific or other financial barriers to investment. While generally perceived as a first positive step towards increasing private investment, some commentators have expressed reservations about the plan. These include, among others, the lack of fresh money for the initial contributions to EFSI. Since a substantial amount of these contributions is reshuffled from other places in the European budget, the question was raised whether EFSI can fund additional projects or just replicates investment projects that would have happened without the plan. Other criticism relates to the high estimate of the expected leverage ratio of 1:15, and to the risk that the plan will only have a limited impact on stressed economies. The Juncker Plan addresses private investment, but so far there really is no clear strategy to stimulate productive public investment on the European and national level. Countries with fiscal space are reluctant to engage in higher spending, while those willing and in need of it the most are restricted by the rules. Member States and the Commission should therefore discuss options for further improving the euro area's economic governance. In addition to urging countries with fiscal space to increase investing in national public goods, investment could be treated with budget flexibility. One could, for instance, upgrade the importance of public investment in the European Semester. Additional deficit granted for public investment purposes could be attached to certain Country-Specific Recommendations. Another solution would be to allow some form of budget flexibility, such as the formulation of a new Golden Rule for productive public investment becoming part of the Stability and Growth Pact's application. Besides relying on a larger amount of flexibility in the rules, the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) could be another solution to fund investment in European public goods. It will also be necessary to overcome the mistrust among Member States that is preventing further action. The political bargain of stronger conditionality, such as through contractual arrangements, could improve the situation. Increased trust will also be an important condition for tackling long-reaching economic governance reforms such as the creation of a Fiscal Capacity, which could take the form of a macroeconomic shock insurance. Such a Fiscal Capacity could make a real difference in providing the necessary funding to maintain productive public investment, even in times of deep recessions. The proposals presented do not attempt to be conclusive, but shall rather be an input for a wider debate on how to increase growth and employment in Europe. The paper draws heavily on the discussion of a Workshop on Growth and Investment, which the European Policy Centre (EPC) hosted on 10 December 2014 under Chatham-House Rule, with a group of economists and representatives from the European institutions.

Poor and under pressure: the social impact of Europe's fiscal consolidation. Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2015/04, March 2015

Europe faces major challenges related to poverty, unemployment and polarisation between the south and the north, which impact adversely the current living conditions of many citizens, and also negatively impact medium- and long-term economic growth. Fiscal consolidation exaggerated social hardship. In vulnerable countries there was no alternative to fiscal consolidation, but in most EU countries and at aggregate EU level, consolidation was premature when the cyclical position of the economy was deteriorating. Spending on social protection was shielded relative to other spending categories, but public bank rescue costs were high. While the changes in the tax mix favoured job creation, the overall tax burden become more regressive. There is an increasing generational divide between the elderly and the young in terms of social indicators. Social spending on elderly people was favoured relative to spending on families, children and education. There is now a serious danger that a lost generation might develop in several member states. Forceful policies should include bold structural reforms, better use of the European economic governance framework, more demand promotion, and a revision of national tax/benefit systems for fair burden sharing between the wealthy and poor.

Effectiveness and transmission of the ECB’s balance sheet policies. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 275, December 2014

We estimate the effects of exogenous innovations to the balance sheet of the ECB since the start of the financial crisis within a structural VAR framework. An expansionary balance sheet shock stimulates bank lending, stabilizes financial markets, and has a positive impact on economic activity and prices. The effects on bank lending and output turn out to be smaller in the member countries that have been more affected by the financial crisis, in particular those countries where the banking system is less well-capitalized.

In Pursuit of Peace, Prosperity and Power – What ASEAN and EU can learn from each other? EU Centre Singapore Policy Brief No. 7, May 2014

The EU and ASEAN are often compared and seen as relatively successful regional organisations in their respective regions. Yet of late, both regional organisations are under intense scrutiny as they confront challenges posed by the financial crisis and rising geopolitical tensions. Their inability to respond effectively to these challenges has brought about a chorus of criticisms. Noting the current tensions face by both the EU and ASEAN in their respective regions, one could not help but wonder how and if they would be able to deal with the increasing complex security landscape because of a weakened US, and the rise of the rest. This article will compare and contrast the approaches taken by the EU and ASEAN thus far in trying to build peace and prosperity, and how they manage the demands of power politics to distill some lessons on what they can learn from each other in order to navigate an increasingly paradoxical world of economic interdependence but political fragmentation.

A briefing on Eurobonds. European Policy Brief No. 10, June 2012

The recurrent debate on Eurobonds is often clouded by misconceptions. This Policy Brief clarifies their aims and possible forms, before discussing the key challenges for their introduction. It argues that, by ensuring market access to vulnerable Member States, Eurobonds can constitute a valuable tool to alleviate the eurozone crisis. To make use of their short-term potential, a condi-tional and progressive introduction of Eurobonds, starting with a limited scheme, seems the best achievable approach.

The Business Cycle on Both Sides of the Atlantic. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 16, August 2014

The recent economic recession, that began in the US in late 2007 and lasted eighteen months with a heavy toll on society’s wellbeing, has demonstrated the need and urgency of properly understanding the business cycle. This is important because this paper shows that the US business cycle is a leading indicator for the European Union and the Eurozone. Therefore, it can advise governments in the European continent that a change of economic tendency is taking place, which due to globalization will sooner or later affect economies and societies. Thus, understanding the business cycle will give European governments an opportunity to adjust economic and monetary policies to help soften the negative effects on European society.

EU Supervisory Cooperation Scaled Back at the Expense of Capital Markets Union. CEPS Commentary, 20 April 2015

Making capital markets union a success can only happen by reinforcing supervisory cooperation and creating enforceable rules, which in turn require strong institutions functioning at the EU level. In this CEPS Commentary, Karel Lannoo argues that scaling back the European Supervisory Authorities – the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) – is entirely counterproductive from that perspective. While the EU may have well established institutions at the national level, he insists that capital markets union requires EU-wide rules for issuers, investors and intermediaries alike.