Introduction to politics of climate change: discourses of policy and practice in developing countries

This Themed Section aims to increase understanding of how the idea of climate change, and the policies and actions that spring from it, travel beyond their origins in natural sciences to meet different political arenas in the developing world. It takes a discursive approach whereby climate change is not just a set of physical processes but also a series of messages, narratives and policy prescriptions. The articles are mostly case study-based and focus on sub-Saharan Africa and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). They are organised around three interlinked themes. The first theme concerns the processes of rapid technicalisation and professionalisation of the climate change ‘industry’, which have sustantially narrowed the boundaries of what can be viewed as a legitimate social response to the problem of global warming. The second theme deals with the ideological effects of the climate change industry, which is ‘depoliticisation’, in this case the deflection of attention away from underlying political conditions of vulnerability and exploitation towards the nature of the physical hazard itself. The third theme concerns the institutional effects of an insufficiently socialised idea of climate change, which is the maintenance of existing relations of power or their reconfiguration in favour of the already powerful. Overall, the articles suggest that greater scrutiny of the discursive and political dimensions of mitigation and adaptation activities is required. In particular, greater attention should be directed towards the policy consequences that governments and donors construct as a result of their framing and rendition of climate change issues.

Innovations for enabling urban climate governance: evidence from Mumbai

Climate change is a ‘wicked’ problem. No central authority manages climate change, and those creating the problem are also trying to solve it. Climate change brings uncertainty in ways that cities have not tackled previously. There is a need to explore new governance forms able to deal with change and to enable transformations. In this paper we explore seven local climate innovations to better understand the enabling conditions underpinning success and the governance barriers that are encountered. We connect the more formal and emergent climate governance ‘innovations’ through adaptation and mitigation experiments in Mumbai, India. Case studies indicate an emerging development model. Effective climate governance has to be an inevitable part of new development in the South. While climate externality exists in all development planning and implementation, smaller community-level efforts indicate how opportunities are offered within existing systems to integrate with larger institutional climate governance.

The reversibility of sea level rise

During the last century, global climate has been warming, and projections indicate that such a warming is likely to continue over coming decades. Most of the extra heat is stored in the ocean, resulting in thermal expansion of seawater and global mean sea level rise. Previous studies have shown that after CO2 emissions cease or CO2 concentration is stabilized, global mean surface air temperature stabilizes or decreases slowly, but sea level continues to rise. Using idealized CO2 scenario simulations with a hierarchy of models including an AOGCM and a step-response model, the authors show how the evolution of thermal expansion can be interpreted in terms of the climate energy balance and the vertical profile of ocean warming. Whereas surface temperature depends on cumulative CO2 emissions, sea level rise due to thermal expansion depends on the time profile of emissions. Sea level rise is smaller for later emissions, implying that targets to limit sea level rise would need to refer to the rate of emissions, not only to the time integral. Thermal expansion is in principle reversible, but to halt or reverse it quickly requires the radiative forcing to be reduced substantially, which is possible on centennial time scales only by geoengineering. If it could be done, the results indicate that heat would leave the ocean more readily than it entered, but even if thermal expansion were returned to zero, the geographical pattern of sea level would be altered. Therefore, despite any aggressive CO2 mitigation, regional sea level change is inevitable.

Ranging characteristics of the domestic cat (Felis catus) in an urban environment

In many countries, high densities of domestic cats (Felis catus) are found in urban habitats where they have the potential to exert considerable predation pressure on their prey. However, little is known of the ranging behaviour of cats in the UK. Twenty cats in suburban Reading, UK, were fitted with GPS trackers to quantify movement patterns. Cats were monitored during the summer and winter for an average of 6.8 24 h periods per season. Mean daily area ranged (95 % MCP) was 1.94 ha. Including all fixes, mean maximum area ranged was 6.88 ha. These are broadly comparable to those observed in urban areas in other countries. Daily area ranged was not affected by the cat’s sex or the season, but was significantly larger at night than during the day. There was no relationship between area ranged and habitat availability. Taking available habitat into account, cat ranging area contained significantly more garden and other green space than urban habitats. If cats were shown to be negatively affecting prey populations, one mitigation option for consideration in housing developments proposed near important wildlife sites would be to incorporate a ‘buffer zone’ in which cat ownership was not permitted. Absolute maximum daily area ranged by a cat in this study was 33.78 ha. This would correspond to an exclusory limit of approximately 300–400 m to minimise the negative effects of cat predation, but this may need to be larger if cat ranging behaviour is negatively affected by population density

Research priorities in observing and modeling urban weather and climate

In 2007, the world reached the unprecedented milestone of half of its people living in cities, and that proportion is projected to be 60% in 2030. The combined effect of global climate change and rapid urban growth, accompanied by economic and industrial development, will likely make city residents more vulnerable to a number of urban environmental problems, including extreme weather and climate conditions, sea-level rise, poor public health and air quality, atmospheric transport of accidental or intentional releases of toxic material, and limited water resources. One fundamental aspect of predicting the future risks and defining mitigation strategies is to understand the weather and regional climate affected by cities. For this reason, dozens of researchers from many disciplines and nations attended the Urban Weather and Climate Workshop.1 Twenty-five students from Chinese universities and institutes also took part. The presentations by the workshop's participants span a wide range of topics, from the interaction between the urban climate and energy consumption in climate-change environments to the impact of urban areas on storms and local circulations, and from the impact of urbanization on the hydrological cycle to air quality and weather prediction.

A new scenario framework for climate change research: background, process, and future directions

The scientific community is developing new global, regional, and sectoral scenarios to facilitate interdisciplinary research and assessment to explore the range of possible future climates and related physical changes that could pose risks to human and natural systems; how these changes could interact with social, economic, and environmental development pathways; the degree to which mitigation and adaptation policies can avoid and reduce risks; the costs and benefits of various policy mixes; residual impacts under alternative pathways; and the relationship of future climate change and adaptation and mitigation policy responses with sustainable development. This paper provides the background to and process of developing the conceptual framework for these scenarios, as described in the three subsequent papers in this Special Issue (Van Vuuren et al.; O’Neill et al.; Kriegler et al.). The paper also discusses research needs to further develop and apply this framework. A key goal of the current framework design and its future development is to facilitate the collaboration of climate change researchers from a broad range of perspectives and disciplines to develop policy- and decision-relevant scenarios and explore the challenges and opportunities human and natural systems could face with additional climate change.

Assessing the benefits of crop albedo bio-geoengineering

It has been proposed that growing crop varieties with higher canopy albedo would lower summer-time temperatures over North America and Eurasia and provide a partial mitigation of global warming ('bio-geoengineering') (Ridgwell et al 2009 Curr. Biol. 19 1–5). Here, we use a coupled ocean–atmosphere–vegetation model (HadCM3) with prescribed agricultural regions, to investigate to what extent the regional effectiveness of crop albedo bio-geoengineering might be influenced by a progressively warming climate as well as assessing the impacts on regional hydrological cycling and primary productivity. Consistent with previous analysis, we find that the averted warming due to increasing crop canopy albedo by 0.04 is regionally and seasonally specific, with the largest cooling of ~1 °C for Europe in summer whereas in the low latitude monsoonal SE Asian regions of high density cropland, the greatest cooling is experienced in winter. In this study we identify potentially important positive impacts of increasing crop canopy albedo on soil moisture and primary productivity in European cropland regions, due to seasonal increases in precipitation. We also find that the background climate state has an important influence on the predicted regional effectiveness of bio-geoengineering on societally-relevant timescales (ca 100 years). The degree of natural climate variability and its dependence on greenhouse forcing that are evident in our simulations highlights the difficulties faced in the detection and verification of climate mitigation in geoengineering schemes. However, despite the small global impact, regionally focused schemes such as crop albedo bio-geoengineering have detection advantages.

Climate change impacts on global food security

Climate change could potentially interrupt progress toward a world without hunger. A robust and coherent global pattern is discernible of the impacts of climate change on crop productivity that could have consequences for food availability. The stability of whole food systems may be at risk under climate change because of short-term variability in supply. However, the potential impact is less clear at regional scales, but it is likely that climate variability and change will exacerbate food insecurity in areas currently vulnerable to hunger and undernutrition. Likewise, it can be anticipated that food access and utilization will be affected indirectly via collateral effects on household and individual incomes, and food utilization could be impaired by loss of access to drinking water and damage to health. The evidence supports the need for considerable investment in adaptation and mitigation actions toward a “climate-smart food system” that is more resilient to climate change influences on food security.

Urban climates and global climate change

Cities and global climate change are closely linked: cities are where the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions take place through the consumption of fossil fuels; they are where an increasing proportion of the world’s people live; and they also generate their own climate – commonly characterized by the urban heat island. In this way, understanding the way cities affect the cycling of energy, water, and carbon to create an urban climate is a key element of climate mitigation and adaptation strategies, especially in the context of rising global temperatures and deteriorating air quality in many cities. As climate models resolve finer spatial-scales, they will need to represent those areas in which more than 50% of the world’s population already live to provide climate projections that are of greater use to planning and decision-making. Finally, many of the processes that are instrumental in determining urban climate are the same factors leading to global anthropogenic climate change, namely regional-scale land-use changes; increased energy use; and increased emissions of climatically-relevant atmospheric constituents. Cities are therefore both a case study for understanding, and an agent in mitigating, anthropogenic climate change. This chapter reviews and summarizes the current state of understanding of the physical basis of urban climates, as well as our ability to represent these in models. We argue that addressing the challenges of managing urban environments in a changing climate requires understanding the energy, water, and carbon balances for an urban landscape and, importantly, their interactions and feedbacks, together with their links to human behaviour and controls. We conclude with some suggestions for where further research is needed.

Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment

Black carbon aerosol plays a unique and important role in Earth’s climate system. Black carbon is a type of carbonaceous material with a unique combination of physical properties. This assessment provides an evaluation of black-carbon climate forcing that is comprehensive in its inclusion of all known and relevant processes and that is quantitative in providing best estimates and uncertainties of the main forcing terms: direct solar absorption; influence on liquid, mixed phase, and ice clouds; and deposition on snow and ice. These effects are calculated with climate models, but when possible, they are evaluated with both microphysical measurements and field observations. Predominant sources are combustion related, namely, fossil fuels for transportation, solid fuels for industrial and residential uses, and open burning of biomass. Total global emissions of black carbon using bottom-up inventory methods are 7500 Gg yr�-1 in the year 2000 with an uncertainty range of 2000 to 29000. However, global atmospheric absorption attributable to black carbon is too low in many models and should be increased by a factor of almost 3. After this scaling, the best estimate for the industrial-era (1750 to 2005) direct radiative forcing of atmospheric black carbon is +0.71 W m�-2 with 90% uncertainty bounds of (+0.08, +1.27)Wm�-2. Total direct forcing by all black carbon sources, without subtracting the preindustrial background, is estimated as +0.88 (+0.17, +1.48) W m�-2. Direct radiative forcing alone does not capture important rapid adjustment mechanisms. A framework is described and used for quantifying climate forcings, including rapid adjustments. The best estimate of industrial-era climate forcing of black carbon through all forcing mechanisms, including clouds and cryosphere forcing, is +1.1 W m�-2 with 90% uncertainty bounds of +0.17 to +2.1 W m�-2. Thus, there is a very high probability that black carbon emissions, independent of co-emitted species, have a positive forcing and warm the climate. We estimate that black carbon, with a total climate forcing of +1.1 W m�-2, is the second most important human emission in terms of its climate forcing in the present-day atmosphere; only carbon dioxide is estimated to have a greater forcing. Sources that emit black carbon also emit other short-lived species that may either cool or warm climate. Climate forcings from co-emitted species are estimated and used in the framework described herein. When the principal effects of short-lived co-emissions, including cooling agents such as sulfur dioxide, are included in net forcing, energy-related sources (fossil fuel and biofuel) have an industrial-era climate forcing of +0.22 (�-0.50 to +1.08) W m-�2 during the first year after emission. For a few of these sources, such as diesel engines and possibly residential biofuels, warming is strong enough that eliminating all short-lived emissions from these sources would reduce net climate forcing (i.e., produce cooling). When open burning emissions, which emit high levels of organic matter, are included in the total, the best estimate of net industrial-era climate forcing by all short-lived species from black-carbon-rich sources becomes slightly negative (�-0.06 W m�-2 with 90% uncertainty bounds of �-1.45 to +1.29 W m�-2). The uncertainties in net climate forcing from black-carbon-rich sources are substantial, largely due to lack of knowledge about cloud interactions with both black carbon and co-emitted organic carbon. In prioritizing potential black-carbon mitigation actions, non-science factors, such as technical feasibility, costs, policy design, and implementation feasibility play important roles. The major sources of black carbon are presently in different stages with regard to the feasibility for near-term mitigation. This assessment, by evaluating the large number and complexity of the associated physical and radiative processes in black-carbon climate forcing, sets a baseline from which to improve future climate forcing estimates.

MEGAPOLI: concept of multi-scale modelling of megacity impact on air quality and climate

The EU FP7 Project MEGAPOLI: "Megacities: Emissions, urban, regional and Global Atmospheric POLlution and climate effects, and Integrated tools for assessment and mitigation" (http://megapoli.info) brings together leading European research groups, state-of-the-art scientific tools and key players from non-European countries to investigate the interactions among megacities, air quality and climate. MEGAPOLI bridges the spatial and temporal scales that connect local emissions, air quality and weather with global atmospheric chemistry and climate. The suggested concept of multi-scale integrated modelling of megacity impact on air quality and climate and vice versa is discussed in the paper. It requires considering different spatial and temporal dimensions: time scales from seconds and hours (to understand the interaction mechanisms) up to years and decades (to consider the climate effects); spatial resolutions: with model down- and up-scaling from street- to global-scale; and two-way interactions between meteorological and chemical processes.

Time valued life cycle greenhouse gas emissions from buildings

The UK has adopted legally binding carbon reduction targets of 34% by 2020 and 80% by 2050 (measured against the 1990 baseline). Buildings are estimated to be responsible for more than 50% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the UK. These consist of both operational, produced during use, and embodied, produced during manufacture of materials and components, and during construction, refurbishments and demolition. A brief assessment suggests that it is unlikely that UK emission reduction targets can be met without substantial reductions in both Oc and Ec. Oc occurs over the lifetime of a building whereas the bulk of Ec occurs at the start of a building’s life. A time value for emissions could influence the decision making process when it comes to comparing mitigation measures which have benefits that occur at different times. An example might be the choice between building construction using low Ec construction materials versus building construction using high Ec construction materials but with lower Oc, although the use of high Ec materials does not necessarily imply a lower Oc. Particular time related issues examined here are: the urgency of the need to achieve large emissions reductions during the next 10 to 20 years; the earlier effective action is taken, the less costly it will be; future reduction in carbon intensity of energy supply; the carbon cycle and relationship between the release of GHG’s and their subsequent concentrations in the atmosphere. An equation is proposed, which weights emissions according to when they occur during the building life cycle, and which effectively increases Ec as a proportion of the total, suggesting that reducing Ec is likely to be more beneficial, in terms of climate change, for most new buildings. Thus, giving higher priority to Ec reductions is likely to result in a bigger positive impact on climate change and mitigation costs.

Options for support to agriculture and food security under climate change

Agriculture and food security are key sectors for intervention under climate change. Agricultural production is highly vulnerable even to 2C (low-end) predictions for global mean temperatures in 2100, with major implications for rural poverty and for both rural and urban food security. Agriculture also presents untapped opportunities for mitigation, given the large land area under crops and rangeland, and the additional mitigation potential of aquaculture. This paper presents a summary of current knowledge on options to support farmers, particularly smallholder farmers, in achieving food security through agriculture under climate change. Actions towards adaptation fall into two broad overlapping areas: (1) accelerated adaptation to progressive climate change over decadal time scales, for example integrated packages of technology, agronomy and policy options for farmers and food systems, and (2) better management of agricultural risks associated with increasing climate variability and extreme events, for example improved climate information services and safety nets. Maximization of agriculture’s mitigation potential will require investments in technological innovation and agricultural intensification linked to increased efficiency of inputs, and creation of incentives and monitoring systems that are inclusive of smallholder farmers. Food systems faced with climate change need urgent, broad-based action in spite of uncertainties.

The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment

Advances in the science and observation of climate change are providing a clearer understanding of the inherent variability of Earth’s climate system and its likely response to human and natural influences. The implications of climate change for the environment and society will depend not only on the response of the Earth system to changes in radiative forcings, but also on how humankind responds through changes in technology, economies, lifestyle and policy. Extensive uncertainties exist in future forcings of and responses to climate change, necessitating the use of scenarios of the future to explore the potential consequences of different response options. To date, such scenarios have not adequately examined crucial possibilities, such as climate change mitigation and adaptation, and have relied on research processes that slowed the exchange of information among physical, biological and social scientists. Here we describe a new process for creating plausible scenarios to investigate some of the most challenging and important questions about climate change confronting the global community

The effect of climate policy on the impacts of climate change on river flows in the UK

This paper compares the effects of two indicative climate mitigation policies on river flows in six catchments in the UK with two scenarios representing un-mitigated emissions. It considers the consequences of uncertainty in both the pattern of catchment climate change as represented by different climate models and hydrological model parameterisation on the effects of mitigation policy. Mitigation policy has little effect on estimated flow magnitudes in 2030. By 2050 a mitigation policy which achieves a 2oC temperature rise target reduces impacts on low flows by 20-25% compared to a business-as-usual emissions scenario which increases temperatures by 4oC by the end of the 21st century, but this is small compared to the range in impacts between different climate model scenarios. However, the analysis also demonstrates that an early peak in emissions would reduce impacts by 40-60% by 2080 (compared with the 4oC pathway), easing the adaptation challenge over the long term, and can delay by several decades the impacts that would be experienced from around 2050 in the absence of policy. The estimated proportion of impacts avoided varies between climate model patterns and, to a lesser extent, hydrological model parameterisations, due to variations in the projected shape of the relationship between climate forcing and hydrological response.