Credit cycles in theory and experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.

Horizontal innovation in the theory of growth and development

We analyze recent contributions to growth theory based on the model of expanding variety of Romer (1990). In the first part, we present different versions of the benchmark linear model with imperfect competition. These include the labequipment model, labor-for-intermediates and directed technical change . We review applications of the expanding variety framework to the analysis of international technology diffusion, trade, cross-country productivity differences, financial development and fluctuations. In many such applications, a key role is played by complementarities in the process of innovation.

Rate of convergence of a particle method to the solution of the Mc Kean-Vlasov's equation

This paper studies the rate of convergence of an appropriatediscretization scheme of the solution of the Mc Kean-Vlasovequation introduced by Bossy and Talay. More specifically,we consider approximations of the distribution and of thedensity of the solution of the stochastic differentialequation associated to the Mc Kean - Vlasov equation. Thescheme adopted here is a mixed one: Euler/weakly interactingparticle system. If $n$ is the number of weakly interactingparticles and $h$ is the uniform step in the timediscretization, we prove that the rate of convergence of thedistribution functions of the approximating sequence in the $L^1(\Omega\times \Bbb R)$ norm and in the sup norm is of theorder of $\frac 1{\sqrt n} + h $, while for the densities is ofthe order $ h +\frac 1 {\sqrt {nh}}$. This result is obtainedby carefully employing techniques of Malliavin Calculus.

Contracting externalities and multiple equilibria in sectors: Theory and evidence

We consider an economy where the production technology has constantreturns to scale but where in the descentralized equilibrium thereare aggregate increasing returns to scale. The result follows froma positive contracting externality among firms. If a firms issurrounded by more firms, employees have more opportunitiesoutside their own firm. This improves employees' incentives toinvest in the presence of ex post renegotiation at the firm level,at not cost. Our leading result is that if a region is sparselypopulated or if the degree of development in the region is lowenough, there are multiple equilibria in the level of sectorialemployment. From the theoretical model we derive a non-linearfirst-order censored difference equation for sectoral employment.Our results are strongly consistent with the multiple equilibriahypothesis and the existence of a sectoral critical scale (belowwich the sector follows a delocation process). The scale of theregions' population and the degree of development reduce thecritical scale of the sector.

On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion offorward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the classof generic two player normal form games preceded by an outsideoption. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts(including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

Pi*-pi* bonding interactions generated by halogen oxidation of zirconium(IV) redox-active ligand complexes.

The new complex, [Zr(pda)2]n (1, pda2- = N,N'-bis(neo-pentyl)-ortho-phenylenediamide, n = 1 or 2), prepared by the reaction of 2 equiv of pdaLi2 with ZrCl4, reacts rapidly with halogen oxidants to afford the new product ZrX2(disq)2 (3, X = Cl, Br, I; disq- = N,N'-bis(neo-pentyl)-ortho-diiminosemiquinonate) in which each redox-active ligand has been oxidized by one electron. The oxidation products 3a-c have been structurally characterized and display an unusual parallel stacked arrangement of the disq- ligands in the solid state, with a separation of approximately 3 A. Density functional calculations show a bonding-type interaction between the SOMOs of the disq- ligands to form a unique HOMO while the antibonding linear combination forms a unique LUMO. This orbital configuration leads to a closed-shell-singlet ground-state electron configuration (S = 0). Temperature-dependent magnetism measurements indicate a low-lying triplet excited state at approximately 750 cm-1. In solution, 3a-c show strong disq--based absorption bands that are invariant across the halide series. Taken together these spectroscopic measurements provide experimental values for the one- and two-electron energies that characterize the pi-stacked bonding interaction between the two disq- ligands.

An economic theory of church strictness

This paper makes several contributions to the growing literatureon the economics of religion. First, we explicitly introduce spatial-location models into the economics of religion. Second, we offer a newexplanation for the observed tendency of state (monopoly) churches tolocate toward the "low-tension" end of the "strictness continuum" (ina one-dimensional product space): This result is obtained through theconjunction of "benevolent preferences" (denominations care about theaggregate utility of members) and asymmetric costs of going to a moreor less strict church than one prefers.We also derive implications regarding the relationship between religiousstrictness and membership. The driving forces of our analysis, religiousmarket interactions and asymmetric costs of membership, high-light newexplanations for some well-established stylized facts. The analysis opensthe way to new empirical tests, aimed at confronting the implications ofour model against more traditional explanations.

The struggle against creative accounting: Is "true and fair view" part of the problem or part of the solution?

Creative accounting is a growing issue of interest in Spain. In this article we argue that the concept true and fair view can limit or promote the use of creative accounting depending upon its interpretation. We review the range of meanings that true and fair view can take at an international level and compare the experience of the United Kingdom with the Australian one by analysing the use of true and fair view to limit creative accounting. Finally, we suggest lines of action to be considered by the Spanish accounting standards-setting institutions.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Wh-constructions in cape verdean creole: extensions of the copy theory of movement

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A Walrasian theory of commodity money: Paradoxical results

The objective of this note is to analyze some implications of the model of commodity money described in Banerjee and Maskin (1996) which may seem paradoxical. In order to do this, we incorporate a general production cost structure into the model. We focus on two different results. First, the existence of technologies that make counterfeiting a commodity more difficult may exclude it from being used as medium of exchange. Second, allocative distortions due to problems of asymmetric information may become larger in the presence of such technologies.

Auctions of licences and market structure

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in amarket where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage ina symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium,the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}.The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when severalfirms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buylicences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent,either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs inevery stage, depending on the parameter configuration.

Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.