Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

Sanctions and public enforcement of insider trading laws in Europe

The recent financial crisis triggered an increasing demand for financial regulation to counteract the potential negative economic effects of the evermore complex operations and instruments available on financial markets. As a result, insider trading regulation counts amongst the relatively recent but particularly active regulation battles in Europe and overseas. Claims for more transparency and equitable securities markets proliferate, ranging from concerns about investor protection to global market stability. The internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional notions of regulation and enforcement. Considering that insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe, this study follows a law and economics approach in identifying how this prohibition should be enforced. More precisely, the study investigates first whether criminal law is necessary under all circumstances to enforce insider trading; second, if it should be introduced at EU level. This study provides evidence of law and economics theoretical logic underlying the legal mechanisms that guide sanctioning and public enforcement of the insider trading prohibition by identifying optimal forms, natures and types of sanctions that effectively induce insider trading deterrence. The analysis further aims to reveal the economic rationality that drives the potential need for harmonization of criminal enforcement of insider trading laws within the European environment by proceeding to a comparative analysis of the current legislations of height selected Member States. This work also assesses the European Union’s most recent initiative through a critical analysis of the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for Market Abuse. Based on the conclusions drawn from its close analysis, the study takes on the challenge of analyzing whether or not the actual European public enforcement of the laws prohibiting insider trading is coherent with the theoretical law and economics recommendations, and how these enforcement practices could be improved.

The Application of European Competition Law in Arbitration Proceedings

This work provides several policy proposals capable to strengthen the private enforcement of EU competition law in arbitration. It focuses on the procedural law aspects that are permeated by legal uncertainty and that have not yet fallen under the scrutiny of the law and economics debate. The policy proposals described herein are based on the functional approach to law and economics and aim to promote a more qualified decision making process by: adjudicators, private parties and lawmakers. The resulting framework of procedural rules would be a cost-effective policy tool that could sustain the European Commission’s effort to guarantee a workable level of competition in the EU internal market. This project aims to answer the following broad research question: which procedural rules can improve the efficiency of antitrust arbitration by decreasing litigation costs for private parties on the one hand, and by increasing private parties’ compliance with competition law on the other hand?Throughout this research project, such broad question has been developed into research sub-questions revolving around several key legal issues. The chosen sub-research questions result from a vacuum in the European enforcement system that leaves several key legal issues in antitrust arbitration unresolved. The legal framework proposed in this research project could prevent such a blurry scenario from impairing the EU private enforcement of competition law in arbitration. Therefore, our attention was triggered by those legal issues whose proposed solutions lead to relevant uncertainties and that are most suitable for a law and economics analysis.

Law, Informal Institutions and Trust: an Experimental Perspective

This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.

Reparation and enforcement of judgments : a comparative analysis of the European and Inter-American human rights systems

The inter-American human rights system has been conceived following the example of the European system under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) before it was modified by Protocol No 11. However, two important differences exist. First, the authority of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to order reparation has been strictly limited by the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, the ECtHR's main function is to determine whether the ECHR has been violated. Beyond the declaratory effect of its judgments, according to Article 41 ECHR, it may only "afford just satisfaction to the injured party". The powers of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) were conceived in a much broader fashion in Article 63 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), giving the Court the authority to order a variety of individual and general measures aimed at obtaining restitutio in integrum. The first main part of this thesis shows how both Courts have developed their reparation practice and examines the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. Secondly, the ECtHR's rather limited reparation powers have, interestingly, been combined with an elaborate implementation system that includes several of the Council of Europe's organs, principally the Committee of Ministers. In the Inter-American System, no dedicated mechanism was implemented to oversee compliance with the IACtHR's judgments. The ACHR limits itself to inviting the Court to point out in its annual reports the cases that have not been complied with and to propose measures to be adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States. The General Assembly, however, hardly ever took action. The IACtHR has therefore filled this gap by developing a proper procedure to oversee compliance with its judgments. Both the European and the American solutions to ensure compliance are presented and compared in the second main part of this thesis. Finally, based on the results of both main parts, a comparative analysis of the reparation practice and the execution results in both human rights systems is being provided, aimed at developing proposals for the improvement of the functioning of either human rights protection system.

Enforcement of the GNU GPL in Germany and Europe

GPL enforcement is successful in Europe. In several court decisions and out of court settlements the license conditions of the GPL have been successfully enforced. In particular, embedded systems are the main focus of such compliance activities. The article describes the practice of enforcement activities and the legal prerequisites under the application of German law.

Enforcing Copyright Infringements Online: In Search of Balanced Private International Law Rules

Enforcement of copyright online and fighting online “piracy” is a high priority on the EU agenda. Private international law questions have recently become some of the most challenging issues in this area. Internet service providers are still uncertain how the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) provisions would apply in EU-wide copyright infringement cases and in which country they can be sued for copyright violations. Meanwhile, because of the territorial approach that still underlies EU copyright law, right holders are unable to acquire EU-wide relief for copyright infringements online. This article first discusses the recent CJEU rulings in the Pinckney and Hejduk cases and argues that the “access approach” that the Court adopted for solving jurisdiction questions could be quite reasonable if it is applied with additional legal measures at the level of substantive law, such as the targeting doctrine. Secondly, the article explores the alternatives to the currently established lex loci protectionis rule that would enable right holders to get EU-wide remedies under a single applicable law. In particular, the analysis focuses on the special applicable law rule for ubiquitous copyright infringements, as suggested by the CLIP Group, and other international proposals.