991 resultados para Political behaviour
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Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have restricted and repetitive behaviours (RRBs) which may be similar to obsessions and compulsions in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). These behaviours can be intrusive and interfere in the lives of the child and their family. Preliminary studies have shown success in using adapted Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) to treat these behaviors in children with high functioning ASD. Using a hypothetical vignette, this thesis attempted to examine procedural knowledge that the children and their parents gained while participating in a CBT treatment that was evaluated in a Randomized Controlled Trial. For both parents and children, there was a significant increase in number of strategies generated from pre to post-treatment. Further, children in the experimental group generated significantly more strategies than the treatment as usual (TAU) group post-intervention. There was no significant correlation between number of strategies generated and the child’s treatment success, age, or IQ.
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Human Class I phosphatidylinositol transfer proteins (PITPs) exists in two forms: PITPα and PITPβ. PITPs are believed to be lipid transfer proteins based on their capacity to transfer either phosphatidylinositol (PI) or phosphatidylcholine (PC) between membrane compartments in vitro. In Drosophila, the PITP domain is found to be part of a multi-domain protein named retinal degeneration B (RdgBα). The PITP domain of RdgBα shares 40 % sequence identity with PITPα and has been shown to possess PI and PC binding and transfer activity. The detailed molecular mechanism of ligand transfer by the human PITPs and the Drosophila PITP domain remains to be fully established. Here, we investigated the membrane interactions of these proteins using dual polarization interferometry (DPI). DPI is a technique that measures protein binding affinity to a flat immobilized lipid bilayer. In addition, we also measured how quickly these proteins transfer their ligands to lipid vesicles using a fluorescence resonance energy transfer (FRET)-based assay. DPI investigations suggest that PITPβ had a two-fold higher affinity for membranes compared to PITPα. This was reflected by a four-fold faster ligand transfer rate for PITPβ in comparison to PITPα as determined by the FRET assay. Interestingly, DPI analysis also demonstrated that PI-bound human PITPs have lower membrane affinity compared to PC-bound PITPs. In addition, the FRET studies demonstrated the significance of membrane curvature in the ligand transfer rate of PITPs. The ligand transfer rate was higher when the accepting vesicles were highly curved. Furthermore, when the accepting vesicles contained phosphatidic acid (PA) which have smaller head groups, the transfer rate increased. In contrast, when the accepting vesicles contained phosphoinositides which have larger head groups, the transfer rate was diminished. However, PI, the favorite ligand of PITPs, or the presence of anionic lipids did not appear to influence the ligand transfer rate of PITPs. Both DPI and FRET examinations revealed that the PITP domain of RdgBα was able to bind to membranes. However, the RdgBα PITP domain appears to be a poor binder and transporter of PC.
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UANL
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UANL
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UANL
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UANL
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UANL
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Rapport de recherche
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This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.
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Affiliation: Mark Daniel : Département de médecine sociale et préventive, Faculté de médecine, Université de Montréal
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Rapport de recherche
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Rapport de recherche
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This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.