Oligarchies in Spatial Environments

In spatial environments we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Individual preferences measure distances between alternatives according to the Lp-norm (for a fixed p => 1). When the policy space is multi-dimensional and the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex, any quasi-transitive welfare function must be oligarchic. As a corollary we obtain that for transitive welfare functions weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex.

A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. The properties used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.

Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

Quasi-Transitive and Suzumura Consistent Relations

We examine properties of binary relations that complement quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency in the sense that they, together with the original axiom(s), are equivalent to transitivity. In general, the conjunction of quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency is strictly weaker than transitivity but in the case of collective choice rules that satisfy further properties, the conjunction of quasi- transitivity and Suzumura consistency implies transitivity of the social relation. We prove this observation by characterizing the Pareto rule as the only collective choice rule such that collective preference relations are quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent but not necessarily complete.

Desert and Distributive Efficiency

It is highly desirable for an allocation of goods to be efficient. However, one might also deem it important that an allocation gives individuals what they deserve. This paper investigates whether it is possible for an allocation to be both efficient and give people what they deserve. It will first of all consider comparative desert, and conclude that it is possible to satisfy both desiderata. It will then consider absolute desert by integrating Shelly Kagan’s work on desert and economic theory. The conclusion will be that there are potential conflicts between absolute desert and efficiency. The paper will then examine how to select the best compromise between the two values, considering several different conceptions of absolute desert.

School Choice with Control

Controlled choice over public schools is a common policy of school boards in the United States. It attempts giving choice to parents while maintaining racial and ethnic balance at schools. This paper provides a foundation for controlled school choice programs. We develop a natural notion of fairness and show that assignments, which are fair for same type students and constrained non-wasteful, always exist in controlled choice problems; a "controlled" version of the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (CDAA) always finds such an assignment which is also weakly Pareto-optimal. CDAA provides a practical solution for controlled school choice programs.

«School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds»

Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving options to parents while maintaining diversity, often enforced by setting feasibility constraints with hard upper and lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that there might not exist assignments that satisfy standard fairness and non-wastefulness properties; whereas constrained non-wasteful assignments which are fair for same type students always exist. We introduce a "controlled" version of the deferred acceptance algorithm with an improvement stage (CDAAI) that finds a Pareto optimal assignment among such assignments. To achieve fair (across all types) and non-wasteful assignments, we propose the control constraints to be interpreted as soft bounds-flexible limits that regulate school priorities. In this setting, a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm (DAASB) finds an assignment that is Pareto optimal among fair assignments while eliciting true preferences. CDAAI and DAASB provide two alternative practical solutions depending on the interpretation of the control constraints. JEL C78, D61, D78, I20.

«Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the groves mechanisms»

A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter infinite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family.

Analyse statistique de la pauvreté et des inégalités

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Squattage militant : entre efficience parétienne et principe de justice

Le squattage militant est étudié du point du vue du fonctionnement du marché immobilier et des principes de justice libérale. On montre que certains cas de vacance peuvent être considérés comme des défaillances du marché et que, sous certaines conditions, le squattage peut être pareto-améliorant. On examine ensuite le squattage du point de vue des principes de justice en considérant la question des goûts dispendieux, qui doit être relogé, l'éventualité du paiement d'un loyer et la base informationnelle requise pour le relogement.

Recherche d'éléments répétés par analyse des distributions de fréquences d'oligonucléotides

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Fonctions de perte en actuariat

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

La résolution du problème de formation de cellules dans un contexte multicritère

Les techniques de groupement technologique sont aujourd’hui utilisées dans de nombreux ateliers de fabrication; elles consistent à décomposer les systèmes industriels en sous-systèmes ou cellules constitués de pièces et de machines. Trouver le groupement technologique le plus efficace est formulé en recherche opérationnelle comme un problème de formation de cellules. La résolution de ce problème permet de tirer plusieurs avantages tels que la réduction des stocks et la simplification de la programmation. Plusieurs critères peuvent être définis au niveau des contraintes du problème tel que le flot intercellulaire,l’équilibrage de charges intracellulaires, les coûts de sous-traitance, les coûts de duplication des machines, etc. Le problème de formation de cellules est un problème d'optimisation NP-difficile. Par conséquent les méthodes exactes ne peuvent être utilisées pour résoudre des problèmes de grande dimension dans un délai raisonnable. Par contre des méthodes heuristiques peuvent générer des solutions de qualité inférieure, mais dans un temps d’exécution raisonnable. Dans ce mémoire, nous considérons ce problème dans un contexte bi-objectif spécifié en termes d’un facteur d’autonomie et de l’équilibre de charge entre les cellules. Nous présentons trois types de méthodes métaheuristiques pour sa résolution et nous comparons numériquement ces métaheuristiques. De plus, pour des problèmes de petite dimension qui peuvent être résolus de façon exacte avec CPLEX, nous vérifions que ces métaheuristiques génèrent des solutions optimales.

Population Ethics, Social Choice Theory, and Two problems in the Measurement of Economic Poverty

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On Truncated Versions of Certain Measures of Inequality and Stability

The present study focuses attention on defining certain measures of income inequality for the truncated distributions and characterization of probability distributions using the functional form of these measures, extension of some measures of inequality and stability to higher dimensions, characterization of bivariate models using the above concepts and estimation of some measures of inequality using the Bayesian techniques. The thesis defines certain measures of income inequality for the truncated distributions and studies the effect of truncation upon these measures. An important measure used in Reliability theory, to measure the stability of the component is the residual entropy function. This concept can advantageously used as a measure of inequality of truncated distributions. The geometric mean comes up as handy tool in the measurement of income inequality. The geometric vitality function being the geometric mean of the truncated random variable can be advantageously utilized to measure inequality of the truncated distributions. The study includes problem of estimation of the Lorenz curve, Gini-index and variance of logarithms for the Pareto distribution using Bayesian techniques.