976 resultados para Non reciprocity trade
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Aim Niche conservatism, or the extent to which niches are conserved across space and time, is of special concern for the study of non-native species as it underlies predictions of invasion risk. Based on the occurrence of 28 non-native birds in Europe, we assess to what extent Grinnellian realized niches are conserved during invasion, formulate hypotheses to explain the variation in observed niche changes and test how well species distribution models can predict non-native bird occurrence in Europe. Location Europe. Methods To quantify niche changes, a recent method that applies kernel smoothers to densities of species occurrence in a gridded environmental space was used. This corrects for differences in the availability of environments between study areas and allows discrimination between 'niche expansion' into environments new to the species and 'niche unfilling', whereby the species only partially fills its niche in the invaded range. Predictions of non-native bird distribution in Europe were generated using several distribution modelling techniques. Results Niche overlap between native and non-native bird populations is low, but niche changes are smaller for species having a higher propagule pressure and that were introduced longer ago. Non-native birds in Europe occupy a subset of the environments they inhabit in their native ranges. Niche expansion into novel environments is rare for most species, allowing species distribution models to accurately predict invasion risk. Main conclusions Because of the recent nature of most bird introductions, species occupy only part of the suitable environments available in the invaded range. This signals that apart from purely ecological factors, patterns of niche conservatism may also be contingent on population-specific historical factors. These results also suggest that many claims of niche differences may be due to a partial filling of the native niche in the invaded range and thus do not represent true niche changes.
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Colloque de Formation de Centre d'Antalgie du CHUV Lausanne, Suisse, septembre, 2011
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This paper considers trade secrecy as an appropriation mechanism in the context ofb the US Economic Espionage Act (EEA) 1996. We examine the relation between trade secret intensity and firm size, using a cross section of 95 court cases. The paper builds on extant work in three respects. First, we create a unique body of evidence, using EEA prosecutions from 1996 to 2008. Second, we use an econometric approach to measurement, estimation and hypothesis testing. This allows us comprehensively to test the robustness of findings. Third, we focus on objectively measured valuations, instead of the subjective, self-reported values used elsewhere. We find a stable, robust value for the elasticity of trade secret intensity with respect to firm size, which indicates that a 10% reduction in firm size leads to a 7% increase in trade secret intensity. We find that this result is not sensitive to industrial sector, sample trimming, or functional form.
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We construct new series for common native language and common spoken language for 195 countries, which we use together with series for common official language and linguis-tic proximity in order to draw inferences about (1) the aggregate impact of all linguistic factors on bilateral trade, (2) whether the linguistic influences come from ethnicity and trust or ease of communication, and (3) in so far they come from ease of communication, to what extent trans-lation and interpreters play a role. The results show that the impact of linguistic factors, all together, is at least twice as great as the usual dummy variable for common language, resting on official language, would say. In addition, ease of communication is far more important than ethnicity and trust. Further, so far as ease of communication is at work, translation and inter-preters are extremely important. Finally, ethnicity and trust come into play largely because of immigrants and their influence is otherwise difficult to detect.
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Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.
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We construct new series for common native language and common spoken language for 195 countries, which we use together with series for common official language and linguis-tic proximity in order to draw inferences about (1) the aggregate impact of all linguistic factors on bilateral trade, (2) whether the linguistic influences come from ethnicity and trust or ease of communication, and (3) in so far they come from ease of communication, to what extent trans-lation and interpreters play a role. The results show that the impact of linguistic factors, all together, is at least twice as great as the usual dummy variable for common language, resting on official language, would say. In addition, ease of communication is far more important than ethnicity and trust. Further, so far as ease of communication is at work, translation and inter-preters are extremely important. Finally, ethnicity and trust come into play largely because of immigrants and their influence is otherwise difficult to detect.
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This paper offers an integrated analysis of the forces shaping the emergence of the African slave trade over the early modern period. We focus our attention on two questions. First, why most of the increase in the demand for slaves during this period came exclusively from western Europeans. Second, and of most relevance for present-day development outcomes, why was the overwhelming majority of slaves of African origin. Technological differences in manufacturing technology, the specificities of sugar (and other crops’) production, and the cultural fragmentation of the African continent all play a role in the analysis. Supporting evidence for each of our claims is provided from a broad corpus of relevant literature.
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A metabolic hypothesis is presented for insulin resistance in obesity, in the presence or absence of Type 2 (non-insulin-dependent) diabetes mellitus. It is based on physiological mechanisms including a series of negative feed-back mechanisms, with the inhibition of the function of the glycogen cycle in skeletal muscle as a consequence of decreased glucose utilization resulting from increased lipid oxidation in the obese. It considers the inhibition of glycogen synthase activity together with inhibition of glucose storage and impaired glucose tolerance. The prolonged duration of increased lipid oxidation, considered as the initial cause, may lead to Type 2 diabetes. This hypothesis is compatible with others based on the inhibition of insulin receptor kinase and of glucose transporter activities.
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The paper aims to examine the empirical relationship between trade openness and economic growth of India for the time period 1970-2010. Trade openness is a multi-dimensional concept and hence measures of both trade barriers and trade volumes have been used as proxies for openness. The estimation results from Vector Autoregressive method suggest that growth in trade volumes accelerate economic growth in case of India. We do not find any evidence from our analysis that trade barriers lower growth.
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This paper proposes a new methodology, the Domination Index, to evaluate non-income inequalities between social groups such as inequalities of educational attainment, occupational status, health or subjective well-being. The Domination Index does not require specific cardinalisation assumptions, but only uses the ordinal structure of these non-income variables. We approach from an axiomatic perspective and show that a set of desirable properties for a group inequality measure when the variable of interest is ordinal, characterizes the Domination Index up to a positive scalar transformation. Moreover we make use of the Domination Index to explore the relation between inequality and segregation and show how these two concepts are related theoretically.
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Most of the expansion of global trade during the last three decades has been of the North-South kind - between capital-abundant developed and labour-abundant developing countries. Based on this observation, I argue that the recent growth of world trade is best understood from a factor-proportions perspective. I present novel evidence documenting that differences in capital-labour ratios across countries have increased in the wake of two shocks to the global economy: i) the opening up of China and ii) financial globalisation and the resulting upstream capital flows towards capital-abundant regions. I analyse their impact on specialisation and the volume of trade in a dynamic model which combines factor-proportions trade in goods with international trade in financial assets. Calibrating this model, I find that it can account for 60% of world trade growth between 1980 and 2007. It is also capable of predicting international investment patterns which are consistent with the data
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Can international trade act as the sole engine of growth for an economy? If yes, what are the mechanisms through which trade operates in transmitting permanent growth? This paper answers these questions with two simple two-country models, in which only one country enjoys sustained growth in autarky. The models differ in the assumptions on technical change, which is either labour- or capital-augmenting. In both cases, the stagnant economy imports growth by trading. In the first model, growth is transmitted because of permanent increases in the trade volume. In the alternative framework, the stagnant economy imports sustained growth because its terms of trade permanently improve.
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We set up a trade model where three countries compete for an exogenous number of firms. Our innovation lies in the geography of the model. Of the three countries, one is the hub through which all trade takes place. First, we establish the natural geography of the region, which is given by the equilibrium distribution of industrial activity in the absence of taxes or subsidies. We then examine the implications for corporate taxes when the countries compete with each other to attract firms. We find that, even when all countries are the same size, the centrality of the hub gives it an advantage in tax setting, such that its equilibrium tax can be larger than that of the spokes and yet it still attracts a disproportionate share of industry. Thus geographic advantage in tax competition has a second dimension, centrality in addition to size.
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We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multi-dimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the effects of monitoring and penalising mistakes on work quality, and evaluate spillovers on non- incentivised dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We .nd that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are large, but reduces punctuality substantially irrespectively of the size of incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with ten per cent of participants stealing overall. Our setting also allows us to disentangle between possible theoretical mechanisms driving the adverse effects of monitoring. Our .ndings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.