Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.

Religion and Economic Growth: Was Weber Right?

Evidence of falling wages in Catholic cities and rising wages in Protestant cities between 1500 and 1750, during the spread of literacy in the vernacular, is inconsistent with most theoretical models of economic growth. In The Protestant Ethic, Weber suggested an alternative explanation based on culture. Here, a theoretical model confirms that a small change in the subjective cost of cooperating with strangers can generate a profound transformation in trading networks. In explaining urban growth in early-modern Europe, specifications compatible with human-capital versions of the neoclassical model and endogenous-growth theory are rejected in favor of a “small-world” formulation based on the Weber thesis.

Asymmetric Smiles, Leverage Effects and Structural Parameters.

In this paper, we characterize the asymmetries of the smile through multiple leverage effects in a stochastic dynamic asset pricing framework. The dependence between price movements and future volatility is introduced through a set of latent state variables. These latent variables can capture not only the volatility risk and the interest rate risk which potentially affect option prices, but also any kind of correlation risk and jump risk. The standard financial leverage effect is produced by a cross-correlation effect between the state variables which enter into the stochastic volatility process of the stock price and the stock price process itself. However, we provide a more general framework where asymmetric implied volatility curves result from any source of instantaneous correlation between the state variables and either the return on the stock or the stochastic discount factor. In order to draw the shapes of the implied volatility curves generated by a model with latent variables, we specify an equilibrium-based stochastic discount factor with time non-separable preferences. When we calibrate this model to empirically reasonable values of the parameters, we are able to reproduce the various types of implied volatility curves inferred from option market data.

Empirical Assessment of an Intertemporal Option Pricing Model with Latent variables

This paper assesses the empirical performance of an intertemporal option pricing model with latent variables which generalizes the Hull-White stochastic volatility formula. Using this generalized formula in an ad-hoc fashion to extract two implicit parameters and forecast next day S&P 500 option prices, we obtain similar pricing errors than with implied volatility alone as in the Hull-White case. When we specialize this model to an equilibrium recursive utility model, we show through simulations that option prices are more informative than stock prices about the structural parameters of the model. We also show that a simple method of moments with a panel of option prices provides good estimates of the parameters of the model. This lays the ground for an empirical assessment of this equilibrium model with S&P 500 option prices in terms of pricing errors.

Logique et tests d'hypotheses: reflexions sur les problemes mal poses en econometrie

Dans ce texte, nous analysons les développements récents de l’économétrie à la lumière de la théorie des tests statistiques. Nous revoyons d’abord quelques principes fondamentaux de philosophie des sciences et de théorie statistique, en mettant l’accent sur la parcimonie et la falsifiabilité comme critères d’évaluation des modèles, sur le rôle de la théorie des tests comme formalisation du principe de falsification de modèles probabilistes, ainsi que sur la justification logique des notions de base de la théorie des tests (tel le niveau d’un test). Nous montrons ensuite que certaines des méthodes statistiques et économétriques les plus utilisées sont fondamentalement inappropriées pour les problèmes et modèles considérés, tandis que de nombreuses hypothèses, pour lesquelles des procédures de test sont communément proposées, ne sont en fait pas du tout testables. De telles situations conduisent à des problèmes statistiques mal posés. Nous analysons quelques cas particuliers de tels problèmes : (1) la construction d’intervalles de confiance dans le cadre de modèles structurels qui posent des problèmes d’identification; (2) la construction de tests pour des hypothèses non paramétriques, incluant la construction de procédures robustes à l’hétéroscédasticité, à la non-normalité ou à la spécification dynamique. Nous indiquons que ces difficultés proviennent souvent de l’ambition d’affaiblir les conditions de régularité nécessaires à toute analyse statistique ainsi que d’une utilisation inappropriée de résultats de théorie distributionnelle asymptotique. Enfin, nous soulignons l’importance de formuler des hypothèses et modèles testables, et de proposer des techniques économétriques dont les propriétés sont démontrables dans les échantillons finis.

Wage Policy of Firms: an Empirical Investigation.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of wages and workers' mobility within firms with a hierarchical structure of job levels. The theoretical model proposed by Gibbons and Waldman (1999), that combines the notions of human capital accumulation, job rank assignments based on comparative advantage and learning about workers' abilities, is implemented empirically to measure the importance of these elements in explaining the wage policy of firms. Survey data from the GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) are used to draw conclusions on the common features characterizing the wage policy of firms from a large sample of firms. The GSOEP survey also provides information on the worker's rank within his firm which is usually not available in other surveys. The results are consistent with non-random selection of workers onto the rungs of a job ladder. There is no direct evidence of learning about workers' unobserved abilities but the analysis reveals that unmeasured ability is an important factor driving wage dynamics. Finally, job rank effects remain significant even after controlling for measured and unmeasured characteristics.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

A Theoretical Comparison Between Integrated and Realized Volatilies

In this paper, we provide both qualitative and quantitative measures of the cost of measuring the integrated volatility by the realized volatility when the frequency of observation is fixed. We start by characterizing for a general diffusion the difference between the realized and the integrated volatilities for a given frequency of observations. Then, we compute the mean and variance of this noise and the correlation between the noise and the integrated volatility in the Eigenfunction Stochastic Volatility model of Meddahi (2001a). This model has, as special examples, log-normal, affine, and GARCH diffusion models. Using some previous empirical works, we show that the standard deviation of the noise is not negligible with respect to the mean and the standard deviation of the integrated volatility, even if one considers returns at five minutes. We also propose a simple approach to capture the information about the integrated volatility contained in the returns through the leverage effect.

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers.

It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. In this paper, we show, using a simple example, that in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence, trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.

Nonparametric Instrumental Regression

The focus of the paper is the nonparametric estimation of an instrumental regression function P defined by conditional moment restrictions stemming from a structural econometric model : E[Y-P(Z)|W]=0 and involving endogenous variables Y and Z and instruments W. The function P is the solution of an ill-posed inverse problem and we propose an estimation procedure based on Tikhonov regularization. The paper analyses identification and overidentification of this model and presents asymptotic properties of the estimated nonparametric instrumental regression function.

Some Implications of the Zero Lower Bound on Interest Rates for the Term Structure and Monetary Policy

In an economy where cash can be stored costlessly (in nominal terms), the nominal interest rate is bounded below by zero. This paper derives the implications of this nonnegativity constraint for the term structure and shows that it induces a nonlinear and convex relation between short- and long-term interest rates. As a result, the long-term rate responds asymmetrically to changes in the short-term rate, and by less than predicted by a benchmark linear model. In particular, a decrease in the short-term rate leads to a decrease in the long-term rate that is smaller in magnitude than the increase in the long-term rate associated with an increase in the short-term rate of the same size. Up to the extent that monetary policy acts by affecting long-term rates through the term structure, its power is considerably reduced at low interest rates. The empirical predictions of the model are examined using data from Japan.

Does the Barro-Gordon Model Explain the Behavior of US Inflation? a Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence

This paper tests the predictions of the Barro-Gordon model using US data on inflation and unemployment. To that end, it constructs a general game-theoretical model with asymmetric preferences that nests the Barro-Gordon model and a version of Cukierman’s model as special cases. Likelihood Ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the Barro-Gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the version of Cukierman’s model is not. Reduced-form estimates are consistent with the view that the Federal Reserve weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate.

Habit Formation and the Persistence of Monetary Shocks

This paper studies the persistent effects of monetary shocks on output. Previous empirical literature documents this persistence, but standard general equilibrium models with sticky prices fail to generate output responses beyond the duration of nominal contracts. This paper constructs and estimates a general equilibrium model with price rigidities, habit formation, and costly capital adjustment. The model is estimated via Maximum Likelihood using US data on output, the real money stock, and the nominal interest rate. Econometric results suggest that habit formation and adjustment costs to capital play an important role in explaining the output effects of monetary policy. In particular, impulse response analysis indicates that the model generates persistent, hump-shaped output responses to monetary shocks.

Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited.

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that the risk averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk neutral and the risk averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff witha kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991, 1995).