Jumps in the Volatility of Financial Markets.

Recent work suggests that the conditional variance of financial returns may exhibit sudden jumps. This paper extends a non-parametric procedure to detect discontinuities in otherwise continuous functions of a random variable developed by Delgado and Hidalgo (1996) to higher conditional moments, in particular the conditional variance. Simulation results show that the procedure provides reasonable estimates of the number and location of jumps. This procedure detects several jumps in the conditional variance of daily returns on the S&P 500 index.

Matching Markets under (In)complete Information

We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that for stable (matching) mechanisms there is a strong and surprising link between Nash equilibria under complete information and Bayesian Nash equilibria under incomplete information. That is,given a common belief, a strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common belief, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information at the true profile in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism. This result may help to explain the success of stable mechanisms in these markets.

Impact of Openness to Trade on Capital Formation in Developed and Emerging Markets: a Comparative Study.

Rapport de recherche

ITEM : An Integrated Transport Economy Model - Price Elasticities of Freight Transport Demand in Canada : Three Canadian Markets and Four Commodities.

Rapport de recherche

The role of financial markets in the stabilization and reconstruction of Lebanon.

Rapport de recherche

A medical Handbook: for the use of practitioners and students

UANL

A reference handbook of the medical sciences : embracing the entirerange of scientific and practical medicine and allied science

UANL

Who has responsibility for access to essential medical drugs in the developing world?

L’accès aux traitements de base est un enjeu crucial pour la santé, la pauvreté et le développement. La responsabilité en matière d’accès est alors une question essentielle. Le huitième Objectif du Millénaire pour le Développement postule qu’en coopération avec les firmes pharmaceutiques, l’accès aux traitements essentiels doit être assuré. Les principales parties prenantes qui doivent engager leur responsabilité pour l’accès aux médicaments sont (1) l’industrie pharmaceutique, (2) les gouvernements, (3) la société au sens large, et (4) les individus (qu’ils soient ou non malades). Quatre approches permettent d’appréhender la responsabilité: (a) l’approche déontologique; (b) l’utilitarisme; (c) l’égalitarisme; (b) l’approche basée sur les droits de l’homme. Ces quatre arguments peuvent être utilisés pour assigner une responsabilité aux gouvernements dans l’accès aux médicaments. Le papier conclut qu’il est parfois difficile de distinguer entre ces quatre approches et qu’un « glissement-d’échelle » de la responsabilité est une voie utile pour appréhender les rôles des quatre principales parties prenantes dans l’accès aux médicaments, dépendant du pays ou de la région et de son environnement interne.

Le service sanitaire de la Compagnie du canal de Suez (1860-1914) : médecine coloniale ou medical encounter?

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading cycle algorithm finds the unique core allocation. When preferences are not necessarily strict, we use an exogenous profile of tie-breakers to resolve any ties in individuals' preferences and apply Gale's top trading cycle algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences. We provide a foundation of these simple extensions of Gale's top trading cycle algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences. We show that Gale's top trading cycle algorithm with fixed tie-breaking is characterized by individual rationality, strategy-proofness, weak efficiency, non-bossiness, and consistency. Our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a 'good and simple' rule for the resulting strict preferences. This reinforces the market-based approach even in the presence of indifferences because always competitive allocations are chosen.