Assessing the Relevance of Anomie Theory for Explaining Spatial Variation in Lethal Criminal Violence: An Aggregate-Level Analysis of Homicide within the United States

One of the most influential statements in the anomie theory tradition has been Merton’s argument that the volume of instrumental property crime should be higher where there is a greater imbalance between the degree of commitment to monetary success goals and the degree of commitment to legitimate means of pursing such goals. Contemporary anomie theories stimulated by Merton’s perspective, most notably Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional anomie theory, have expanded the scope conditions by emphasizing lethal criminal violence as an outcome to which anomie theory is highly relevant, and virtually all contemporary empirical studies have focused on applying the perspective to explaining spatial variation in homicide rates. In the present paper, we argue that current explications of Merton’s theory and IAT have not adequately conveyed the relevance of the core features of the anomie perspective to lethal violence. We propose an expanded anomie model in which an unbalanced pecuniary value system – the core causal variable in Merton’s theory and IAT – translates into higher levels of homicide primarily in indirect ways by increasing levels of firearm prevalence, drug market activity, and property crime, and by enhancing the degree to which these factors stimulate lethal outcomes. Using aggregate-level data collected during the mid-to-late 1970s for a sample of relatively large social aggregates within the U.S., we find a significant effect on homicide rates of an interaction term reflecting high levels of commitment to monetary success goals and low levels of commitment to legitimate means. Virtually all of this effect is accounted for by higher levels of property crime and drug market activity that occur in areas with an unbalanced pecuniary value system. Our analysis also reveals that property crime is more apt to lead to homicide under conditions of high levels of structural disadvantage. These and other findings underscore the potential value of elaborating the anomie perspective to explicitly account for lethal violence.

Brain electric microstates and momentary conscious mind states as building blocks of spontaneous thinking: I. Visual imagery and abstract thoughts

Prompted reports of recall of spontaneous, conscious experiences were collected in a no-input, no-task, no-response paradigm (30 random prompts to each of 13 healthy volunteers). The mentation reports were classified into visual imagery and abstract thought. Spontaneous 19-channel brain electric activity (EEG) was continuously recorded, viewed as series of momentary spatial distributions (maps) of the brain electric field and segmented into microstates, i.e. into time segments characterized by quasi-stable landscapes of potential distribution maps which showed varying durations in the sub-second range. Microstate segmentation used a data-driven strategy. Different microstates, i.e. different brain electric landscapes must have been generated by activity of different neural assemblies and therefore are hypothesized to constitute different functions. The two types of reported experiences were associated with significantly different microstates (mean duration 121 ms) immediately preceding the prompts; these microstates showed, across subjects, for abstract thought (compared to visual imagery) a shift of the electric gravity center to the left and a clockwise rotation of the field axis. Contrariwise, the microstates 2 s before the prompt did not differ between the two types of experiences. The results support the hypothesis that different microstates of the brain as recognized in its electric field implement different conscious, reportable mind states, i.e. different classes (types) of thoughts (mentations); thus, the microstates might be candidates for the `atoms of thought'.

Action crisis and cost–benefit thinking: A cognitive analysis of a goal-disengagement phase

The present research is based on the notion that disengagement from goals is not a discrete event but a process (Klinger, 1975). A critical phase in this process is when difficulties and setbacks in striving for a goal accumulate. This critical phase is termed here as an action crisis. Given the profound effects that people's thoughts have on their self-regulatory efficiency, it is essential to understand the cognitive correlates of an action crisis. In two experimental lab and two correlational field studies, the hypothesis that goal-related costs and benefits become cognitively highly accessible during an action crisis was tested and supported. Participants who were experiencing an action crisis in such diverse goal areas as intimate relationships, sports, and university studies, thought about goal-related costs and benefits more intensively and frequently in comparison to participants who were not in an action crisis. In an incidental learning task they recognized more of cost–benefit-items and less of implementation-items than the control group. Results are interpreted in terms of action phase specific mindsets (Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012).

Do untrustworthy faces facilitate the recognition of antonyms? A critical analysis of thinking the opposite under distrust

Distrust should automatically activate a "thinking the opposite". Thus, according to Schul, Mayo and Burnstein (2004), subjects detect antonyms of adjectives faster when confronted with untrustworthy rather than trustworthy faces. We conducted four experiments within their paradigm to test whether the response latency of detecting antonyms remains stable. We introduced the following changes: the paradigm was applied with and without an induction phase, faces were culturally adapted, the stimuli were presented according more to priming rules, and the canonicity of antonyms was controlled. Results show that the response latency of detecting antonyms is difficult to predict. Even if faces are culturally adapted and priming rules are applied more strictly, response latency depends on whether the induction phase is applied and on the canonicity of antonyms rather than on the trustworthiness of faces. In general, this paradigm seems not to be appropriate to test thinking the opposite under distrust.