Transnational authority in the knowledge-based economy: Who sets the standards of ICT training and certification?

This article examines the extent and limits of nonstate forms of authority in international relations. It analyzes how the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure for the tradability of services in a global knowledge-based economy relies on informal regulatory practices for the adjustment of ICT-related skills. By focusing on the challenge that highly volatile and short-lived cycles of demands for this type of knowledge pose for ensuring the right qualification of the labor force, the article explores how companies and associations provide training and certification programs as part of a growing market for educational services setting their own standards. The existing literature on non-conventional forms of authority in the global political economy has emphasized that the consent of actors, subject to informal rules and some form of state support, remains crucial for the effectiveness of those new forms of power. However, analyses based on a limited sample of actors tend toward a narrow understanding of the issues concerned and fail to fully explore the differentiated space in which non state authority is emerging. This article develops a three-dimensional analytical framework that brings together the scope of the issues involved, the range of nonstate actors concerned, and the spatial scope of their authority. The empirical findings highlight the limits of these new forms of nonstate authority and shed light on the role of the state and international governmental organizations in this new context.

Las relaciones comerciales de la Unión Europea con sus vecinos: ¿europeización, internacionalización o coordinación?

[spa] La política de Vecindad de la Unión Europea se acostumbra a interpretar como un instrumento de europeización forzada. Gracias a su fuerza de negociación, la Unión Europea impondría a sus vecinos su modelo económico y hasta político y social. Esta sin embargo no es la evidencia que se obtiene en el ámbito del comercio. En consonancia con el modelo teórico de relaciones exteriores desarrollado por varios investigadores bajo la dirección de Esther Barbé, observamos como, en el ámbito comercial, el modelo de relaciones entre la Unión Europea y cuatro países de la política de Vecindad puede ser tanto de europeización como también de internacionalización o de coordinación. El tipo de modelo aplicado viene condicionado, como asevera el marco teórico, por el cumplimiento de las condiciones necesarias que se requieren para que Europa imponga sus normas: legitimidad, incentivos y coherencia interna. Estas condiciones varían en función tanto del tema tratado como del país vecino.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country

We argue that preferences for secession are the expression of a common unobserved mechanisms determining national identity. This paper examines the hypothesis of independence of both preferences for secession (independent Euskadi) and Basque national identity in the light of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). We deal with psychological determinants of individuals' national identity formation as well as those that influence the propensity of individuals to support the secession of their perceived ¿imagined community¿ or nation.. We undertake econometric survey analysis for the Basque Country using a bivariate probit model and publicly available data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Our results provide robust evidence of a common determination of national identity and political preferences for the secession of the Basque Country consistently with Akerloff and Kranton model.

Against the mainstream: Nazi privatization in 1930s Germany

The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery f public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party.

TACI, unlike BAFF-R, is solely activated by oligomeric BAFF and APRIL to support survival of activated B cells and plasmablasts.

The cytokine BAFF binds to the receptors TACI, BCMA, and BAFF-R on B cells, whereas APRIL binds to TACI and BCMA only. The signaling properties of soluble trimeric BAFF (BAFF 3-mer) were compared with those of higher-order BAFF oligomers. All forms of BAFF bound BAFF-R and TACI, and elicited BAFF-R-dependent signals in primary B cells. In contrast, signaling through TACI in mature B cells or plasmablasts was only achieved by higher-order BAFF and APRIL oligomers, all of which were also po-tent activators of a multimerization-dependent reporter signaling pathway. These results indicate that, although BAFF-R and TACI can provide B cells with similar signals, only BAFF-R, but not TACI, can respond to soluble BAFF 3-mer, which is the main form of BAFF found in circulation. BAFF 60-mer, an efficient TACI agonist, was also detected in plasma of BAFF transgenic and nontransgenic mice and was more than 100-fold more active than BAFF 3-mer for the activation of multimerization-dependent signals. TACI supported survival of activated B cells and plasmablasts in vitro, providing a rational basis to explain the immunoglobulin deficiency reported in TACI-deficient persons.

Las relaciones comerciales de la Unión Europea con sus vecinos: ¿europeización, internacionalización o coordinación?

[spa] La política de Vecindad de la Unión Europea se acostumbra a interpretar como un instrumento de europeización forzada. Gracias a su fuerza de negociación, la Unión Europea impondría a sus vecinos su modelo económico y hasta político y social. Esta sin embargo no es la evidencia que se obtiene en el ámbito del comercio. En consonancia con el modelo teórico de relaciones exteriores desarrollado por varios investigadores bajo la dirección de Esther Barbé, observamos como, en el ámbito comercial, el modelo de relaciones entre la Unión Europea y cuatro países de la política de Vecindad puede ser tanto de europeización como también de internacionalización o de coordinación. El tipo de modelo aplicado viene condicionado, como asevera el marco teórico, por el cumplimiento de las condiciones necesarias que se requieren para que Europa imponga sus normas: legitimidad, incentivos y coherencia interna. Estas condiciones varían en función tanto del tema tratado como del país vecino.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.