World population growth and fertility patterns, 1960-2000. A simple model explaining the evolution of world's fertility during the second half of the 20th Century

In this paper we attempt to describe the general reasons behind the world populationexplosion in the 20th century. The size of the population at the end of the century inquestion, deemed excessive by some, was a consequence of a dramatic improvementin life expectancies, attributable, in turn, to scientific innovation, the circulation ofinformation and economic growth. Nevertheless, fertility is a variable that plays acrucial role in differences in demographic growth. We identify infant mortality, femaleeducation levels and racial identity as important exogenous variables affecting fertility.It is estimated that in poor countries one additional year of primary schooling forwomen leads to 0.614 child less per couple on average (worldwide). While it may bepossible to identify a global tendency towards convergence in demographic trends,particular attention should be paid to the case of Africa, not only due to its differentdemographic patterns, but also because much of the continent's population has yet toexperience improvement in quality of life generally enjoyed across the rest of theplanet.

A structural model of Australia as a small open economy

This paper sets up and estimates a structuralmodel of Australia as a small open economyusing Bayesian techniques. Unlike other recentstudies, the paper shows that a small microfoundedmodel can capture the open economydimensions quite well. Specifically, the modelattributes a substantial fraction of the volatilityof domestic output and inflation to foreigndisturbances, close to what is suggested by unrestrictedVAR studies. The paper also investigatesthe effects of various exogenous shockson the Australian economy.

The so-called 'external partners' in the groups of corporations: A model of presentation in the consolidated statements

This paper studies, on the one hand, theories set out around theconsideration of the external partners in the consolidated informationand on the other hand, financial models that discuss the convenience ofthe separation or not of the different elements that form part of theliabilities of the balance sheet of the companies. A Model is proposed,the External Partners Model, which financially argues a certain presentationand processing of such and that, in our opinion, facilitates the analysisof the consolidated financial statements. This model is based on twohypotheses: (1) the economic and financial variables are not independentand (2) the value of the company depends, among other factors, of thetype of sources that constitute their capital. These two hypotheses willimply that a separation should be included in the consolidated balance sheet between equity and liabilities as they are different sources ofcapital and then its separation will give relevant information to itsusers.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.

Allocating ideas: Horizontal competition in tournaments

We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition intournaments with two competing firms. The sponsor cares about the qualityof the design but also about the design location. A priori not even thesponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discoveredonce he has seen the actual proposals. We show that the more efficientfirm is more likely to be conservative when choosing the design location.Also, to get some differentiation in design locations, the cost differencebetween contestants can neither be too small nor too big. Therefore, ifthe sponsor mainly cares about the design location, participation in thetournaments by the two lowest cost contestants cannot be optimal for thesponsor.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

Contracting externalities and multiple equilibria in sectors: Theory and evidence

We consider an economy where the production technology has constantreturns to scale but where in the descentralized equilibrium thereare aggregate increasing returns to scale. The result follows froma positive contracting externality among firms. If a firms issurrounded by more firms, employees have more opportunitiesoutside their own firm. This improves employees' incentives toinvest in the presence of ex post renegotiation at the firm level,at not cost. Our leading result is that if a region is sparselypopulated or if the degree of development in the region is lowenough, there are multiple equilibria in the level of sectorialemployment. From the theoretical model we derive a non-linearfirst-order censored difference equation for sectoral employment.Our results are strongly consistent with the multiple equilibriahypothesis and the existence of a sectoral critical scale (belowwich the sector follows a delocation process). The scale of theregions' population and the degree of development reduce thecritical scale of the sector.

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

Forecasting and turning point predictions in a Bayesian panel VAR model

We provide methods for forecasting variables and predicting turning points in panel Bayesian VARs. We specify a flexible model which accounts for both interdependencies in the cross section and time variations in the parameters. Posterior distributions for the parameters are obtained for a particular type of diffuse, for Minnesota-type and for hierarchical priors. Formulas for multistep, multiunit point and average forecasts are provided. An application to the problem of forecasting the growth rate of output and of predicting turning points in the G-7 illustrates the approach. A comparison with alternative forecasting methods is also provided.

Stabilization versus insurance: Welfare effects of procyclical taxation under incomplete markets

We construct and calibrate a general equilibrium business cycle model with unemployment and precautionary saving. We compute the cost of business cycles and locate the optimum in a set of simple cyclical fiscal policies. Our economy exhibits productivity shocks, giving firms an incentive to hire more when productivity is high. However, business cycles make workers' income riskier, both by increasing the unconditional probability of unusuallylong unemployment spells, and by making wages more variable, and therefore they decrease social welfare by around one-fourth or one-third of 1% of consumption. Optimal fiscal policy offsets the cycle, holding unemployment benefits constant but varying the tax rate procyclically to smooth hiring. By running a deficit of 4% to 5% of output in recessions, the government eliminates half the variation in the unemployment rate, most of the variation in workers'aggregate consumption, and most of the welfare cost of business cycles.

Cost-effectiveness of low-molecular-weight heparin for treatment of pulmonary embolism.

BACKGROUND: Low-molecular-weight heparin (LMWH) appears to be safe and effective for treating pulmonary embolism (PE), but its cost-effectiveness has not been assessed. METHODS: We built a Markov state-transition model to evaluate the medical and economic outcomes of a 6-day course with fixed-dose LMWH or adjusted-dose unfractionated heparin (UFH) in a hypothetical cohort of 60-year-old patients with acute submassive PE. Probabilities for clinical outcomes were obtained from a meta-analysis of clinical trials. Cost estimates were derived from Medicare reimbursement data and other sources. The base-case analysis used an inpatient setting, whereas secondary analyses examined early discharge and outpatient treatment with LMWH. Using a societal perspective, strategies were compared based on lifetime costs, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), and the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio. RESULTS: Inpatient treatment costs were higher for LMWH treatment than for UFH (dollar 13,001 vs dollar 12,780), but LMWH yielded a greater number of QALYs than did UFH (7.677 QALYs vs 7.493 QALYs). The incremental costs of dollar 221 and the corresponding incremental effectiveness of 0.184 QALYs resulted in an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of dollar 1,209/QALY. Our results were highly robust in sensitivity analyses. LMWH became cost-saving if the daily pharmacy costs for LMWH were < dollar 51, if > or = 8% of patients were eligible for early discharge, or if > or = 5% of patients could be treated entirely as outpatients. CONCLUSION: For inpatient treatment of PE, the use of LMWH is cost-effective compared to UFH. Early discharge or outpatient treatment in suitable patients with PE would lead to substantial cost savings.

Shocks and institutions in a job matching model

This paper explains the divergent behavior of European an US unemploymentrates using a job market matching model of the labor market with aninteraction between shocks an institutions. It shows that a reduction inTF growth rates, an increase in real interest rates, and an increase intax rates leads to a permanent increase in unemployment rates when thereplacement rates or initial tax rates are high, while no increase inunemployment occurs when institutions are "employment friendly". The paperalso shows that an increase in turbulence, modelle as an increase probabilityof skill loss, is not a robust explanation for the European unemploymentpuzzle in the context of a matching model with both endogenous job creationand job estruction.

Why do emerging economies borrow short term?

We argue that one reason why emerging economies borrow short term is that it is cheaperthan borrowing long term. This is especially the case during crises, as in these episodes therelative cost of long-term borrowing increases. We construct a unique database of sovereignbond prices, returns, and issuances at di¤erent maturities for 11 emerging economies from 1990to 2009 and present a set of new stylized facts. On average, these countries pay a higher riskpremium on long-term than on short-term bonds. During crises, the di¤erence between the tworisk premia increases and issuance shifts towards shorter maturities. To illustrate our argument,we present a simple model in which the maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharingproblem between an emerging economy subject to rollover crises and risk averse internationalinvestors.

A test of the predictive validity of non-linear QALY models using time trade-off utilities

This paper presents a test of the predictive validity of various classes ofQALY models (i.e., linear, power and exponential models). We first estimatedTTO utilities for 43 EQ-5D chronic health states and next these states wereembedded in health profiles. The chronic TTO utilities were then used topredict the responses to TTO questions with health profiles. We find that thepower QALY model clearly outperforms linear and exponential QALY models.Optimal power coefficient is 0.65. Our results suggest that TTO-based QALYcalculations may be biased. This bias can be avoided using a power QALY model.

Wealth, financial intermediation and growth

This paper presents empirical support for the existence of wealth effects in the contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth, and offers a theoretical explanation for these effects. Using GMM dynamic panel data techniques applied to study the growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation, we show that the exogenous contribution of financial development on economic growth has different effects for different levels of income per capita. We find that this contribution is generally increasing with thelevel of income per capita of the economy, up to a relatively high level of income. This contribution is consistently lower for poor countries; and for some low levels of income per capita it can be negative. We provide a model to account for these wealth effects. The model is a overlapping generations growth model where financial intermediaries implement liquidity risk sharing among depositors. We show that at early stages of economic development, a bank can increase welfare of its depositors only at the cost of lowering investment and growth. However, once the economy has crossed certain wealth threshold, the liquidity role of banks becomes unambiguously growth enhancing. As wealth increases, banks offer improving liquidity insurance, and higher growth; however, for high levels of wealth, growth generated byfinancial intermediation declines as the economy attains the optimal level of consumption risk sharing.