Demographics and Brexit: A deeper problem for the EU? CEPS Commentary, 8 July 2016

There has been much debate about the demographic factors that contributed to the outcome of the UK’s referendum on its membership of the EU. Two aspects command special attention. First, there are marked differences between young and old generations in the preferences shown for remaining in the EU. While the former predominantly voted to remain, a great majority of the latter voted to leave. On the other hand, voter turnout revealed the opposite trend: about 83% of UK citizens aged 65 and older voted, whereas only 36% of those aged 18-24 cast their vote (Figure 1).

Scotland and the European Union. EPC Policy Brief, 14 July 2016

Britain’s referendum on EU membership revealed a country divided; while the United Kingdom voted to leave by 52%, Scotland voted by 62% to remain in the EU, putting the question of Scottish independence back on the table. The Scottish government says that Scotland should not be taken out of the EU against the will of its people, and that a second referendum on independence is “highly likely”. Although the Scottish people voted against independence in a referendum in 2014, opinion polls currently suggest that a majority in Scotland wants another referendum, and would vote for independence. In this Policy Brief, Graham Avery looks at how the Scottish question relates to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; what factors have changed since the Scottish people voted against independence in 2014 and what Scotland‘s chances are of remaining in the EU.

A Global Strategy for a soul-searching European Union. EPC Discussion Paper, 13 July 2016

On 28 June 2016, just a few days after the historic Brexit vote, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini presented the paper on the new European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) at the European Council, outlining the strategic coordinates for the EU’s foreign and security policy. In this Discussion Paper, Giovanni Grevi takes a closer look at the EUGS and assesses its main rationale, features, added value and prospects against the backdrop of an ever more complex world. Not only is the EU dealing with increasingly contested and polarised politics at home, but the global theatre itself has become hugely disorienting, more integrated and yet more fragmented at the same time. The paper recalibrates the overall foreign policy posture of the EU and sketches out a more modest and concrete approach compared to earlier aspirations, and a more joined-up one compared to current practice. By doing so, the strategy seeks to square the circle between the need for Europe to be cohesive and purposeful in a harder strategic environment and the fact that domestic politics within the Union constrain its external action and drain its attractiveness. The EUGS calls on the EU and member states to fully take on their responsibility to underpin unity, prosperity and security at home by taking more effective and joined-up action abroad. The question is, of course, whether this call will be heeded.

Enseignement et recherche

Le vote du 9 février sur l'immigration a eu des répercussions sur les programmes de formation et de recherche académique, Eramsus+ et Horizon 2020. - L'initiative « Protection contre la sexualisation à l'école maternelle et primaire » a récolté le nombre de signatures requises. - La question de l'équivalence des diplômes de la formation professionnelle supérieure a fait débat. - La loi sur la formation continue a abouti. - Le contre-projet indirect à l'initative sur les bourses d'étude propose une réforme de la loi sur les aides à la formation. - La participation de la Suisse à la « Source européenne de spallation ESS » à passer le cap du premier Conseil.

The 2015 National Elections in Switzerland: Renewed Polarization and Shift to the Right

The 2015 election to the Swiss Parliament marks a return to an already observed trend that was only interrupted in 2011: a shift to the right and an increase in polarization. The vote share of the nationalist-conservative Swiss People's Party (SVP) has now reached a historical height of 29.4% (+2.8). This note discusses why cantons matter in the Swiss national elections, and to what degree elections have become nationalized. Institutionally, the 26 cantons serve as electoral districts. This leads to a highly disproportional electoral system and has magnified the minor vote shifts to a slightly more pronounced shift in seats, with the right now holding a tiny majority of 101 of 200 seats in the first chamber. The two winners, the SVP and the Liberals, also had most campaign funds at their disposal. They were able to guide an extensive nationwide campaign in which they advocated their core issues instead of candidates. Other parties only advertised at the cantonal level.

Procéduralisme épistémique et légitimité démocratique : une défense de l'égalité politique

Ce mémoire explore la relation qui lie démocratie et légitimité politique, dans une perspective épistémique. La démocratie, dans son acception la plus générale, confère à chacun la possibilité de faire valoir les intérêts qu'il estime être les siens et ceux de sa communauté, en particulier à l’occasion d’un scrutin. Cette procédure décisionnelle qu’est le vote consacre ainsi en quelque sorte la liberté et l’égalité dont profitent chacun des citoyens, et confère une certaine légitimité au processus décisionnel. Cela dit, si le vote n’est pas encadré par des considérations épistémiques, rien ne garantit que le résultat politique qui en découlera sera souhaitable tant pour les individus que pour la collectivité: il est tout à fait permis d’imaginer que des politiques discriminatoires, économiquement néfastes ou simplement inefficaces voient ainsi le jour, et prennent effet au détriment de tous. En réponse à ce problème, différentes théories démocratiques ont vu le jour et se sont succédé, afin de tenter de lier davantage le processus démocratique à l’atteinte d’objectifs politiques bénéfiques pour la collectivité. Au nombre d’entre elles, la démocratie délibérative a proposé de substituer la seule confrontation d’intérêts de la démocratie agrégative par une recherche collective du bien commun, canalisée autour de procédures délibératives appelées à légitimer sur des bases plus solides l’exercice démocratique. À sa suite, la démocratie épistémique s’est inspirée des instances délibératives en mettant davantage l’accent sur la qualité des résultats obtenus que sur les procédures elles-mêmes. Au final, un même dilemme hante chaque fois les différentes théories : est-il préférable de construire les instances décisionnelles en se concentrant prioritairement sur les critères procéduraux eux-mêmes, au risque de voir de mauvaises décisions filtrer malgré tout au travers du processus sans pouvoir rien y faire, ou devons-nous avoir d’entrée de jeu une conception plus substantielle de ce qui constitue une bonne décision, au risque cette fois de sacrifier la liberté de choix qui est supposé caractériser un régime démocratique? La thèse que nous défendrons dans ce mémoire est que le concept d’égalité politique peut servir à dénouer ce dilemme, en prenant aussi bien la forme d’un critère procédural que celle d’un objectif politique préétabli. L’égalité politique devient en ce sens une source normative forte de légitimité politique. En nous appuyant sur le procéduralisme épistémique de David Estlund, nous espérons avoir démontré au terme de ce mémoire que l’atteinte d’une égalité politique substantielle par le moyen de procédures égalitaires n’est pas une tautologie hermétique, mais plutôt un mécanisme réflexif améliorant tantôt la robustesse des procédures décisionnelles, tantôt l’atteinte d’une égalité tangible dans les rapports entre citoyens.

Proximité à distance : les fonctions critiques de la mimêsis dans la pensée de Theodor W. Adorno

La présente thèse entend donner sens à un concept qui occupe une place centrale au sein de la pensée de Theodor W. Adorno mais qui, parce que notoirement difficile à définir, n’a pas reçu l’attention qu’il mérite : la mimêsis (Mimesis). Il s’agira, plus exactement, de comprendre la mimêsis comme un point nodal de la critique adornienne, qui nous permet de comprendre au nom et en vue de quoi elle se déploie. Car sous toutes ses acceptions – et nous verrons qu’elles sont fort variées – la mimêsis adornienne est toujours invoquée dans le but de contrecarrer les tendances hétéronomes (c’est-à-dire : déshumanisantes) propres aux sociétés capitalistes avancées. Surtout, elle est constamment présentée comme un correctif matérialiste au type de rationalité abstraite qui sous-tend ces sociétés. Cette tâche s’avère d’autant plus lourde que, malgré son important poids normatif, la mimêsis ne fait pas l’objet, chez Adorno, d’une théorisation explicite. Il nous faudra pallier cette indétermination, en identifiant d’abord les assises normatives les plus premières de la critique adornienne (0.0. Introduction : les fondements normatifs de la critique adornienne), pour ensuite rendre compte des fonctions particulières qu’occupe la mimêsis au sein de cette critique (1.0. Les fonctions critiques de la mimêsis adornienne). Ce travail de débroussaillage exégétique et interprétatif nous permettra de constater que la mimêsis adornienne recèle trois types de potentiels critiques distincts. D’abord, en ce qu’elle est présentée – dans les travaux des années 1930 et 1940 surtout – comme une impulsion psychosomatique à même de trahir, l’instant d’une brève résistance, la violence infligée à la nature intérieure et extérieure de l’homme par les forces réificatrices de la rationalité instrumentale (Instrumentelle Vernunft), la mimêsis adornienne peut être comprise comme un mimétisme (Mimikry) bioanthropologique dont la valeur est principalement expressive (2.O. Mimikry : le potentiel bioanthropologique de la mimêsis). Ensuite, lorsqu’elle sera pensée – à partir de la fin des années 50 surtout – comme une compétence proprement épistémique qui permet au sujet connaissant de rencontrer à nouveau puis de redéterminer les objets de son expérience, la mimêsis adornienne peut être comprise comme un correctif critique à la logique appropriative de la pensée identifiante (identifizierendes Denken) (3.O. Affinität et Entäusserung : le potentiel épistémique de la mimêsis). Enfin, dans la mesure où elle informe le modus operandi de l’oeuvre d’art d’avant-garde telle que défendue par Adorno dans la Théorie esthétique, et qui consiste à détourner, en les retournant contre elles-mêmes, les contraintes imposées par le monde totalement administré (total verwaltete Welt), la mimêsis peut être comprise comme une Methexis subversive, c’est-à-dire comme une stratégie séditieuse à même de conjurer l’hétéronomie sociale en l’anticipant et en l’incorporant (4.0. Methexis subversive : le potentiel stratégique de la mimêsis). Ainsi, tout en voulant rendre justice à la très grande polysémie du concept, nous aimerions démontrer que la mimêsis adornienne pointe constamment vers une forme ou une autre de résistance : comme expression, comme extériorisation ou comme subversion.

Analyse des événements festifs et religieux dans le Petit Maghreb sous l'approche de la médiation

Travail dirigé présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade Maîtrise (M.Sc.) en criminologie option sécurité intérieure

Voters and Candidates of the Future

Within the literature there is a growing concern about lower voter turnout rates among young age cohorts. In this article we investigate the reported willingness to vote among 72,466 14-year old adolescents from 22 European countries, taking part in the International Citizen and Civic Education Survey (ICCS, 2009). Results indicate that the willingness to vote remains quite high among this age group, but with a clear gender division. While girls are more likely to state that they will vote, boys are more likely to see themselves as a future election candidate. An open classroom climate at school contributes to the willingness to vote in future elections. The elements that are known to have an effect on the turnout level of adults, however, do not have a significant impact on the intention to vote among adolescents. This would suggest that the observed low turnout rate among young age groups cannot just be attributed to an alleged lack of political motivation among adolescents.

Electoral Volatility, Political Sophistication, Trust and Efficacy

In this article we investigate voter volatility and analyze the causes and motives of switching vote intentions. We test two main sets of variables linked to volatility in literature; political sophistication and ‘political (dis)satisfaction’. Results show that voters with low levels of political efficacy tend to switch more often, both within a campaign and between elections. In the analysis we differentiate between campaign volatility and inter-election volatility and by doing so show that the dynamics of a campaign have a profound impact on volatility. The campaign period is when the lowly sophisticated switch their vote intention. Those with higher levels of interest in politics have switched their intention before the campaign has started. The data for this analysis are from the three wave PartiRep Belgian Election Study (2009).

Partisan Dealignment in Germany: A rejoinder to Russell Dalton

The work of Russell Dalton has undoubtedly played a seminal role in the study of the relation between political sophistication and partisan dealignment. We furthermore acknowledge the presence of a consensus on the occurrence of lower levels of partisanship in Germany. Using panel data as well as pooled cross-sectional observations, however, it is clear that generational replacement is not the sole driving force of partisan dealignment, but that period effects should also be taken into account. While on an aggregate level rising levels of political sophistication have occurred simultaneously with decreasing partisanship, individual level analysis suggests clearly that the least sophisticated are most likely to feel alienated from the party system. We close with some very specific suggestion on how to address the democratic consequences of declining levels of partisanship.

Economic Policy Voting and Incumbency: Unemployment in Western Europe

The economic voting literature has been dominated by the incumbency-oriented hypothesis, where voters reward or punish government at the ballot box according to economic performance. The alternative, policy-oriented hypothesis, where voters favor parties closest to their issue position, has been neglected in this literature. We explore policy voting with respect to an archetypal economic policy issue – unemployment. Voters who favor lower unemployment should tend to vote for left parties, since they “own” the issue. Examining a large time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) pool of Western European nations, we find some evidence for economic policy voting. However, it exists in a form conditioned by incumbency. According to varied tests, left incumbents actually experience a net electoral cost, if the unemployment rate climbs under their regime. Incumbency, then, serves to break any natural economic policy advantage that might accrue to the left due to the unemployment issue.

Macroeconomics, economic crisis and electoral outcomes: A national European pool

An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates.

The economic voter and economic crisis

Theories of economic voting have a long tradition in political science and continue to inspire a large group of scholars. Classical economic voting theory assumes a reward-and-punishment mechanism (Key, 1966). This mechanism implies that incumbents are more likely to stay in power under a good economy, but are cast out under a bad economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). The economy has repeatedly been shown to be a major determinant of electoral behavior (see especially the recent book by Duch and Stevenson, 2008), but the current economic crisis seems to provide a marked illustration of how the economy affects voting. In recent elections across the Western industrialized world, most ruling coalitions lost their majority. Opposition parties, on the other hand, whether right wing or left wing, have appeared to benefit from the economic downturn.

Election Forecasting under Opaque Conditions

Election forecasting models assume retrospective economic voting and clear mechanisms of accountability. Previous research indeed indicates that incumbent political parties are being held accountable for the state of the economy. In this article we develop a ‘hard case’ for the assumptions of election forecasting models. Belgium is a multiparty system with perennial coalition governments. Furthermore, Belgium has two completely segregated party systems (Dutch and French language). Since the prime minister during the period 1974-2011 has always been a Dutch language politician, French language voters could not even vote for the prime minister, so this cognitive shortcut to establish political accountability is not available. Results of an analysis for the French speaking parties (1981-2010) show that even in these conditions of opaque accountability, retrospective economic voting occurs as election results respond to indicators with regard to GDP and unemployment levels. Party membership figures can be used to model the popularity function in election forecasting.