Retinal adaptation of visual processing time delays.

A significant proportion of the processing delays within the visual system are luminance dependent. Thus placing an attenuating filter over one eye causes a temporal delay between the eyes and thus an illusion of motion in depth for objects moving in the fronto-parallel plane, known as the Pulfrich effect. We have used this effect to study adaptation to such an interocular delay in two normal subjects wearing 75% attenuating neutral density filters over one eye. In two separate experimental periods both subjects showed about 60% adaptation over 9 days. Reciprocal effects were seen on removal of the filters. To isolate the site of adaptation we also measured the subjects' flicker fusion frequencies (FFFs) and contrast sensitivity functions (CSFs). Both subjects showed significant adaptation in their FFFs. An attempt to model the Pulfrich and FFF adaptation curves with a change in a single parameter in Kelly's [(1971) Journal of the Optical Society of America, 71, 537-546] retinal model was only partially successful. Although we have demonstrated adaptation in normal subjects to induced time delays in the visual system we postulate that this may at least partly represent retinal adaptation to the change in mean luminance.

Changes of mind in decision-making.

A decision is a commitment to a proposition or plan of action based on evidence and the expected costs and benefits associated with the outcome. Progress in a variety of fields has led to a quantitative understanding of the mechanisms that evaluate evidence and reach a decision. Several formalisms propose that a representation of noisy evidence is evaluated against a criterion to produce a decision. Without additional evidence, however, these formalisms fail to explain why a decision-maker would change their mind. Here we extend a model, developed to account for both the timing and the accuracy of the initial decision, to explain subsequent changes of mind. Subjects made decisions about a noisy visual stimulus, which they indicated by moving a handle. Although they received no additional information after initiating their movement, their hand trajectories betrayed a change of mind in some trials. We propose that noisy evidence is accumulated over time until it reaches a criterion level, or bound, which determines the initial decision, and that the brain exploits information that is in the processing pipeline when the initial decision is made to subsequently either reverse or reaffirm the initial decision. The model explains both the frequency of changes of mind as well as their dependence on both task difficulty and whether the initial decision was accurate or erroneous. The theoretical and experimental findings advance the understanding of decision-making to the highly flexible and cognitive acts of vacillation and self-correction.