The Budget of the European Union. IES WORKING PAPER 4/2010

This paper first provides a short history of the European budget, focusing on the development of the EU’s “own resources”. It then elaborates on the fundamental changes to the financial system and the budgetary procedure that the Treaty of Lisbon introduced. It is posited that with the amendments the budgetary process has lost clarity. Whilst the multiannual framework may provide for long-term stability, it stands in contradiction to a central principle of parliamentary democracy: annual budgets. The EU’s search for a fair and transparent budgetary system has not yet come to full fruition. Europe needs a fairer and more transparent system. Since the Luxembourg agreement of 1970, the Union has not done anything with the VAT as own resources. The VAT is related to the welfare standards and developments in the Member States. A fixed share of this indirect tax could form the base of a long term financing plan for the general EU budget.

Answering the Call of the European Court of Justice in Eurofoods a Proposed Package of Due Process Rights with a View Toward the 2012 Revision of the European Insolvency Regulation. IES WORKING PAPER 3/2011

This paper anticipates the 2012 revision of the European Insolvency Regulation, which is the sole Union legislation on the subject of cross border insolvency proceedings. The paper first describes the historical background of the Regulation. The salient point of the historical discussion is that the Regulation is the product of forty years of negotiation and arises from a historical context that is no longer applicable to current economic realities, i.e. it provides for liquidation, not reorganization, it doesn’t deal with cross border groups of companies, and it lacks an effective mechanism for transparency and creditor participation. The paper then reviews the unique hybrid jurisdictional system of concurrent universal and territorial proceedings that the Regulation imposes. It looks at this scheme from a practical viewpoint, i.e. what issues arise with concurrent proceedings in two states, involving the same assets, the same creditors, and the same company. The paper then focuses on a significant issue raised by the European Court of Justice in the Eurofoods case, i.e. the need to comply with fundamental due process principles that, while not articulated in the Regulation, lie at the core of Union law. Specifically, the paper considers the ramifications of the Court’s holding that “a Member State may refuse to recognize insolvency proceedings opened in another Member State where the decision to open the proceedings was taken in flagrant breach of the fundamental right to be heard.” In response to the Court’s direction, this paper proposes a package of due process rights, consisting principally of an accessible, efficient and useful insolvency database, the infrastructure of which already exists, but the content and use of which has not yet been developed. As part of a cohesive three part due process package, the paper also proposes the formation of cross border creditors' committees and the establishment of a European Insolvency Administrator. Finally, on the institutional level, this paper proposes that the revision of the Regulation and the development of the insolvency database not only need to be coordinated, but need to be conceptualized, managed and undertaken, not as the separate efforts of diverse institutions, but as a single, unified endeavor.

The Criminalisation of Irregular Migration in the European Union. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 80/2015

This paper offers an academic examination of the legal regimes surrounding the criminalisation of irregular migrants in the EU and of acts of solidarity with irregular migrants, such as assisting irregular migrants to enter or remain in the EU, and other behaviour that is motivated by humanitarian instincts. The research analyses EU law and its relationship with national provisions regarding the criminalisation of irregular migration and of acts of solidarity vis-á-vis irregular migrants. A comparative analysis was made of the laws of the UK, France and Italy, supplemented by an analysis of the laws of Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. By considering the role of public trust in fostering compliance with the law, the paper explores the impact of criminalisation measures on institutions’ authority to compel individuals to comply with the law (institutional legitimacy). The study finds that certain indicators question institutional legitimacy and reveals the varied nature and extent of penalties imposed by different member states. The paper concludes that there is an important role for public trust in immigration law compliance, not just in measures directed towards irregular migrants but also towards those acting in solidarity with irregular migrants.

More Union in European Defence. CEPS Task Force Report, 26 February 2015

Years of uncoordinated cuts in defence spending have eroded the EU’s role as a security actor in what is now a multipolar world. This CEPS Task Force report aims to provide member states and the EU institutions with the narrative to strengthen defence cooperation in the EU, in the face of numerous emergencies in the EU’s strategic neighbourhood and ever-present security threats. The report is a record of the deliberations over several months between high-level experts in the field of European security and defence, who conclude that the Treaty of Lisbon demands and permits a great deal more in terms of our common security and defence activities. And that member states could achieve much more value for money than the €190 billion that they spend to keep up 28 national armies, comprising roughly 1.5 million service personnel. This report suggests policy actions to further the EU’s strategic, institutional, capabilities, and resources cooperation in the field of defence. Ultimately, in the view of the Task Force experts, further integration should amount to a European Defence Union.

EU’s quest for energy security. What role for the Energy Union? EPC Policy Brief, 3 March 2015

From the Introduction. The past year has pushed energy security high on the EU agenda, and with it, the need for stronger cooperation on a common energy policy. For years the EU member states have been driven by different reasons to – or not to – collaborate. The internal energy market's economic benefits have not have not provided a sufficient driver for cooperation. The first climate and energy targets were an achievement, but in reality action has been undermined by concerns over competitiveness. Being a global leader in setting targets has not translated in cross-border collaboration in meeting them. National interests and bilateral energy deals have weakened EU's common voice vis-à-vis supplier countries. Whether the recognition of EU's energy vulnerability will become a real driver for creating an Energy Union worth its name remains to be seen. The need for action could not be stronger.

The Energy Union: what is in a name? EPC Commentary, 18 March 2015

On 19-20 March, the EU Council will react to the Commission’s Communication on the Energy Union. Considering the high expectations, the reactions have been diverse so far, with complaints about the lack of attention for some specific interests or unsurprising credit as the document is vague enough to accommodate all wishes. However, a general consensus has emerged about the need for a holistic approach. States and stakeholders seem to recognise that the main challenges Europe faces in energy matters are deeply interconnected and can no longer be treated separately and without a larger role for the EU.

Living (dangerously) without a fiscal union. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/03

The euro area’s political contract requires member nations to rely principally on their own resources when confronted with severe economic distress. Since monetary policy is the same for all, national fiscal austerity is the default response to counter national fiscal stress. Moreover, the monetary policy was itself stodgy in countering the crisis, and banking-sector problems were allowed to fester. And it was considered inappropriate to impose losses on private sector creditors. Thus, the nature of the incomplete monetary union and the self-imposed taboos led deep and persistent fiscal austerity to become the norm. As a consequence, growth was hurt, which undermined the primary objective of lowering the debt burden. To prevent a meltdown, distressed nations were given official loans to repay private creditors. But the stress and instability continued and soon it became necessary to ease the repayment terms on official loans. When even that proved insufficient, the German-inspired fiscal austerity was combined with the deep pockets of the European Central Bank. The ECB’s safety net for insolvent or near-insolvent banks and sovereigns, in effect, substituted for the absent fiscal union and drew the central bank into the political process.

The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the European Union. College of Europe Research Paper in Law 01/2014

Introduction. The European Union’s external action is not only defined by its influence on international developments, but also by its ability and the need to respond to those developments. While traditionally many have stressed the EU’s ‘autonomy’, over the years its ‘dependence’ on global developments has become more clear.2 International law has continued to play a key role in, not only in the EU’s external relations, but also in the Union’s own legal order.3 The purpose of this paper is not to assess the role or performance of the EU in international institutions.4 Rather it purports to reverse the picture and focus on a somewhat under-researched topic: the legal status of decisions of international organizations in the EU’s legal order.5 While parts of the status of these decisions relate to the status of international agreements and international customary law, it can be argued that decisions of international organizations and other international bodies form a distinct category. In fact, it has been observed that “this phenomenon has added a new layer of complexity to the already complex law of external relations of the European Union”.6 Emerging questions relate to the possible difference between decisions of international organizations of which the EU is a member (such as the FAO) and decisions of organizations where it is not (irrespective of existing competences in that area – such as in the ILO). Questions also relate to the hierarchical status of these decisions in the EU’s legal order and to the possibility of them being invoked in direct or indirect actions before the Court of Justice. This contribution takes a broad perspective on decisions of international organizations by including decisions taken in other international institutions which do not necessarily comply with the standard definition of international organizations,7 be it bodies set-up by multilateral conventions or informal (transnational / regulatory) bodies. Some of these bodies are relatively close to the EU (such as the Councils established by Association Agreements – see further Section 5 below); others operate at a certain distance. Limiting the analysis to formal international organizations will not do justice to the manifold relationships between the European Union and various international bodies and to the effects of the norms produced by these bodies. The term ‘international decisions’ is therefore used to refer to any normative output of international institutional arrangements.

Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung, Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit Michael Gehler = European integration from a historical experience, A Discussion with Michael Gehler. ZEI Discussion Paper C227, 2015

From 1995 to 1999 Monika Wulf-Mathies served as EU commissioner responsible for regional and cohesion policy. She tells us the story of the EU Commission under President Jacques Santer with regard to the historical development of the preparation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Union Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and the EU-Eastern Enlargement. She touches also controversial aspects of the Santer Commission, which led to her collective demission in 1999. According to Wulf-Mathies the increase of EU's democracy deficit is result of an erosion process of the common institutions caused by the nation states which contributed to their weakness. The democratic substance of the union suffers because of the 'summarization' of the EU decision making processes. Monika Wulf-Mathies argues in favor of the community method, which needs revitalization. She proposes European democracy enforcement and transfers of the national budget und economy policies to EU bodies. This eyewitness talk offers an actual EU analysis as well as an assessment of the Santer Commission.

The European Union and global security: is the EU becoming the indispensable partner? EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 11, April 2014

The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ‘crisis cycle’, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ‘comprehensive approach’). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU’s intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles in addressing conflict situations? This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU’s hesitant role in crisis management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU’s security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at nontraditional security. Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the region.

Promoting the agenda for a social Economic and Monetary Union: Attention, credibility and coalition-building. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 37, November 2014

In the aftermath of the crisis, new instruments of economic governance have been adopted at the EU level. Until recently, these have been strongly dominated by what I assume to be the ECFIN coalition. However, at least since 2011, this coalition’s supremacy has been challenged by the competing coalition’s (EPSCO) willingness to rebalance the economic governance so that social concerns are better taken into account. Hence, drawing on the agenda-setting literature in the EU context, this working paper aims at retracing the process that has led to put this issue of the social dimension of the EMU on to the EU political agenda. Three hypotheses are made concerning the rise of this issue, the strategies employed by agenda-setters, and the policy subsystem of the economic governance. First, this study shows that the interest in this issue has been gradually fostered ‘from below’, at the level of the European Parliament and the European Commission. Second, due to its ‘high politics’ nature, this issue could only be initiated ‘from above’ (European Council) and then expanded to lower levels of decision-making (Commission). Specifically, DG EMPL has managed to attract attention to this issue and to build its credibility in dealing with it by strategically framing the issue and directing it towards the EPSCO venue. Finally, I analyze the outcome of this agenda-setting process by assessing to what extent the two new social scoreboards which form part of this social dimension have been taken into account during the 2014 European semester. The result of this analysis is that the new economic governance has not been genuinely rebalanced insofar as its dominant policy core remains that of the ECFIN coalition.

Banking Union: are the EMU design mistakes being repeated? European Policy Brief No. 12, October 2012

This Policy Brief pleads for an unambiguous commitment by eurozone leaders to establishing a Banking Union that is based on all three of its pillars: common supervision, a single bank resolution authority and a joint deposit insurance. There is a clear risk that the EU will agree on common supervision, but subsequently fails to put in place the remaining elements of its Banking Union. By doing so, the EU would make the same mistake as when it designed EMU, namely, creating a system with built-in flaws that risks leading to huge costs and a questioning of the European project as such.

What if the Next Financial Crisis Hits the Banking Union? A Call for an “If All Else Fails” Clause. European Policy Brief No. 16, September 2013

This Policy Brief argues that the envisaged design of the Banking Union risks not being sufficient to deal with the next large-scale financial crisis. Therefore, an “if all else fails” clause should be approved, stating that the Banking Union members can provide joint last resort financing to deal with a future crisis. An agreement on the clause should be feasible because it is beneficial to all Member States.

Contractual arrangements: the overlooked step towards a fiscal union. European Policy Brief No. 18, December 2013

‘Contractual arrangements’ were proposed as an initial step towards a fiscal union that would consolidate the EMU. At this stage, the debate should be centred on the cornerstone of these contracts: the solidarity mechanism. The form of the financial support should not be limited to loans, and include the possibility for grants. Only the countries with the greatest adjustment needs should benefit from the financial support of other countries. This solidarity could be justified in principle by the intensity of the ‘shocks’ they experienced. In this way, contractual arrangement would facilitate the completion of the necessary adjustment in the current crisis – thanks both to more structural reforms and more mutual support within the eurozone.

The Role of the European Union in the World. European Policy Brief No. 22, March 2014

Despite the hopes raised by the most recent Treaties, the Lisbon Treaty in particular, the European Union has been unable to strengthen, let alone develop its role on the international stage. A couple of weeks away from the European Parliament elections, we need to ask ourselves what can reasonably be done by the upcoming Parliament to ensure that significant progress is made with respect to the EU’s foreign policy. Some of this progress could result from the implementation of the European Security Strategy or originate from the role and initiatives of the High Representative/Vice-president of the Commission. In addition, rethinking specific approaches could allow for significant improvements in key areas such as the EU’s dealings with neighbouring countries, its commercial relationship with the US, its energy security or its common security and defence policy.