Computation of multiple correspondence analysis, with code in R

The generalization of simple correspondence analysis, for two categorical variables, to multiple correspondence analysis where they may be three or more variables, is not straighforward, both from a mathematical and computational point of view. In this paper we detail the exact computational steps involved in performing a multiple correspondence analysis, including the special aspects of adjusting the principal inertias to correct the percentages of inertia, supplementary points and subset analysis. Furthermore, we give the algorithm for joint correspondence analysis where the cross-tabulations of all unique pairs of variables are analysed jointly. The code in the R language for every step of the computations is given, as well as the results of each computation.

Iowa Individual Income Tax Statistical Report 2006

Iowa Individual Income Tax Statistical Report 2006

Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

The impact of tax credits on labour supply

One of the principle aims of the Working Families' Tax Credit in the UK was to increase the participation of single mothers. The literature to date concludes there was approximately a five-percentage-point increase in employment of single mothers. The differences-in-differences methodology that is typically used compares single mother with single women without children. However, the characteristics of these groups are very different, and change over time in relative covariates are likely to violate the identifying assumption. We find that when we control for differential trends between women with and without children, the employment effect of the policy falls significantly. Moreover, the effect is borne solely by those working full-time (30 hours or more), while having no effect on inducing people into the labor market from inactivity. Looking closely at important covariates over time, we can see sizeable changes in the relative returns to employment between the treatment and control groups.

Are tax subsidies for private medical insurance self-financing? Evidence from a microsimulation model for outpatient and inpatient episodes

This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.

Pääministeri R. v. Fieandt 15/3 1958

Kirje

Road Use Tax/Fund Primary Road Fund Budget: Reversions, September 11, 2008

Pursuant to Iowa Code Section 307.46(2) - This is the Iowa Department of Transportation's report on the use of reversions.

Income maintenance programs and multidimensional screening

This paper examines properties of optimal poverty assistance programs under different informational environments using an income maintenanceframework. To that end, we make both the income generating ability andthe disutility of labor of individuals unobservable, and compare theresulting benefit schedules with those of programs found in the UnitedStates since Welfare Reform (1996). We find that optimal programs closelyresemble a Negative Income Tax with a Benefit Reduction rate that dependson the distribution of population characteristics. A policy of workfare(unpaid public sector work) is inefficient when disutility of labor isunobservable, but minimum work requirements (for paid work) may be usedin that same environment. The distortions to work incentives and thepresence of minimum work requirements depend on the observability andrelative importance of the population's characteristics.