Social Work as Laboratory for Normative Professionalisation

In most Western countries, the professional status of social workers is instable and insecure. Of course, most Western countries are themselves instable, ridden with feelings of insecurity and in search of reassurance and promises of control. But social work hardly lends itself as a projection screen for visions of professional control and efficiency in the face of insecurity. On the contrary: within the present cultural and political climate, social work connotes primarily with unpopular social problems, with people unable to cope adequately with the competitiveness and the rate of change of post-industrial societies, that is to say: it connotes more with dependency and helplessness then with autonomy and control. Moreover, whereas public discourse in most Western country is dominated by a neo-liberal perspective and the intricate network of economic, managerial, consumerist and military metaphors connected with it, social work still carries with it a legacy of 'progressive politics' increasingly labeled as outdated and inadequate. Although the values of solidarity and social justice connected with this 'progressive heritage' certainly have not faded away completely, the loudest and most popular voices on the level of public discourse keep underscoring the necessity to adapt to the 'realities' of present-day postindustrial societies and their dependence on economic growth, technological innovation and the dynamics of an ever more competitive world-market. This 'unavoidable' adaptation involves both the 'modernization' and progressive diminishment of 'costly' welfare-state arrangements and a radical reorientation of social work as a profession. Instead of furthering the dependency of clients in the name of solidarity, social workers should stimulate them to face their own responsibilities and help them to function more adequately in a world where individual autonomy and economic progress are dominant values. This shift has far-reaching consequences for the organization of the work itself. Efficiency and transparency are the new code words, professional autonomy is dramatically limited and interventions of social workers are increasingly bound to 'objective' standards of success and cost-effectiveness.

Poverty in Israel

The paper deals with poverty within Israel. Against the background of the history of pre-state Israel and the developments after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 the historical roots of Israeli poverty are analyzed. Thus the ‘socialist’-Zionist project, ethnic exclusion, religious and intra-Jewish ethnic lines of conflict as well as the Bedouins, Druzes and Israeli Arabs as ‘specific’ Israeli citizen are discussed. Despite the economic growth in Israel since 2003 ‘the majority of Israeli wage earners (over 60percent) earned less than $1,450 a month last year’ (Goldstein 2007, p. 1). In 2004 1.3 million Israelis lived below the poverty line, a number which in 2005 increased to more than 1.5 million Israelis. In spite of growing economic prosperity the proportion of families belonging to the working-poor, i.e. families with at least one family member in paid employment, increased from 11.4 percent in 2004 to 12.2 percent in 2005. The percentage of poor families in the working population increased from 40.6 percent to 43.1 percent. Nearly 60 percent of the ‘working-poor’ were working fulltime (Sinai 2006a, Shaoul 2006). 42 percent of Israeli Arab families are living below the poverty line. The average wages are less than half the wages of Ashkenazi Jews. Every second Israeli Arab child lives in poverty. When in 1996 to 2001 the unemployment rate of the Jewish Israelis increased by about 53 percent, the unemployment rate of the Arab Israelis increased by 126 percent (cf. Shaoul 2006). 80 percent of Israelis regard themselves as poor. 23 percent of the pensioners are living below the poverty line. Poverty among children increased in 1988 to 2005 by about 50 percent. Approximately one fifth of all under-age children (714.000) in Israel are suffering from hunger (cf. Shaoul 2006). 75 percent of the poor families cannot afford medicine and 70 percent are dependant on food donations (cf. Sinai 2005b). Nearly one third of the Holocaust survivors are living in poverty. Some of the Holocaust survivors get $ 600,- per month from the German government, whilst other Holocaust survivors receive only $ 350,- per month from the Israeli Ministry of Finance and the Holocaust survivors that immigrated to Israel after 1953 (who amount to 70 percent of the Holocaust survivors in Israel) only receive the general national pension. Nearly 20 percent of the Holocaust survivors are at the present time 86 years and older, 70 percent are older than 76 years. (cf. Medina 2007, p. 1) They are not entitled to a supplementary payment or to compensation. But the problematic economic situation of the Holocaust survivors is neither new information nor an unknown fact. As a result of the precarious situation several are in need of the help of welfare organizations, because they cannot afford to some degree their necessary medicine.

Efforts and Models of Education for Parents: the Danish Approach

The report examines the relationship between day care institutions, schools and so called “parents unfamiliar to education” as well as the relationship between the institutions. With in Danish public and professional discourse concepts like parents unfamiliar to education are usually referring to environments, parents or families with either no or just very restricted experience of education except for the basic school (folkeskole). The “grand old man” of Danish educational research, Prof. Em. Erik Jørgen Hansen, defines the concept as follows: Parents who are distant from or not familiar with education, are parents without tradition of education and by that fact they are not able to contribute constructively in order to back up their own children during their education. Many teachers and pedagogues are not used to that term; they rather prefer concepts like “socially exposed” or “socially disadvantaged” parents or social classes or strata. The report does not only focus on parents who are not capable to support the school achievements of their children, since a low level of education is usually connected with social disadvantage. Such parents are often not capable of understanding and meeting the demands from side of the school when sending their children to school. They lack the competencies or the necessary competence of action. For the moment being much attention is done from side of the Ministries of Education and Social Affairs (recently renamed Ministry of Welfare) in order to create equal possibilities for all children. Many kinds of expertise (directions, counsels, researchers, etc.) have been more than eager to promote recommendations aiming at achieving the ambitious goal: 2015 95% of all young people should complement a full education (classes 10.-12.). Research results are pointing out the importance of increased participation of parents. In other word the agenda is set for ‘parents’ education’. It seems necessary to underline that Danish welfare policy has been changing rather radical. The classic model was an understanding of welfare as social assurance and/or as social distribution – based on social solidarity. The modern model looks like welfare as social service and/or social investment. This means that citizens are changing role – from user and/or citizen to consumer and/or investor. The Danish state is in correspondence with decisions taken by the government investing in a national future shaped by global competition. The new models of welfare – “service” and “investment” – imply severe changes in hitherto known concepts of family life, relationship between parents and children etc. As an example the investment model points at a new implementation of the relationship between social rights and the rights of freedom. The service model has demonstrated that weakness that the access to qualified services in the field of health or education is becoming more and more dependent of the private purchasing power. The weakness of the investment model is that it represents a sort of “The Winner takes it all” – since a political majority is enabled to make agendas in societal fields former protected by the tripartite power and the rights of freedom of the citizens. The outcome of the Danish development seems to be an establishment of a political governed public service industry which on one side are capable of competing on market conditions and on the other are able being governed by contracts. This represents a new form of close linking of politics, economy and professional work. Attempts of controlling education, pedagogy and thereby the population are not a recent invention. In European history we could easily point at several such experiments. The real news is the linking between political priorities and exercise of public activities by economic incentives. By defining visible goals for the public servants, by introducing measurement of achievements and effects, and by implementing a new wage policy depending on achievements and/or effects a new system of accountability is manufactured. The consequences are already perceptible. The government decides to do some special interventions concerning parents, children or youngsters, the public servants on municipality level are instructed to carry out their services by following a manual, and the parents are no longer protected by privacy. Protection of privacy and minority is no longer a valuable argumentation to prevent further interventions in people’s life (health, food, school, etc.). The citizens are becoming objects of investment, also implying that people are investing in their own health, education, and family. This means that investments in changes of life style and development of competences go hand in hand. The below mentioned programmes are conditioned by this shift.

Language in Political Economy and Market Economy: A Case Study of India

The political philosophy underpinning the Indian Constitution is socialist economy in a multilingual political landscape. The Constitution grants some fundamental rights to all citizens regarding language and to linguistic and other minorities regarding education. It also obligates states to use many languages in school education. Restructuring the economy with free market as its pivot and the growing dominance of English in the information driven global economy give rise to policy changes in language use in education, which undermine the Constitutional provisions relating to language, though these changes reflect the manufactured consent of the citizens. This is made possible by the way the Constitution is interpreted by courts with regard to the fundamental rights of equality and non-discrimination when they apply to language. The unique property of language that it can be acquired, unlike other primordial attributes such as ethnicity or caste, comes into play in this interpretation. The result is that the law of the market takes over the law of the land.

‘Continue or terminate?’ Determinants of long-term volunteering in sports clubs

This study analyzed the determinants underlying sports club volunteers' tendencies to continue or terminate their long-term commitment to volunteering in order to help sports clubs improve their volunteer management. Their risk of terminating was viewed in terms of subjective expectations and evaluations (satisfaction) regarding club-related working conditions and normative commitments (solidarity) to the sports club. These relationships were tested empirically with an online questionnaire of 441 sports club volunteers in a selection of 45 Swiss sports clubs. Results showed that the constructs orientation toward collective solidarity and volunteer job satisfaction correlated positively with long-term volunteering commitment. The effect of the former was stronger than that of the latter. Volunteers with a higher orientation toward collective solidarity were unlikely to terminate their voluntary engagement in their club. The discussion presents recommendations to help clubs retain volunteers.

Socialism and intrafirm asset allocation

We rely on a survey of Swiss firms to document deviation from first-best for reasons of internal 'fairness' when allicating resources. This 'socialist' practice is more widespread in smaller than in larger firms. It ignores the reputation and past performance of the managers who apply for dunding, but takes into account their hierarchical position and their past use of resources. Socialism is only partially explained by concerns about empire building and managerial optimism, and it is not meant to benefit shareholders.

Das radikale Milieu im vorrevolutionären Russland

This article traces the networks in the Russian revolutionary underground from the 1860s untill 1917 and subsumes them under the term radical milieu. Though there existed ideological differences all Russian radicals shared a common identity as „anti-society“ against the tsarist regime. In the radical milieu with its own values the participants tried to create their own reality, where all members regardless of their social origin or sex were seen as equal. The radical milieu was backed by a sphere of sympathisers that constituted the main source of material support and the main recruiting field. But the radicals were very careful when selecting new members for their underground world. Applicants had to fulfil defined criteria. The radical milieu in Russia was in a permanent danger to be infiltrated by the secret police. This situation between fear and hope was the background where ideas of solidarity but also visions of violence and revenge against the “traitors” were ripening and then became realised.

Adult parent-child relationships: Relationship quality, support, and reciprocity

In accordance with Bengtson's model of intergenerational solidarity (e.g. Bengtson & Roberts, 1991), the interrelations between adult daughters' family values, their perception of the relationship quality with their parents, the support they reported to give to and to receive from their parents, and their perception of reciprocity in intergenerational support exchange were investigated for N = 265 middle-aged women in Germany. It was also asked whether the support given to parents and perceived reciprocity are related to daughters' felt burden as a result of their support. Cross-sectional, self-report data were examined with multiple and multinomial logistic regression analyses. The analyses revealed positive relations between family values, relationship quality, and support to parents. Perceived reciprocity was associated with the exchange of intergenerational support and imbalance in support had negative effects on the relationship quality. Felt burden was predicted by the extent of support and the perceived reciprocity. However, specific correlational patterns depending on the kind of support as well as differences in the importance of mother and father occurred. The findings are discussed against the background of the meaning of family obligations and reciprocity in a Western culture.

Risk adjustment in aging societies

Background In Switzerland, age is the predominant driver of solidarity transfers in risk adjustment (RA). Concerns have been voiced regarding growing imbalances in cost sharing between young and old insured due to demographic changes (larger fraction of elderly >65 years and rise in average age). Particularly young adults aged 19–25 with limited incomes have to shoulder increasing solidarity burdens. Between 1996 and 2011, monthly intergenerational solidarity payments for young adults have doubled from CHF 87 to CHF 182, which corresponds to the highest absolute transfer increase of all age groups. Results By constructing models for age-specific RA growth and for calculating the lifetime sum of RA transfers we investigated the causes and consequences of demographic changes on RA payments. The models suggest that the main driver for RA increases in the past was below average health care expenditure (HCE) growth in young adults, which was only half as high (average 2% per year) compared with older adults (average 4% per year). Shifts in age group distributions were only accountable for 2% of the CHF 95 rise in RA payments. Despite rising risk adjustment debts for young insured the balance of lifetime transfers remains positive as long as HCE growth rates are greater than the discount rate used in this model (3%). Moreover, the life-cycle model predicts that the lifetime rate of return on RA payments may even be further increased by demographic changes. Nevertheless, continued growth of RA contributions may overwhelm vulnerable age groups such as young adults. We therefore propose methods to limit the burden of social health insurance for specific age groups (e.g. young adults in Switzerland) by capping solidarity payments. Conclusions Taken together, our mathematical modelling framework helps to gain a better understanding of how demographic changes interact with risk adjustment and how redistribution of funds between age groups can be controlled without inducing further selection incentives. Those methods can help to construct more equitable systems of health financing in light of population aging.

Where Empires Meet: Orientalism and Marginality at the Former Russo-British Frontier

This article explores the intersection of orientalism and marginality in two regions at the former Russo-British frontier between Central and South Asia. Focussing on Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan and Gilgit-Baltistan in today’s Pakistan, an analysis of historical and contemporary orientalist projections on and in the two border regions reveals changing modes of domination through the course of the twentieth century (British, Kashmiri, Pakistani and Russian, Soviet, Tajik). In this regard, different local experiences of “ colonial ” rule, both in Gorno-Badakhshan and Gilgit-Baltistan, challenge “ classical ” periodisations of colonial/postcolonial and colonial/socialist/postsocialist. This article furthermore maintains that processes of marginalisation in both regions can be interpreted as effects of imperial and Cold War contexts that have led to the establishment of the frontier. Thus, a central argument is that neither the status of the frontier between Central and South Asia as a stable entity, nor the periodisations that have conventionally been ascribed to the two regions as linear timelines can be taken for granted.