Avoidance Policies – A New Conceptual Framework

This paper develops a general theoretical framework within which a heterogeneous group taxpayers confront a market that supplies a variety of schemes for reducing tax liability, and uses this framework to explore the impact of a wide range of anti-avoidance policies. Schemes differ in their legal effectiveness and hence in the risks to which they expose taxpayers - risks which go beyond the risk of audit considered in the conventional literature on evasion. Given the individual taxpayer’s circumstances, the prices charged for the schemes and the policy environment, the model predicts (i) whether or not any given taxpayer will acquire a scheme, and (ii) if they do so, which type of scheme they will acquire. The paper then analyses how these decisions, and hence the tax gap, are influenced by four generic types of policy: Disclosure – earlier information leading to faster closure of loopholes; Penalties – introduction of penalties for failed avoidance; Policy Design – fundamental policy changes that design out opportunities for avoidance; Product Register - the introduction of GAARs or mini-GAARs that give greater clarity about how different types of scheme will be treated. The paper shows that when considering the indirect/behavioural effects of policies on the tax gap it is important to recognise that these operate on two different margins. First policies will have deterrence effects – their impact on the quantum of taxpayers choosing to acquire different types schemes as distinct to acquiring no scheme at all. There will be a range of such deterrence effects reflecting the range of schemes available in the market. But secondly, since different schemes generate different tax gaps, policies will also have switching effects as they induce taxpayers who previously acquired one type of scheme to acquire another. The first three types of policy generate positive deterrence effects but differ in the switching effects they produce. The fourth type of policy produces mixed deterrence effects.

Shocks, Monetary Policy and Institutions: Explaining Unemployment Persistence in Persistence in “Europe” and the United States

This paper examines the rise in European unemployment since the 1970s by introducing endogenous growth into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and unemployment. We subject the model to an uncorrelated cost push shock, in order to mimic a scenario akin to the one faced by central banks at the end of the 1970s. Monetary policy implements a disinfl ation by following an interest feedback rule calibrated to an estimate of a Bundesbank reaction function. 40 quarters after the shock has vanished, unemployment is still about 1.8 percentage points above its steady state. Our model also broadly reproduces cross country differences in unemployment by drawing on cross country differences in the size of cost push shock and the associated disinfl ation, the monetary policy reaction function and the wage setting structure.

Structural Interactions in Spatial Panels

Until recently, much effort has been devoted to the estimation of panel data regression models without adequate attention being paid to the drivers of diffusion and interaction across cross section and spatial units. We discuss some new methodologies in this emerging area and demonstrate their use in measurement and inferences on cross section and spatial interactions. Specifically, we highlight the important distinction between spatial dependence driven by unobserved common factors and those based on a spatial weights matrix. We argue that, purely factor driven models of spatial dependence may be somewhat inadequate because of their connection with the exchangeability assumption. Limitations and potential enhancements of the existing methods are discussed, and several directions for new research are highlighted.

Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit

This paper examines the optimal design of climate change policies in the context where governments want to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the carbon taxes and other environmental policies that could in principle stimulate such investment will be imposed over a very long future. The conventional claim by environmental economists is that environmental policies alone are sufficient to induce firms to undertake optimal investment. However this argument requires governments to be able to commit to these future taxes, and it is far from clear that governments have this degree of commitment. We assume instead that governments cannot commit, and so both they and the private sector have to contemplate the possibility of there being governments in power in the future that give different (relative) weights to the environment. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect. Compared to the situation where governments can commit it increases the incentive of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the incentive of the private sector to invest. Consequently governments may need to use additional policy instruments – such as R&D subsidies – to stimulate the required investment.

The Taylor Principle and (In-) Determinacy in a New Keynesian Model with hiring Frictions and Skill Loss

We introduce duration dependent skill decay among the unemployed into a New-Keynesian model with hiring frictions developed by Blanchard/Gali (2008). If the central bank responds only to (current, lagged or expected future) inflation and quarterly skill decay is above a threshold level, determinacy requires a coefficient on inflation smaller than one. The threshold level is plausible with little steady-state hiring and firing ("Continental European Calibration") but implausibly high in the opposite case ("American calibration"). Neither interest rate smoothing nor responding to the output gap helps to restore determinacy if skill decay exceeds the threshold level. However, a modest response to unemployment guarantees determinacy. Moreover, under indeterminacy, both an adverse sunspot shock and an adverse technology shock increase unemployment extremely persistently.

Institutions and the Scale Effect

Growth models which imply a scale effect are commonly refuted on the basis of empirical evidence. A focus on the extent of the market as opposed to the scale of the country has led recent studies to reconsider the role that country scale plays when conditioning on other factors. We consider a variant of a simple learning by doing model to account for the potential role for institutions in determining the strength – and direction – of the scale effect. Using cross-country data, we find a significant interaction between property rights institutions and the effect of scale on long-run growth: In countries with poor property rights institutions, scale is positively related with income per capita; where property rights institutions are good, higher scale is associated with lower per capita ncomes. We find no evidence of such role for contracting institutions.

Understanding Interactions in Social Networks and Committees

While much of the literature on cross section dependence has focused mainly on estimation of the regression coefficients in the underlying model, estimation and inferences on the magnitude and strength of spill-overs and interactions has been largely ignored. At the same time, such inferences are important in many applications, not least because they have structural interpretations and provide useful interpretation and structural explanation for the strength of any interactions. In this paper we propose GMM methods designed to uncover underlying (hidden) interactions in social networks and committees. Special attention is paid to the interval censored regression model. Our methods are applied to a study of committee decision making within the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee.

Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability

We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.

Moody choice

If choices depend on the decision maker's mood, is the attempt to derive any consistency in choice doomed? In this paper we argue that, even with full unpredictability of mood, the way choices from a menu relate to choices from another menu exhibits some structure. We present two alternative models of 'moody choice' and show that, in either of them, not all choice patterns are possible. Indeed, we characterise both models in terms of consistency requirements of the observed choice data.

Endogenous Price Flexibility and Optimal Monetary Policy

Much of the literature on optimal monetary policy uses models in which the degree of nominal price flexibility is exogenous. There are, however, good reasons to suppose that the degree of price flexibility adjusts endogenously to changes in monetary conditions. This paper extends the standard New Keynesian model to incorporate an endogenous degree of price flexibility. The model shows that endogenising the degree of price flexibility tends to shift optimal monetary policy towards complete inflation stabilisation, even when shocks take the form of cost-push disturbances. This contrasts with the standard result obtained in models with exogenous price flexibility, which show that optimal monetary policy should allow some degree of inflation volatility in order to stabilise the welfarerelevant output gap.

Local Currency Pricing, Foreign Monetary Shocks and Exchange Rate Policy

The implications of local currency pricing (LCP) for monetary regime choice are analysed for a country facing foreign monetary shocks. In this analysis expenditure switching is potentially welfare reducing. This contrasts with the existing LCP literature, which focuses on productivity shocks and thus analyses a world where expenditure switching is welfare enhancing. This paper shows that, when home and foreign producers follow LCP, expenditure switching is absent and a floating rate is preferred by the home country. But when only home producers follow LCP, expenditure switching is present and a fixed rate can be welfare enhancing for the home country.

Scotland: A New Fiscal Settlement

Executive Summary Many commentators have criticised the strategy currently used to finance the Scottish Parliament – both the block grant system, and the small degree of fiscal autonomy devised in the Calman report and the UK government’s 2009 White Paper. Nevertheless, fiscal autonomy has now been conceded in principle. This paper sets out to identify formally what level of autonomy would be best for the Scottish economy and the institutional changes needed to support that arrangement. Our conclusions are in line with the Steel Commission: that significantly more fiscal powers need to be transferred to Scotland. But what we can then do, which the Steel Commission could not, is to give a detailed blueprint for how this proposal might be implemented in practice. We face two problems. The existing block grant system can and has been criticised from such a wide variety of points of view that it effectively has no credibility left. On the other hand, the Calman proposals (and the UK government proposals that followed) are unworkable because, to function, they require information that the policy makers cannot possibly have; and because, without borrowing for current activities, they contain no mechanism to reconcile contractual spending (most of the budget) with variable revenue flows – which is to invite an eventual breakdown. But in its attempt to fix these problems, the UK White Paper introduces three further difficulties: new grounds for quarrels between the UK and Scottish governments, a long term deflation bias, and a loss of devolution.

Infrastructure Finance and Industrial Takeoff in England

That financial matters did not constrain industrial takeoff in the UK is generally accepted in the historical literature; in contrast, contemporary empirical analyses have found evidence that financial development can be a causal determinant of economic growth. We look to reconcile these findings by concentrating on a particular aspect of industrialising UK where inefficiencies in finance could have had bite: The finance of physical infrastructures. We document the historical record and develop the importance of spatial disaggregation and spillovers in both technological and financial development. We develop a simple model that captures the nature of infrastructure finance within a theory of endogenous growth where financial costs are endogenous. We argue that the conception of the finance-growth nexus as a largely static, aggregative phenomenon misses out a good deal of complexity and we relate that complexity to a number of implications for regulation of both financial systems and the emergence of infrastructures

Second-Order Approximation to the Rotemberg Model around a Distorted Steady State

Less is known about social welfare objectives when it is costly to change prices, as in Rotemberg (1982), compared with Calvo-type models. We derive a quadratic approximate welfare function around a distorted steady state for the costly price adjustment model. We highlight the similarities and differences to the Calvo setup. Both models imply inflation and output stabilization goals. It is explained why the degree of distortion in the economy influences inflation aversion in the Rotemberg framework in a way that differs from the Calvo setup.

Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations

This paper studies the implications for monetary policy of heterogeneous expectations in a New Keynesian model. The assumption of rational expectations is replaced with parsimonious forecasting models where agents select between predictors that are underparameterized. In a Misspecification Equilibrium agents only select the best-performing statistical models. We demonstrate that, even when monetary policy rules satisfy the Taylor principle by adjusting nominal interest rates more than one for one with inflation, there may exist equilibria with Intrinsic Heterogeneity. Under certain conditions, there may exist multiple misspecification equilibria. We show that these findings have important implications for business cycle dynamics and for the design of monetary policy.