Law and the power of feminism: how marriage lost its power to oppress women

In Feminism and the Power of Law Carol Smart argued that feminists should use non-legal strategies rather than looking to law to bring about women’s liberation. This article seeks to demonstrate that, as far as marriage is concerned, she was right. Statistics and contemporary commentary show how marriage, once the ultimate and only acceptable status for women, has declined in social significance to such an extent that today it is a mere lifestyle choice. This is due to many factors, including the ‘sexual revolution’ of the 1960s, improved education and job opportunities for women, and divorce law reform, but the catalyst for change was the feminist critique that called for the abandonment (rather than the reform) of the institution and made the unmarried state possible for women. I conclude that this loss of significance has been more beneficial to British women in terms of the possibility of ‘liberation’ than appeals for legal change and recognition, and that we should continue to be wary of looking to law to solve women’s problems.

Law of large numbers for super-brownian motions with a single point source

We investigate the super-Brownian motion with a single point source in dimensions 2 and 3 as constructed by Fleischmann and Mueller in 2004. Using analytic facts we derive the long time behavior of the mean in dimension 2 and 3 thereby complementing previous work of Fleischmann, Mueller and Vogt. Using spectral theory and martingale arguments we prove a version of the strong law of large numbers for the two dimensional superprocess with a single point source and finite variance.

Online data processing consent under EU law: a theoretical framework and empirical evidence from the UK

This article analyses the results of an empirical study on the 200 most popular UK-based websites in various sectors of e-commerce services. The study provides empirical evidence on unlawful processing of personal data. It comprises a survey on the methods used to seek and obtain consent to process personal data for direct marketing and advertisement, and a test on the frequency of unsolicited commercial emails (UCE) received by customers as a consequence of their registration and submission of personal information to a website. Part One of the article presents a conceptual and normative account of data protection, with a discussion of the ethical values on which EU data protection law is grounded and an outline of the elements that must be in place to seek and obtain valid consent to process personal data. Part Two discusses the outcomes of the empirical study, which unveils a significant departure between EU legal theory and practice in data protection. Although a wide majority of the websites in the sample (69%) has in place a system to ask separate consent for engaging in marketing activities, it is only 16.2% of them that obtain a consent which is valid under the standards set by EU law. The test with UCE shows that only one out of three websites (30.5%) respects the will of the data subject not to receive commercial communications. It also shows that, when submitting personal data in online transactions, there is a high probability (50%) of incurring in a website that will ignore the refusal of consent and will send UCE. The article concludes that there is severe lack of compliance of UK online service providers with essential requirements of data protection law. In this respect, it suggests that there is inappropriate standard of implementation, information and supervision by the UK authorities, especially in light of the clarifications provided at EU level.

Unwritten law in Hobbesian political thought

In Hobbesian terminology, ‘unwritten laws’ are natural laws enforced within a polity, by a non-sovereign judge, without some previous public promulgation. This article discusses the idea in the light of successive Hobbesian accounts of ‘law’ and ‘obligation’. Between De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes dropped the idea that natural law is strictly speaking law, but he continued to believe unwritten laws must form a part of any legal system. He was unable to explain how such a law could claim a legal status. His loyalty to the notion, in spite of all the trouble that it caused, is a sign of his belief that moral knowledge is readily accessible to all.