Cuba’s Role in Venezuela’s Control of the Internet and Online Social Networks

The arrival of Cuba’s Information Technology (IT) and Communications Minister Ramiro Valdés to Venezuela in the Spring of 2010 to serve as a ‘consultant’ to the Venezuelan government awakened a new reality in that country. Rampant with deep economic troubles, escalating crime, a murder rate that has doubled since Chávez took over in 1999, and an opposition movement led by university students and other activists who use the Internet as their primary weapon, Venezuela has resorted to Cuba for help. In a country where in large part traditional media outlets have been censored or are government-controlled, the Internet and its online social networks have become the place to obtain, as well as disseminate, unfiltered information. As such, Internet growth and use of its social networks has skyrocketed in Venezuela, making it one of Latin America’s highest Web users. Because of its increased use to spark political debate among Venezuelans and publish information that differs with the official government line, Chávez has embarked on an initiative to bring the Internet to the poor and others who would otherwise not have access, by establishing government-sponsored Internet Info Centers throughout the country, to disseminate information to his followers. With the help of Cuban advisors, who for years have been a part of Venezuela’s defense, education, and health care initiatives, Chávez has apparently taken to adapting Cuba’s methodology for the control of information. He has begun to take special steps toward also controlling the type of information flowing through the country’s online social networks, considering the implementation of a government-controlled single Internet access point in Venezuela. Simultaneously, in adapting to Venezuela’s Internet reality, Chávez has engaged online by creating his own Twitter account in an attempt to influence public opinion, primarily of those who browse the Web. With a rapidly growing following that may soon reach one million subscribers, Chávez claims to have set up his own online trench to wage cyber space battle.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

The Basis of Support for Hugo Chávez: Measuring the Determinants of Presidential Job Approval in Venezuela

Since 1999, Venezuela has experienced a dramatic transformation of its political system with the coming to power of Hugo Chávez and his movement, known in Venezuela as Chavismo. Chávez has dismantled the previous political system and established neo-populist structures that rely on his personal appeal and the close collaboration of the armed forces. Chávez has relied heavily on significant support from the poor and those who felt economically and politically excluded by the “Punto Fijo system.” President Chávez has built an impressive record of electoral victories; winning every electoral contest except one since coming to power in 1999. He continues to receive relatively high levels of support among sectors of Venezuelan society. However, there is evidence of growing discontent with high crime rates, high levels of inflation, and significant corruption in the public administration. Using data from the AmericasBarometer surveys conducted in 2007, 2008 and 2010, this paper seeks to examine the basis of Chávez’s popular support. In general, the AmericasBarometer findings suggest that Venezuelans support for President Chávez is closely linked to the access to social programs and that as long as the government is able to fund these social programs or missions, particularly MERCAL and Barrio Adentro, it will possess an important tool to garner and sustain support for President Chávez. Our analysis, however, also indicates that evaluations of the national economic situation, more than crime or insecurity, are a key factor that could undermine support for the regime.

Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish-Speaking Latin America

Despite significant concern among policy, law enforcement and intelligence communities in the United States (U.S.) over the possible spread of radical Islamist thought throughout the world as part of a global jihad movement, there has been little investigation into the growing cyber networks in Latin America that promote strong anti-Semitic and anti-U.S. messages. This paper offers an overview of that network, focusing on the structure of Shi’ite websites that promote not only religious conversion but are also supportive of Iran -- a designated State-sponsor of terrorism – its nuclear program. Hezbollah, and the “Bolivarian revolution” led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and his allies in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. There is also a smaller group of Sunni Muslim websites, mostly tied to the legacy organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of the Shi’ite websites are linked to each other consistently portray Israel as a Nazi State, and the United States as an imperialist war monger. The Palestinian issue is frequently juxtaposed with the anti-imperialist struggle that those states supporting Chávez’ Bolivarian revolution claim to wage against the United States. Some of the Islamist websites claim thousands of new convert, but such claims are difficult to verify. Most of the websites visited touted the conversion of one or two individuals as significant victories and signs of progress, implying that there are few, if any, mass conversions. While conducting this research, no websites directly claiming to be linked to Hezbollah were found, although there numerous sites hosted by that group that were active until around 2006. Several of the inactive links are supportive of Hezbollah as a political party. No websites linked to al Qaeda were found. Yet a substantial Internet network remains operational. Much of the outreach for Shi’ite Muslims, closely tied to Iran, is sponsored on numerous websites across the region, including El Salvador, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia. Numerous Facebook forums for discussion are also hosted around Latin America. These links must be viewed in the context of the rapidly expanding diplomatic, intelligence, political and economic ties of Iran in recent years with the self-proclaimed Bolivarian states. Given the sparse literature available and the rich vein of un-mined information on the sites cited as well as others that one could find with additional research, the cyber network of Islamist groups remains one of the least understood or studied facets of their presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. It merits significantly more investigation.

Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions

Three key states are relevant in considering future nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. For historical and geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to reactive nuclear weapons programs. Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chávez, has repeatedly demonstrated interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela lacks any serious nuclear expertise. Even if it had the managerial and technological capacity, the lead-time to develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from international sources would be difficult because members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards, and potential non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suppliers are highly surveilled, risking the exposure of such a program before Venezuela could put a deterrent into place. While South American states have historically opposed nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation. Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security community. On the other hand, Venezuela under President Chávez is perceived as a revisionist power seeking a transformation of the international system. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and Colombia, and it would prompt nuclear weapons development by Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for reasons of preserving regional leadership and prestige than for fear of a Venezuelan threat.

The effects of age, ethnicity, sexual dysfunction, urinary incontinence, masculinity, and relationship with the partner on the quality of life of men with prostate cancer

Prostate cancer, the leading cause of cancer in men, has positive survival rates and constitutes a challenge to men with its side effects. Studies have addressed the bivaritate relationships between prostate cancer treatment side effects masculinity, partner relationship, and quality of life (QOL). However, few studies have highlighted the relationships among prostate cancer treatment side effects (i.e., sexual dysfunction, urinary incontinence), masculinity, and relationship with the partner together on QOL in men. Most studies were conducted with predominately Caucasian sample of men. Miami is a unique multiethnic setting that hosts Cuban, Columbian, Venezuelan, Haitian, other Latin American and Caribbean communities that were not represented in previous literature. The purpose of this study was to examine relative contributions of age, ethnicity, sexual dysfunction, urinary incontinence, masculinity, and perception of the relationship with the partner on the quality of life in men diagnosed with prostate cancer. Data were collected using self administered questionnaires measuring demographic variables, sexual and urinary functioning (UCLA PCI), masculinity (CMNI), partner relationship (DAS), and QOL (SF-36). A total of 117 partnered heterosexual men diagnosed with prostate cancer were recruited from four urology clinics in Miami, Florida. Men were 67.47 (SD = 8.42) years old and identified themselves to be of Hispanic origin (54.3 %, n = 63). Findings demonstrated that there was a significant moderate negative relationship between urinary and sexual functioning of men. There was a significant strong negative association between men's perceived relationship with partner and masculinity. There was a weak negative relationship between the partner relationship and QOL. Hierarchal multiple regression showed that the partner relationship (β = -.25, t (91) = -2.28, p = .03) significantly contributed overall to QOL. These findings highlight the importance of the relationship satisfaction in the QOL of men with prostate cancer. Nursing interventions to enhance QOL for these men should consider strengthening the relationship and involving the female partner as an active participant.^

An analysis of Venezuela's foreign policy during the period of the Betancourt doctrine and Caldera's ideological pluralism

This thesis examines the foreign policy of Venezuela during the period of the Betancourt Doctrine (1945-1948 and 1959-1963), and Caldera's Ideological Pluralism (1969-1973). The study seeks to determine whether, and to what extent the pursuit of political and economic interests and ideology determined Venezuela's foreign policy. Based on primary and secondary sources, this study examines political economy and ideology and how these affected the outcome of Venezuela's foreign policy. The major finding of this thesis is that Venezuelan foreign policy was a pragmatic one but it was rationalized within an ideological framework. In fact, Venezuela was most concerned in pursuing its domestic economic and political interests but these were hidden behind an ideological facade.

Race Relations & Politics in Venezuela during Punto Fijo (1958 – 1998)

In 1998, Hugo Chávez Frías’ presidential candidacy brought race to national discussion in Venezuela for first time since 1945. For long, the country’s politics had abided by the myth of racial harmony and racial democracy. This approach pointed to institutional separation in the United States and Africa as examples of true racism. Latin America was largely void of such atrocities. Nonetheless, Chávez claimed the present political parties (Acción Democrática, Copei and Unión Republicana Democrática) disenfranchised the common, colored Venezuelan. He continued to assert the opposition’s racism during his presidency. And his political fanbase agrees. A variety of scholars have studied the break from Punto Fijo politics to the Bolivarian Revolution. Yet, few have linked the obvious class struggle to race. Here, I seek to explain how racial identity has shaped class identity in Venezuela by closely examining the Punto Fijo era (1958-1998). The essay begins with an overview of historical race relations, moving to the period in focus. Then, I examine systematic and institutional exclusion under Punto Fijo politics. The object is to understand the merit of Chávez’s racial claims since 1998. Hence, the study also sees democracy in action and the consequences of racial exclusion. The study will be accomplished through secondary research, considering the limitations brought by working abroad. In the end, this study serves as first step in analyzing the fall of what was once considered Latin America’s most durable democracy.

Race Relations & Politics in Venezuela during Punto Fijo (1958 – 1998)

In 1998, Hugo Chávez Frías’ presidential candidacy brought race to national discussion in Venezuela for first time since 1945. For long, the country’s politics had abided by the myth of racial harmony and racial democracy. This approach pointed to institutional separation in the United States and Africa as examples of true racism. Latin America was largely void of such atrocities. Nonetheless, Chávez claimed the present political parties (Acción Democrática, Copei and Unión Republicana Democrática) disenfranchised the common, colored Venezuelan. He continued to assert the opposition’s racism during his presidency. And his political fanbase agrees. A variety of scholars have studied the break from Punto Fijo politics to the Bolivarian Revolution. Yet, few have linked the obvious class struggle to race. Here, I seek to explain how racial identity has shaped class identity in Venezuela by closely examining the Punto Fijo era (1958-1998). The essay begins with an overview of historical race relations, moving to the period in focus. Then, I examine systematic and institutional exclusion under Punto Fijo politics. The object is to understand the merit of Chávez’s racial claims since 1998. Hence, the study also sees democracy in action and the consequences of racial exclusion. The study will be accomplished through secondary research, considering the limitations brought by working abroad. In the end, this study serves as first step in analyzing the fall of what was once considered Latin America’s most durable democracy.

A geração de 27 e o barroco: la mirada exuberante

From the context of the degree‘s creation of Spanish literature and language‘s course, at UFRN, came the motivation to make this research, that presents a literary study of a poet‘s group known as Generación del 27, that came in to light at Spain, on 1920. A lot of aspects of this study are themes of many others disciplines, of this degree (Spanish Literature II, IberianAmerican Literature, Spanish Culture, Translation in Spanish Language). This work will also serve as inspiration to new reflections and proposes of translations, as bridges between the language that goes and the other that comes. It is the Translation as comprehension‘s negotiation between languages, it is the decir casi lo mismo, here in poem‘s form (ECO, 2007), in the attempt to conclude new learning, that will be shared with undergraduate and graduate students, being at teaching area, extension or new researches. To contextualize this generation‘s studies, were elected the anthologies organized by Gerardo Diego, called Poesía Española (Antologías), published on 2007, by Ediciones Cátedras, and the Antología Comentada de La Generación del 27, wrote by Víctor García de La Concha, published on 2006, by Editorial Espasa Calpe. The research took Generacion Del 27 as their object of research and - from many others critical reading about the poetry made by those young poets, their creative vocation of aesthetics and vanguard – wanted to understand the context of literary‘s creation of those poets del 27. We form our foundation with contributions by Antonio Maravall (2009), Eugenio D‘ors (s.d) Severo Sarduy (1999), Lezama Lima (2011), Alfonso Reyes (1958) e Deleuze (2005) among others that brought the comprehension of the baroque‘s language, giving emphasis to pluridirectional movement, deconstructing it‘s linearity, creating others new forms, as returns, circles, spirals favoring encounters, detachment or equal points of departure and arrivals. In this way, the poets del 27 approached the baroque of six hundred on a re-reading, and made of the third centenary‘s celebration of the Góngora‘s a Mirada exuberante death, to the return of baroque‘s spirit. Alfonso Reyes e Rubén Darío said that real lights highlighted the paths of this poets generation: The light that desdobra scintillates on García Lorca, Jorge Gullén, Dámaso Alonso, Gerardo Diego and the bullfighter Ignacio Sánchez Mejías, poets that expressed tributes in big style to Soledades author, at Madrid‘s Caffe and all Spain.

Terra de charneca erma e de saudade: a construção simbólica do Alentejo português na obra de Florbela Espanca (1916-1930)

In this work, we investigate the symbolic construction of a particular spatiality, starting from the theoretical assumption that spaces are subjective constructions guided by different cultures, feelings and rationales, but mostly spaces are human constructs driven by social relations, as a result of the material investment and symbol that reflects the needs of a particular society at a given time of historical development. Accordingly, we analyze the construction and symbolic imagery of the central region of Portugal, the Alentejo, from the literary production (1916 – 1930) the English poet Florbela Espanca D'Alma Conception Espanca. Thus, we propose to analyze the florbelian work not only from its internal relations, but also external, emphasizing the link between history, space and literature. Thus, we propose to inquire about the symbolic dimension – the meanings of images and representations – which prompted one of the most controversial Portuguese poets of the early twentieth to look into the poetic construction of space Alentejo century, questioning not only the senses brokered by speech literary Florbela Espanca to invent your Alentejo, adorned with memories, pain and longing, but investigate how the socio-cultural environment influenced your work, in your life and ways to feel and live the Alentejo. To better understand how the poet means the Alentejo spatiality, throughout this work we question three categories of space in the work of Florbela Espanca: the region, the countryside and the landscape of the Alentejo. Thus, this research falls within the field of cultural history in the medical we will work with the entire literary output Florbela Espanca, letters, diaries, photos and biographical and literary criticism, by establishing the time frame of 1916 – beginning of intellectual activity Florbela Spank – the 1930 – publication of Blossom Heath (posthumous) and the suicide of the poet. Therefore, a constant symbolic exercise of words crossed by more subjective feelings of the subject, all the time our work will be guided by the question of what would be the Alentejo for the poet, who senses and meanings across this spatiality that marked so sovereignly happiest memories and sad life Florbela Espanca.

Narrativas poéticas e trajetórias dos poetas em Mossoró/RN

The city of Mossoro/RN has showed up as a “cultural capital” in the state of Rio Grande do Norte due to a politic of events that enhance historical facts occurred in that region. These actions evoke researches about a construction of a self-identity of the city and attract many tourists that provides a boost to local economy. Considering this, this paper aims to understand the insertion of poets in this cultural context, analyzing the cultural performances that they participate and their personal narratives. Semi-structured interviews and participant observation in cultural events were employed to get this aim, privileging the observation of popular poets, whose presentations are more frequent. This overview took to the approximation with two artists associations, of which the interviewed poets were selected: “POEMA – Associação de Poetas e Prosadores de Mossoró” and “Casa do Cantador”. The relationship observed among the artists of these institutions – writers, improvisers, cordel makers, musicians and “emboladores de coco” – raised questions about the complexity of popular culture and the social connections among the artists of the city, discussed in this study.

Women of the year award recipients, from left to right: Cicely Tyson, Pearl Bailey, and Maya Angelou

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Poet May Sarton

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Daniela Gioseffi, Feminist poet and belly dancer

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.